Protecting Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Materials Worldwide

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2. GTRI Overview UNCLASSIFIED Mission reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. UNCLASSIFIED

3. UNCLASSIFIED First Line of Defense “The first line of defense in a nuclear detection architecture is security of nuclear and other radiological material at their source (i.e., the security of materials in authorized production, use, or storage facilities or in authorized transport). Security at the source prevents terrorists and criminals from obtaining materials that could be used for malicious acts and provides a level of assurance that materials are secure and under control.” – U.S. Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, “Model Guidelines Document For Nuclear Detection Architectures,” December 2009 Second Line of Defense - Detection and Interdiction First Line of Defense - Physical Security and Material Disposal Consequence Management UNCLASSIFIED

4. UNCLASSIFIED Global Partners UNCLASSIFIED

5. UNCLASSIFIED IND vs. RDD Improvised Nuclear Device (IND):An illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear state, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that produces a nuclear yield. Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD):The combination of radioactive material and the means (whether active or passive) to disperse that material with malicious intent without a nuclear explosion. IND RDD1 Consequence Probability "The threat is complicated and diverse and in many ways more difficult for us to figure out. The training is quicker and tolerance [for less spectacular and successful plots] are much greater . . . but the likelihood of a mass 9/11-style attack is a lot smaller.“ Senior U.S. Intelligence Official [Anonymous], “Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda's New American Recruiters,” Washington Post, August 1, 2010. 1 While the consequences of an IND are orders of magnitude higher than those of an RDD, there is a greater availability of source material for use in an RDD, and the ease of constructing an RDD is orders of magnitude easier than constructing an IND. UNCLASSIFIED

6. UNCLASSIFIED Primary Materials of Concern in the United States Co-60 (5 year half life): Teletherapy and Gamma Knife units (cancer treatment); 1,000 – 10,000 Ci, and panoramic irradiation (sterilization); 100,000 – 10,000,000 Ci Cs-137 (30 year half life): Blood, research, and sterilization irradiators; 1,000 - 50,000 Ci Am-241 (432 year half life): Oil well-logging; 8 - 20 Ci Ir-192 (73 day half life): Brachytherapy (cancer treatment) and radiography (industrial imaging); 10 - 100 Ci NOTE: Sr-90 found primarily overseas in Russian RTGs; generally used in very small amounts in the U.S. UNCLASSIFIED

7. UNCLASSIFIED Radiological Scope and Threat Environment “Al-Qaeda is interested in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or "dirty bombs." Construction of an RDD is well within its capabilities as radiological materials are relatively easy to acquire from industrial or medical sources. Osama Bin Laden's operatives may try to launch conventional attacks against the nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States in a bid to cause contamination, disruption, and terror.” Synopsis of CIA briefing given to National Association of Chiefs of Police, “CIA Briefs Law Enforcement on Possible WMD Attacks,” Examiner.com, December 14, 2009. Radiological Incidents • Radiological Scope • GTRI estimates that there are over 13,000 buildings that house risk-significant quantities of radioactive materials: • United States ~2,700 • Other Than High Income Economy Countries ~5,800 • High-Income Economy Countries ~4,800 • Insider Threat • Disturbing trend of medical professionals performing acts of terrorism/violence: • “Amerithrax” anthrax letter attacks in September 2001, • Glasgow Airport bombing in June 2007, • Fort Hood shootings in November 2009, • University of Alabama shootings in February 2010, • Arrest of radiology technicians in Ottawa, Canada on bomb making charges in August 2010, • Stolen Cs-137 (North Carolina, 1998) • Coworker Attack with Ir-192 Injures 75 People (China, 2003) • Unauthorized Access to GammaKnife Room (Pittsburgh, 2006) • Dhiren Barot “Dirty Bomb” Plot Arrest (UK, 2006) • Aafia Siddiqui Arrested with RDD Plans (Pakistan, 2008) • Cs-137 Source Stolen for Extortion (Argentina, 2009) UNCLASSIFIED

8. GTRI’s Domestic Mission GTRI provides voluntary security assistance which include: Removal of disused or unwanted radioactive sources; Voluntary security upgrades; Specialized training for local law enforcement; No-fault table top exercises; Transportation Security GTRI voluntary security enhancements are: Complementary to and do not replacethe licensees requirements to meet NRC and Agreement State regulatory requirements; Sound, cost-effective, and prudent best practiceswhich further improve security above regulatory requirements. UNCLASSIFIED See NRC RIS 2010-02 “The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Federally Funded Voluntary Security Enhancements For High-Risk Radiological Material UNCLASSIFIED 8

9. Principles of GTRI Security Enhancements Site Specific and Voluntary Proposed upgrades designed specifically for, and negotiated with, each site and local law enforcement agency Free Assessments, equipment, site prep, installation, procedures, and training Minimum 3 years (5 years for RMS) of equipment warranty and maintenance provided In return for upgrades sites are expected to use, maintain, exercise and sustain equipment and procedures After security enhancement design is agreed to, the site must sign a “Sustainability Statement” which will indicate the site’s good faith commitment to operate and maintain upgrades UNCLASSIFIED Security Enhancement Process Volunteer (Licensee) Assess (NNSA) Design (NNSA/Licensee) Agree (Licensee) Operate/ Maintain (Licensee)* Contract (NNSA/Licensee) Install (NNSA) Test/Train (NNSA) * GTRI provides 3 – 5 years of maintenance and warranty on all equipment. UNCLASSIFIED 9

10. Relationship to Increased Control Orders The NRC and State regulatory agencies working together have created a strong and effective regulatory framework that includes licensing, inspection, and enforcement. This partnership ensures the security of 32 civilian nuclear research and test reactors and over 60,000 high-risk radioactive sources without adversely impacting their beneficial uses. This framework provides a common baseline level of security to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security. NNSA works with the NRC, the materials licensees and state, local and tribal governments to build on the existing regulatory requirements by providing voluntary security enhancements. These voluntary security enhancements arecomplementary to and do not replacethe licensees requirements to meet NRC and Agreement State regulations. The voluntary security enhancements aresound, cost-effective, and prudent best practiceswhich further improve security above regulatory requirements. NRC released Regulatory Information Summaries about GTRI programs 2010-02 The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Federally Funded Voluntary Security Enhancements For High-Risk Radiological Material GTRI notifies the appropriate regulator before GTRI initiates work at a site GTRI sends out T&R credential letters for its staff and contractors who visit a site UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 10

11. UNCLASSIFIED Sample Security Enhancements Data Seal: Broken seal will result in transmission of images and alarms wirelessly Passive Infrared Sensors (PIR): Motion triggers alarm In-Device Delay (IDD) Kit: Increases time needed to access sources in certain radiation devices Balanced Magnetic Switch (BMS): Unauthorized entry triggers alarm Iris Reader: Requires eye scan for access Personal Radiation Detector (PRD): Used by response force Remote Monitoring System (RMS): Alarms trigger surveillance Area Radiation Detector: Release of radiation triggers alarm and data transmission UNCLASSIFIED

12. UNCLASSIFIED GTRI Remote Monitoring System UNCLASSIFIED

13. UNCLASSIFIED GTRI Alarm Response Training Three-day course for first responders that teaches site security and local law enforcement how to protect themselves and their communities when responding to alarms indicating the possible theft/sabotage of civilian nuclear and radioactive materials. • GTRI pays for all attendee costs except for salary (e.g. travel, lodging, car rental, and per diem) Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN • Realistic scenarios using radioactive sources, irradiators and security equipment • Classroom instruction and hands-on exercises • Trained to current GTRI standard security upgrades, RFID Tamper indicating devices, Remote Monitoring System, etc. • Personal Radiation Device (PRD) “Train the Trainer” Course • DHS certified and included in the DHS training course catalog • Research and Test Reactor Course UNCLASSIFIED

14. UNCLASSIFIED GTRI Table Top Exercises FBI and NNSA sponsor no-fault, site-specific scenarios where Federal, State, Local, and Private sector officials can exercise their response to terrorist acts involving nuclear and radioactive materials. Promote cross-sector communications, cooperation, and team building among Federal, State, local, and private sector first responders • Players and participants usually include: • Federal (FBI, DHS, DOE) • State (Emergency Management, Regulator, etc.) • Local /Private (Site Personnel, RSO, Site Security, LLEA, Fire Department, County/City Personnel, etc.) • Prepare site-specific integrated response plan with Federal, State, local and private sector partners • Examine newly developed tactics, techniques, and procedures resulting from GTRI voluntary security enhancements • One day (~6 hours) near-real time game play customized to your specific site • Realistic events based on actual FBI threat information • Video injections with mock-media involvement for fast paced action • Challenges first responders to: • Stop theft • Recover missing material • Execute post-dispersal consequence management UNCLASSIFIED

15. Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) Every year, thousands of sources become disused and unwanted in the United States. While secure storage is a temporary measure, the longer sources remain disused or unwanted the chances increase that they will become unsecured or abandoned. Thus, permanent disposal is essential. OSRP - http://osrp.lanl.gov/ To date, GTRI has recovered over 25,000 sources totaling over 779,000 Ci GTRI primarily recovers Cs-137, Co-60, Sr-90, Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226 Every potential recovery is different and must be considered and prioritized GTRI partners with CRCPD on the Source Collection and Threat Reduction (SCATR) project which works with state regulators and licensees to round up sources with commercial disposal pathways UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 15

16. UNCLASSIFIED GTRI Contacts Ioanna Iliopulos Office Director North and South American Threat Reduction Ioanna.Iliopulos@nnsa.doe.gov 202-586-1881 Abigail Cuthbertson Deputy Directory North and South American Threat Reduction Abigail.Cuthbertson@nnsa.doe.gov 202-586-2391 UNCLASSIFIED