1 / 18

When you have a hammer…

When you have a hammer…. National Material Capabilities and Crisis Decision-making Andrew Barron | SIS-600 2010F. Research Question. What effect do national material capabilities (NMC) have on crisis decision-making?

umay
Télécharger la présentation

When you have a hammer…

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. When you have a hammer… National Material Capabilities and Crisis Decision-making Andrew Barron | SIS-600 2010F

  2. Research Question • What effect do national material capabilities (NMC) have on crisis decision-making? • Specifically, do they increase the likelihood of a violent or military response? • Does regime type play a role?

  3. Hypothesis • Null Hypothesis • There is no statistically significant relationship between NMC and crisis decision-making. • There is no statistically significant relationship between regime type and crisis decision-making. • Alternate Hypothesis: • There is a statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables; specifically, greater NMC and more authoritarian government will lead to more militant/violent outcomes.

  4. Literature Review • Peter F. Trumbore and Mark A. Boyer: International Crisis Decisionmaking as A Two-Level Process • Examined regime type differences, relative weight of internal and domestic factors in crisis outcomes • Brandon C. Prins: Interstate Rivalry and the Recurrence of Crises: A Comparison of Rival and Nonrival Crisis Behavior, 1918-1994 • Examined likelihood of military responses to international crises based on a different set of explanatory variables (rival/nonrival states)

  5. Data • Data is drawn from two sources • Correlates of War National Material Capabilities v4.0 • International Crisis Behavior v10 • State level of analysis, covers 1816-2007 • N of combined dataset is 1000

  6. Variables • Independent • cinc: Composite Index of National Capability: total/urban population, iron/steel production, energy consumption, total military personnel, military expenditures. I-R variable. • regime: regime type, 5 options. Nominal. • Dependent • majres: Major response to crisis. Was the military used to respond? Nominal. • cenvio: Centrality of violence to response. Was the response violent? Nominal. • sevvio: Severity of violence. How violent was the response? Nominal.

  7. Descriptive Statistics • Modes imply most crisis responses are nonviolent, political • Centrality, severity of violence most often low • Most regimes are civil authoritarian

  8. Pie Charts: Regimes

  9. Pie Charts: Crisis Responses

  10. Pie Charts: Violence

  11. Histogram: CINC

  12. Bivariate Analysis I:Crisis Response

  13. Bivariate Analysis II:Centrality of Violence

  14. Bivariate Analysis III:Severity of Violence

  15. Probit Analysis I: Crisis Response

  16. Probit Analysis II: Centrality of Violence

  17. Probit Analysis III: Severity of Violence

  18. Conclusions and Implications • Reject the null hypothesis, with reservations • Statistically significant relationship exists • Predictive models significant, but fairly weak • No model significantly predicts whether a military response is likely • Presuming a military response, however, violence is most likely when material capabilities and authoritarian government combine • On its own, material capabilities appear to decrease the likelihood of violence

More Related