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This chapter delves into conventional encryption methodologies, focusing on the characteristics of link and end-to-end security. It explores the importance of authentication, integrity, and encryption across communication channels and highlights vulnerabilities inherent in traffic patterns. The text outlines key distribution techniques such as the Key Distribution Centre (KDC) hierarchy and emphasizes the need for effective random number generation methods. Furthermore, it addresses both connection-oriented and connectionless encryption strategies, ensuring secure communications in diverse network environments.
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Historically – Conventional Encryption • Recently – Authentication, Integrity, Signature, Public-key • Link • End-to-End • Traffic-Analysis • Key Distribution • Random Number Generation CONFIDENTIALY USING CONVENTIONAL ENCRYPTION – Chapter 7
Link • - both ends of link • - many encryps / decryps - all links use it • - decrypt at packet switch (read addr.) • - unique key / node pair • End- to-End • - only at ends • - data encrypted, not address (header) • - one key pair • - traffic pattern insecure • - authentication from sender Confidentiality
Characteristics of Link and End-to-End Table 7.1
- Data secure at nodes • - Authentication • LINK – low level (physical/link) • END-TO-END – network (X.25) • End0 • End1 (ends separately • End2 protected) • | Both Link and End-to-End
OSI email gateway TCP • no end-to-end protocol below appl. layer • networks terminate at mail gateway • mail gateway sets up new transport/network • connections • need end-to-end encryp. at appl. Layer • - disadvantage: many keys E-mail Gateway
Identities • Message Frequency • Message Pattern • Event Correlation • Covert Channel • Link • Headers encrypted • Traffic padding (Fig 7.6) • End-to-End • Pad data • Null messages Traffic Confidentiality
Physically deliver • Third party physically select/deliver • EKold(Knew) → • 4. End-to-End(KDC): • A EKA(Knew) C EKB(Knew)B • N hosts → (N)choose(2) keys – Fig 7.7 • KDC – Key hierarchy – Fig 7.8 • Session Key – temporary : end ↔ end • Only N master keys – physical delivery KEY DISTRIBUTION
User shares Master Key with KDC Steps 1-3 : Key Distribution Steps 3,4,5 : Authentication KEY DISTRIBUTION
LOCAL KDCs KDCX KDCA KDCB A B Key selected by KDCA, KDCB, or KDCX Key Distribution Centre (KDC) Hierarchy
Shorter Lifetime → Highter Security → Reduced Capacity Connection-oriented: - change session key periodically Connectionless: - new key every exchange or #transactions or after time period LIFETIME
Key Distribution (connection-oriented) End-to-End (X.25,TCP), FEP obtains session keys
Decentralised Key Control Not practical for large networks - avoids trusted third party
key types : Data, PIN, File key tags : Session/Master/Encryp/Decryp Control Vector: associate session key with control vector (Fig 7.12) KEY USAGE
Linear Congruential Generator • Xn+1 = (aXn + c) mod m • Encryption : DES (OFB) – (Fig 7.14) • Blum Blum Shub (BBS) • X0 = s2 mod n • for i = 1 to infinity • Xi = (Xi-1)2 mod n • Bi = Xi mod 2 Random Number Generation