Reassessing Australia’s policy towards European integration The security dimension

1. Monash European EU Centre, 26.4.2013 Reassessing Australia’s policy towards European integrationThe security dimension

2. Intro 1 Intro 1 • OZ attitudes towards European integration have attracted growing attention • There is now a large body of literature on OZ/EU relations • In this context some themes have • Received significant attention • Others have been neglected • Trade/economic issues • Economic/trade implications of UK’s entry into EEC • Impact of EU agricultural protectionism on OZ economy • Strategic/defence issues

3. Intro 2 Intro 2 • I argued that strategic/security issues: • Have played an interesting role in shaping OZ attitudes/perceptions towards EU • More specifically, I argue that while trade issues were uppermost in OZ minds, defence & security were not neglected in early years • OZ was concerned that UK’s “enmeshment” with WE would • Lead to a gradual UK disengagement from SEA • UK departure would create a vacuum in an area of great interest to Australia • In addition, we should not forget that in age of decolonisation, the Six • Had lost interest in Asia • Too preoccupied (or absorbed) by the ongoing process of Euro integration • Hence, OZ sceptical that a more integrated WE would become a credible interlocutor on defence

4. Australia and the EDC • As Euro integration took off, OZ began to consider impact on its security in SEA • In the early 1950s the Six embarked on bold plan • EDC Treaty (May 1952) • Australian response was muted • Collapse of EDC not without potential consequences for OZ • UK pledge to keep 4 divisions in WE • Troops tied down in Europe at the expense of Far East

5. Australia and the EEC: strategic implications • In early 1960s Oz was again forced to consider impact of EEC on its security interests in SEA • Catalyst for reappraisal was the news that UK sought membership • British entry generated anxiety in Canberra • Uppermost in OZ minds was the negative impact of entry • Commonwealth cohesion • Anglo-Australian trade • But other considerations weighed heavily: UK role east of Suez

6. Picture “[first: by joining a Western European bloc, the UK would see its freedom of action as a world power curtailed and …] would alsolose both the interest in maintaining, and the ability to maintain, an effective strategic role in the world beyond Suez, where Australia’s defence interests lie” • D

7. Picture “[Hence, the departmental view was that London would be inexorably] drawn into the acceptance of the strategic priorities of its Continental partners ... and into presenting a common European front upon these matters to the rest of the world — which would include Australia and New Zealand”. • D

8. Picture “[As External Affairs concluded that] The United Kingdom may or may not seek to move her European partners to give a higher priority to Asia. In a sea of speculation, the prudent estimate for Australia to make is that the European Community will resist giving this area a high priority; that Australia will have a limited capacity to move European policy in this direction”. • D

9. Australian concerns • French veto ended UK bid, but OZ concerns did not fade away • OZ concerns powerfully resurfaced in 1966-67 • OZ govt feared that UK would use application as a pretext • to withdraw from East of Suez • Or to “find an alternative locus of power” • Wilson did not bring UK into EEC, but withdraw from E of S • When UK applied in 1970, Oz was no longer apprehensive of defence implication of EEC enlargement • If anything, OZ govt began to glimpse possibilities for greater OZ-EEC cooperation

10. Picture “[As the Australian Ambassador in Brussels O.L. Davis perceptively pointed out in a memorandum to the DEA in June 1970] the significance of the increasing integration of the Communities, commercially, economically, monetarily and ultimately socially and politically, is likely to be that its influence as a world entity will grow substantially over the years”. • D