What is this about?

1. Determinants of Incentives of Union Parishad (UP) Leaders in Creating Inclusive, Participatory and Pro-poor Governance Mirza Hassan, PhD. Lead Researcher, BRAC Development Institute, BRAC University SohelaNazneen, PhD. Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka

2. What is this about? • Political determinants of incentives of local government representatives in Bangladesh • Supply side of governance • Study conducted in 2012/13 in 3 unions with 39 in-depth interviews elected leaders; 6 FGDs selected active citizens; secondary document analysis • Structure- -context -theoretical concepts -findings -insights

3. Bangladesh Context • UP is the lowest tier of the LG in Bangladesh • Uninterrupted democratic representation • Electoral accountability tends to function both in de jure and de facto sense • But accountability process does not work in simple direct way between citizen (as principal) and elected representative (as agent) • De facto accountability process is mediated by complex form of social factors which determines UP leaders’ behavior • In this context, social accountability may have an important role in ensuring responsiveness

4. Bangladesh Context • New UP Act, 2009 for social accountability • Creation of forums for citizens engagement (Ward shobha); Standing Committees, Open budget sessions, and other provisions • But how have these affected incentives of UP leaders for pro poor governance?

5. Analytical approaches • Political settlement- refers to balance of power between contending social group • Critical issue here is distribution of resources is compatible with power of social groups (elite and non elite) • Distribution of power in developing countries such as Bangladesh is shaped by informal institutions, particularly patron-client rules governing distribution of benefit • This means relationship between elected officials and citizens is not symmetrical • Citizens holding formal right/ and asserting formal rights is constrained by clientelism and group identities • Citizens are actually clients – this affects accountability relations

6. Analytical approaches-cont’d • Political market imperfection: • Effects electoral accountability and whether the politicians deliver pro poor inclusive governance • Three types of imperfection: -problem of credibility (politicians do not fulfill promise) -voter’s lack information on performance -voters are fragmented based on social divisions

7. Findings: Is there incentive for meeting citizen’s demands? • UP leaders want to win / return to their seats so there is a political imperative to meet demands (including patronage) • These demands can be conflicting between groups • UP leaders try to balance between the needs of core constituents (local powerbrokers such as large land owners, political leaders, teachers etc), their vote bank and the remaining voters • They need to appear fair but also distribute patronage to key groups elite/ and their electoral base (this is based on class, region, religious identity, kin)

8. What wins elections and influences UP leaders’ behavior? • Party affiliations does not matter in winning elections for members although being seen has having access to party officials for the UP chair is considered an asset by citizens in a clientelist system • Network capital is key for winning elections- with elite and middle class (who act as interlocutors with the poor) • Social capital based on kinship and other ascriptive identity is a key asset for winning • These influence how UP leaders act

9. Patron clientelism and accountability • Informal accountability plays a large role in influencing how UP leaders deliver governance/ distribute patronage • Social obligations influence patronage distribution (safety net etc) based on expectation of kith/kin, local norms • Political calculation comes in dealing with elite /middle class who ensure political support (influences delivering service/ safety net/ public goods) • Poor who are clients of elite are included; those not part of elite network are excluded

10. Political settlement, space, incentives and UP leader’s performance • Nature of local level political settlement can influence whether greater resources can be secured from the center • Political alignment of UP leaders with MPs may lead to capture of developmental resources • Partisan nature of local administration may divert resources from the poor • Electoral accountability (winning elections) does not create space for UP leader to negotiate with political parties over resource allocation • Parties have a strong influence in allocation of resources down the administrative chain (ruling party) even in areas where they have no influence in UP electoral politics • Women are affected by these factors, although some factors such as kinship/ family’s political capital have more weight in determining which women run for elections

11. Social accountability mechanisms: How do they influence UP leaders? • Increased participation of poor and (poor) women and access to bureaucrats (UNO) • Some information shared with citizens on UP budgets • Increased voice of the poor does not necessarily mean influence • UP leaders use it for collecting feedback and explain matters to public • Largely ritualistic, and citizens mostly involved (and interested) in discussion on safety net distribution etc, not infrastructure and other projects • Limited checks on UP leader’s behavior

12. Imperfect political markets and consequence • Ensuring vote depends on providing benefits to vote banks/ and also patronage to elites for UP chairs—so UP leaders have smaller stakes for meeting electoral promises (those excluded and non elite) • Given above there is low incentive for UP leaders to involve poor in UP governance • Elite have more information (allocation etc) than the poor; while UP Act has improved access to information’ but information asymmetry that poor suffer from is still large so sanctioning based on performance or making demands in forums is limited • Social divisions among voters (based on kinship, regionalism, etc) means sanctioning capacity of the poor is limited and UP leaders have incentive for meeting demands based on particularistic identity which meets demands of some groups but limits pro poor governance; • The above benefits the elite