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The Egalitarian Ape: Welfare State Games and the Preference for Equality

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25 diapositives · 405 Views · Nov 19, 2014

The Egalitarian Ape: Welfare State Games and the Preference for Equality. Sebastian Lotz University of Cologne Detlef Fetchenhauer University of Cologne, University of Groningen. The typical welfare state.

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  1. The Egalitarian Ape: Welfare State Games and the Preference for Equality Sebastian Lotz University of Cologne Detlef Fetchenhauer University of Cologne, University of Groningen

  2. The typicalwelfarestate • Economies & societiescreatewealthwhichmostofthemdecidetopartlyredistribute • Individual memberspossess different inputfactors (labor, capital, knowledge) andcreate a different amountsofwealth • Redistribution throughsocialsecurity, taxes, donations • Usually: Costof Redistribution

  3. Welfarestategame

  4. Welfarestategame

  5. MotivationalFactors • Maximizationof individual payoff • Maximizationofgrouppayoff (overallwealth) • Maximizationofequality (due toinequalityaversion) • WOLF IN SHEEP‘S CLOTHING; Maximizing individual payoffcanbejustifiedbyotherarguments

  6. Welfarestategame Maximization of Equality

  7. Welfarestategame Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality

  8. Welfarestategame Maximization of Individual Payoff Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality

  9. Welfarestategame Maximization of Individual Payoff Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality

  10. Welfarestategame Maximization of Individual Payoff Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality

  11. Whatothersfound… • As a socialgood, distributive justiceismoreattractive than overallwealth (efficiency)(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2002) • Half ofthepeopleprefertheequaldistribution in thegame, themajorityofthemhoweverismotivatedby pure self-interest (Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007)

  12. Welfarestategame Benevolent Dictator (Equality or Wealth?)

  13. Experimental Design • N = 216 studentsatthe University of Cologne • Betweensubjects design • Random drawdecidedwho‘sdecision will beenforced in thegroup • Accountability: Studentsweretowrite down theirargumentationwhich was distributedamongthegroupmembers usedfor qualitative analysis • 3 ECU = 1 Euro actualpayoff, All benevolentdictatorsparticipated in a lotterybeingabletowin, 200, 150, or 100 ECU • Additional questionnaire

  14. Results: Decisionby Person

  15. Results: Decisionby Person

  16. Results: Decisionby Person

  17. Results: Decisionby Person

  18. Self-ratingofmorality (7-point scale)

  19. Who usedfairness-basedarguments?

  20. Who usedwealth-argument?

  21. Hardlyanydeepthoughts…

  22. Who usedselfishargumentations?

  23. Reasoningbehindtheresults • SocialIntuitist Model • Fast andautomaticintuitionsaretheprimarysourceofmoralevaluations (Haidt, 2001) • „Do noharm“ – heuristics (intention) • People hesitatetoharmsmallgroupsof a societyevenif a (large) majoritybenefits • Inequalityaversion (outcome) • People disregarddistributionswhichunjustifiablyputsomepeoplebetterof than others (evenifthiswouldyield a Pareto improvement)

  24. Implications • Intuitive fairness/moraljudgmentismaindeterminantoftheacceptanceofsocioeconomicpolicy (Haferkamp et al, 2007) • Efficiency almostseems irrelevant tothepeople • Decisionsbased on morality do not alwaysseemeconomicallyright (repetitionofthegame, substantial lossesofwealth)

  25. Summary • Distributionsare not onlyselected due tomaximizationof individual payoff • Accountabilitymightreduceegoism, self-interest • Generally „fair“ distributionsarepreferredevenifthismeanstoleavemoney on thetable. • Ambiguityoffairnessis not seen • In realitythe fair solutionis not asobvious, becausewealthhastobecompiled, individualsareunequallytalented, etc.