Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions

1. Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions – lessons learned from IBESo research programme, Indio Maíz, El Castillo, Nicaragua Helle Munk Ravnborg, DIIS, October 2006

2. Biological Reserve Indio Maíz (RBIM) as part of the Biosphere Reserve Río San Juan decree 66-99 (1999) decree 527 (1990) decree 66-99 and UNESCO recognition (2003)

3. Biodiversity and ecosystems of RBIM • 3,157 km2 (an area the size of Fyn) • protected as IUCN category I - biological reserve • recognized for its good state of conservation • high biological diversity • high ecosystem diversity • yet diversity is insufficiently documented • two expeditions undertaken by FUNDAR (NGO) (2002 y 2004) – both in the RBIM itself

4. IBESo themes and teams

5. Preliminary inventory of flora in RBIM and its buffer zone Objectives: • contribute to the knowledge of the biological diversity existing in RBIM and its buffer zone • design a participatory method to allow the local population appreciate the biological values present in the zone • create economic benefits at the local level based upon the biological richness Method: • train and supervise local ‘para-taxonomist’

6. Some results 8 new species for Nicaragua A total of 1,442 species 4 of these were collected in populated parts of the buffer zone Generation of an average monthly income of US$ 50 for the para-taxonomists Note: FUNDAR documented 436 species from the RBIM

7. Implications • the exclusive focus on the RBIM in biological research undertaken in support of the development the management plan for RBIM and its buffer zone is mistaken • the management category for the RBIM is already defined • the buffer zone possess much biological value

8. Fuente: Paniagua (2003) But El Castillo is much more than a biological reserve • an area of cheap and ‘free’ land • 13% of the population has stayed less than 5 years in the zone, 35% less than 10 years • an area rich in forest resources • in 1999-2000, it was estimated: • incentives for illegal timber cutting and for sale of illegal timber

9. Three options for protecting the RBIM and its buffer zone • provide economic incentives favouring conservation (theme IV) • stimulate and facilitate participation of the local population in the protection and control (theme III) • support the control undertaken by the government institutions (theme IV)

10. Economic incentives favouring sustainable use of natural resources in the RBIM buffer zone • sustainable production systems (e.g. of cocoa) • payment for environmental service schemes (like the direct conservation payments or payments in return for Lapa Verde nests)

11. Typology of producers in El Castillo

12. Implications • experiences with payments for environmental services are incipient – monitoring of the agreements constitutes an important challenge • what constitutes an economic incentive to some, will not appear as such to others – a payment of USD 20 per acre of conserved forest is probably not attractive to livestock farmers • e.g. unlikely that organic production of cocoa represents an attractive alternative to the livestock farmers • to effectively change the natural resource use of the livestock farmers, a combination of incentives, taxes and regulations has to be applied

13. Importance of social capital for the local organization Objectives: • characterize existing social networks and analyze who form part and how they are constituted Methods: • ‘affinity’ ranking supplemented by conversational interviews and focal group discussions

14. * unknown to all interviewed informants Some results • a high level of unfamiliarity among local inhabitants – particularly among men – within the communities (in non-agricultural frontier communities, the level of unfamiliarity is generally around 5%) • men – social networks among men as overlapping circles overlaid by hierarchical relations • women – social networks as non-overlapping circles • very limited experience and willingness to execute social control with respect to environmental issues

15. Implications • communities do not function as entities but function by sectors • environmental and legal institutions should actively back attempts to execute social environmental control made by local inhabitants • in some communities, participating in local committees is correlated with belonging to certain social networks

16. Dilemmas of frontline workers from environmental governance institutions Objectives: • understand the dilemmas which frontline environmental workers face Methods: • interviews with environmental workers, local inhabitants and archival studies

17. Some results • forest governance is limited to issuing permits and there is hardly any control of forest exploitation • each forest guard is responsible for patrolling 8 km of forest border and an area of 70 km2 and lacks equipment • very limited legal basis for environmental governance in the buffer zone as long as no management plan has been elaborated • forest guards (55) constitute 77% of SERBSEN’s personnel and receive 23% of the salary budget (USD 47 000) (corresponding to USD 16/month)– the cost of elaborating the management plan for the Biosphere Reserve Río San Juan is estimated at USD 75 000 • lack of feed-back and institutional support with respect to environmental cases reported by forest guards

18. Implications • to be efficient, the level of control undertaken by forest guards needs to be increased (number of forest guards, equipment to facilitate the patrolling and to document infractions) • improve the institutional support to forest guards (feed back on reported cases, transparent procedures, management plan) • apply forest control as a means to increase the costs of illegal timber

19. Three conclusions for conservation and development efforts • Avoid partial coverage • efforts to generate local support for conservation through development initiatives tend to reach only part of the population – this limits support for conservation • Don’t overlook external actors • ICD initiatives tend to address development needs and environmental awareness of local people. Interests related to timber and agricultural frontier land tend to be held by powerful external actors – these actors tend to be overlooked when adopting the ICD lens • Recognize the limits of social control • many protected areas are located in ‘agricultural frontier’ areas with lack of generalized social networks, trust and security. Here, local people are unlikely to exert social control to ensure conservation and sustainable use of natural resources if not consistently backed by environmental and legal institutions

20. RBIM - 2005 Samaria - 2005 - an illegal community inside RBIM Publications available from www.diis.dk/ibeso Samaria - 2005