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The CoNSEL Lab at Tel Aviv University, led by Prof. Avishai Wool, focuses on securing device and network communications, emphasizing critical areas such as SCADA systems, wireless security, and side-channel cryptography. Our team, including Ph.D. and M.Sc. students, conducts ongoing research into technologies like RFID, Bluetooth, and Modbus/TCP protocol analysis. We aim to develop robust intrusion detection systems and assess vulnerabilities in industrial control systems and payment technologies. Join us as we explore innovative approaches to maintain secure communication networks.
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Prof. Avishai Wool: Securing Device and Network Communications: the CoNSEL Lab @ TAU/EE School of Electrical Engineering, Tel Aviv University
Who we are • Prof. Avishai Wool • Ph.D. Student • Amit Kleinman • M.Sc. Students: • DvirSchirman • Noam Erez • AsafTzur • OfirWeisse • Undergradute student • Gal Lerner • Many past members
What we do (2013 snapshot) • Control networks • SCADA: On-going • Wireless Security: • RFID: Prox-cards (payments, access systems, passports, Israeli e-voting) • Side-channel cryptography • Other projects: • RFID: EPC-Gen2 (product labels) • Bluetooth, anti-malware, OS, file systems, …
Example – Power Plant (Coal) On the outside Industrial Sketch
On inside: Typical Components HMI Modbus/TCP (e.g. over Ethernet)
SCADA network security • Industrial control systems (energy, chemical, …) • Control protocol is not protected • Access to control net “Pwn” all PLCs • Our work: • analyze & model Modbus/TCP protocol • Identify designs for accurate IDS systems • Experiment [TAU has a live Modbus network!]
RFID Prox-card technology • 5cm range • Access systems, transportation, credit cards, passports, Israeli e-vote • Relay attacks • (Extended-range) Jamming • card-to-reader range extension
Range extension attacks Leech Relay Leech Extended range Extended range Ghost Ghost
Side-Channel Cryptanalysis • Devices include secret cryptographic keys • Car alarm systems (keeloq), Cellular SIM cards, … • With device in lab, collect input+output pairs • … plus side channel • E.g., Power consumption trace sampled by scope • Extract secret keys • Our work: algorithms that need very few traces, and can deal with measurement error
Contact: yash@eng.tau.ac.il http://www.eng.tau.ac.il/~yash Questions?