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IETF 76 – Hiroshima Internet Draft : EAP-BIO

IETF 76 – Hiroshima Internet Draft : EAP-BIO. Pascal URIEN – Telecom ParisTech Christophe KIENNERT – Telecom ParisTech. Introduction. Combine EAP-TTLS with Biometry Project developed for particular security conditions Administrative restricted access in sensitive areas Main ideas :

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IETF 76 – Hiroshima Internet Draft : EAP-BIO

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  1. IETF 76 – HiroshimaInternet Draft : EAP-BIO Pascal URIEN – Telecom ParisTech Christophe KIENNERT – Telecom ParisTech

  2. Introduction • Combine EAP-TTLS with Biometry • Project developed for particular security conditions • Administrative restricted access in sensitive areas • Main ideas : • EAP-TTLS offers many choices for authentication protocols during Phase 2 • Advantages of biometry combined with the security of EAP-TTLS • Digital signatures added using smartcards

  3. EAP-TTLS Server certificate User profiles 802.1X RADIUS RADIUS Access point RADIUS Server HOME RADIUS Server EAP-TTLS Login, Password

  4. EAP-BIO EAP-TTLS session initiation User SmartCard Phase 1 : Mutual Authentication Client certificate Server certificate Server Biometric authentication Signed fingerprint Phase 2 : Biometric authentication Biometric reader AVP encapsulating the signed fingerprint Session Keys : f(Master_Secret, Client_Random, Server_Random)

  5. Mutual authentication – Phase 1 Client Access Point Radius Server EAPOL-Start EAP-Request/Identity EAP-Response/Identity RADIUS(Access-Request) EAP-Request/TTLS-Start RADIUS(Access-Challenge) EAP-Response/ClientHello RADIUS(Access-Request) RADIUS(Access-Challenge)/ ServerHello, Certificate, ServerKeyExchange, ServerHelloDone EAP-Request/TTLS EAP-Response/ClientKeyExchange, Certificate, ChangeCipherSpec, Finished RADIUS(Access-Request) EAP-Request/TTLS RADIUS(Access-Challenge)/ ChangeCipherSpec, Finished

  6. Authentification – Phase 2 Client Access point Radius Server EAP-Response/ {Biometric fingerprint, timestamp, signatures} Verification of authentication data RADIUS(Access-Request) EAP-Success RADIUS(Access-Accept)

  7. EAP-BIO : Phase 1 • Phase 1 : Mutual authentication • Need of a client certificate • Can be stored on a smartcard along with the RSA private key • The card is used to initiate the EAP-TTLS session

  8. EAP-BIO : Phase 2 • Phase 2 : Biometric authentication • Biometric fingerprint encapsulated in AVPs with CBEFF format • Can be used on a 1:N or a 1:1 authentication • A 1:1 authentication is more performant • EAP-BIO performs a 1:1 authentication since the identity of the user is known through Phase 1 • Security problems to be solved about biometry • Certify the fingerprint issued by the biometric reader • Certify the voluntary action of the user • The reader must be secure (prevent the use false fingerprints)

  9. Security of EAP-BIO • Use of smartcards and digital signatures • Sign the fingerprint issued by the reader • Insert a timestamp to prevent replay attacks • Sign the fingerprint with the client before sending to the server • Certify the voluntary action of the user • Initiate the EAP-TTLS session with a smartcard • A signature from the user may be required • Session Keys : f(Master-Secret, Client-random, Server-random)

  10. AVP encapsulating the fingerprint Container Header Fingerprint (CBEFF Structure) PKCS#7 Capsule Containing signatures

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