David Hume (1711-1776)

1. David Hume (1711-1776) • Fame as a philosopher (for Treatise and Enquiry) followed fame as an historian (for A History of Britain)

2. Hume’s ‘radical’ empiricism • Hume’s inspiration, as for nearly all English-speaking philosophers in the 18th century, is Locke -- and especially Locke’s notion that all our knowledge, indeed all our thinking, is based ultimately on materials which originate in sensation • But: Hume takes Locke to task for failing to follow through on all of the consequences of this view, i.e. that Locke is not radical enough

3. Hume’s version of the Lockean theory of ‘ideas’ • Hume’s insight is that the only consistent way to classify the contents of our experience (what Locke would have called ‘ideas’) is not by ‘source’ or ‘resemblance’, but only by differences in their appearance • The only relevant differences are ‘force’, ‘vivacity’, or ‘liveliness’ • This yields a distinction into: impressions (the more lively) and ideas (the less lively)

4. The ‘copy thesis’ • Though ideas and impression differ in virtue of force and vivacity, they are related in the following way: every idea is the copy of some impression. • Q: What is the proof of this? • The “missing shade of blue” is supposed to be a counter-example to this; why does Hume undermine his own claim?

5. What good does the “copy thesis” do? • Here are Hume’s own words on this: “When we entertain…any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.”

6. The Associative principles of ideas • Hume contends that all our ideas are related one to another (in our thinking or ‘train of thought’) in one or more of the following three ways: a) resemblance b) contiguity in space or time c) cause/effect Q: what is the proof that these are all the ways in which ideas can be connected?

7. The argument against the idea of the self • By “self” we mean a single thing which is the subject of all our experiences and which continues the same over time • If we do have such an idea (thought or concept), then it must be possible to show the impression (experience or perception) upon which this idea is based • We have no experience which could give rise to such an idea [why not?] • Therefore, we have no such idea (i.e. the term is meaningless, in thesense that there is nothing to which it refers)

8. What do we do with the term “self” then? • If, as Hume contends, we have no meaningful idea of a thing which is the subject of the experiences we have, then who/what are we (what idea do we have of the self)? • “I may venture to affirm of…mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.”

9. Why do we believe that we do have an idea of the self? • We confuse “identity” with “diversity” when successive perceptions are perfectly resembling (and presume a something which connects these perceptions) • Small changes (either proportionally or incrementally) don’t undermine or destroy the association between related ideas or impressions • Where a common effect or end is produced by distinct impressions, we suppose a unifying or common principle

10. What is the connection between or among our experiences? • Resemblance: our present thoughts resemble our past experiences, and we suppose that because they are resembling, they proceed from or belong to the same thing • Cause & effect: our concern for the future & nostalgia/regret for the past leads us to suppose a causal connection between past & future (e.g. I feel bad about some past event, therefore that past experience really is me)

11. What are some consequences of this view? • There is no exact standard for identity (either personal identity or any other kind); therefore some puzzles about it are insoluble (but that’s ok, because they don’t really need to be solved) • Certain views about the persistence (or preexistence) of the self must be false (e.g. reincarnation, survival after death)