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Vicksburg

Vicksburg. Lesson 9. Strategic Situation. Importance of Mississippi River and Vicksburg. At  the time of the Civil War, the Mississippi River was the single most important economic feature of the continent

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Vicksburg

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  1. Vicksburg Lesson 9

  2. Strategic Situation

  3. Importance of Mississippi River and Vicksburg • At  the time of the Civil War, the Mississippi River was the single most important economic feature of the continent • Confederate forces closed the river to navigation, which threatened to strangle northern commercial interests

  4. Lincoln’s Assessment • “See what a lot of land these fellows hold, of which Vicksburg is the key! The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket.... We can take all the northern ports of the Confederacy, and they can defy us from Vicksburg…. I am acquainted with that region and know what I am talking about, and as valuable as New Orleans will be to us, Vicksburg will be more so.”

  5. Trans Mississippi Confederacy as a Supply Source • Texas led the nation in cattle, with an estimated three and a half million head • Virginia and Georgia, the next largest Confederate cattle-producing states, counted slightly more than one million each. • Texas ranked behind only Tennessee in the number of horses and mules, fourth in the number of sheep, and seventh in the production of swine. • Texas was a significant source of livestock for armies in the west, but that could only remain the case so long as those animals could cross the river safely. • Federal success at Vicksburg would deny the eastern Confederacy access to these and other supplies

  6. Key Railroad from Monroe, LA through Vicksburg to Jackson and points east

  7. Splitting the South in Two • Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas (as well as the Indian Territory) accounted for almost half of the Confederacy’s total land mass • Federal control of the Mississippi River would isolate the western and eastern halves of the Confederacy • So Grant’s mission is to seize Vicksburg in order to control the Mississippi River and separate the Confederacy in two

  8. Terrain • Vicksburg was part of a line of bluffs that extended from Columbus, KY to Baton Rouge, LA • Formed an escarpment that greatly favored the defense both on land and on water

  9. Terrain • Northeast of Vicksburg was the Delta • Flat, periodically flooded area coursed by streams of various navigability • Steele’s Bayou, Tallahatchie River, Yazoo River, etc • Steep banked creeks, uncleared swamplands • West of Vicksburg was Louisiana • Even flatter and swampier • Would require much corduroying of roads

  10. Vicksburg and the Mississippi • As Union forces moved south toward Vicksburg in late 1862, the winter and the wet season began. • This ended all possibilities of moving forces by land. • Grant was forced to find an alternative route to reach Vicksburg. • Made several failed attempts from December 1862 through April 1863

  11. Attempts • Chickasaw Bluffs • Grant’s Canal • Lake Providence • Yazoo Pass • Steele’s Bayou

  12. A New Plan • Grant would later claim that he never put much stock in his failed attempts, but considered them useful in keeping the men busy and creating an illusion of activity • As April began, the wet season ended and land operations were once again possible • Grant moved his forces south, following the west bank of the Mississippi River to bypass Vicksburg.

  13. The Commanders: Confederates • John Pemberton • Five divisions totaling 43,000 effectives • Pemberton fell under Joe Johnston’s Department of the West • The Trans-Mississippi Department was commanded by E. Kirby Smith, who Pemberton told, “You can contribute materially to the defense of Vicksburg and the navigation of the Mississippi River by a movement upon the line of communications of the enemy on the western side of the river....To break this would render a most important service.” • The geographically based Confederate departmental system would often inhibit unity of effort among commands

  14. The Commanders: Federal • Ulysses Grant’s Army of the Tennessee • Hurlbut- XVI Corps (headquartered in Memphis, largely performing rear area missions) • Sherman- XV Corps • McPherson- XVII Corps • McClernand- XIII Corps • Maneuver force of ten divisions (44,000 effectives)

  15. The Commanders: Federal • Navy • Mississippi River Squadron commanded by Flag Officer David Porter • About 60 combat vessels of which 20 to 25 could support the Vicksburg operation at any one time • 13 ironclads

  16. Joint Operations • Operations carried on by two or more of the armed forces • At Vicksburg, this was the Army and the Navy

  17. Unity of Command All forces operate under one responsible commander who possesses requisite authority to direct forces in pursuit of a common unified purpose Unity of Effort Coordination and cooperation among all forces, not necessarily part of the same command structure toward a commonly recognized objective Unity of Command vs. Unity of Effort

  18. Vicksburg Would Require Unity of Effort • “Although unity of command was not formalized by regulation, Grant worked hard to ensure that good relations, constant communication, and division of labor fostered unity of effort.” • Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, Chapter1, “Vicksburg”

  19. Grant Involves Porter in Early Planning • “I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate– my recollection was that Admiral Porter was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The cooperation of the Navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise.”

  20. New Plan • After his failed attempts of Dec 1862 through Mar 1863, Grant decided to march his army down the west side of the Mississippi to a point below Vicksburg where river transports could ferry the men across • To make this work, the transports would have to run past the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries

  21. Running the Gauntlet • On the night of April 16, Porter led seven gunboats followed by three transports loaded with thousands of men • The transports towed ten barges loaded with coal and ammunition to be used in future operations down river • The Confederate batteries observed the flotilla, lit up the river with flares, and opened up with their cannon • Only one ship was lost • On the 26th Grant ran the gauntlet again with six more transports laden with coal and rations

  22. Land Movement to New Carthage • While Porter was moving by river, the army was moving on land • On Mar 29, Grant had ordered McClernand to march his four divisions from Milliken’s Bend to New Carthage • Grant joined him there on Apr 17 • On Apr 22, Grant ordered the rest of his army to move to New Carthage • Reconnaissance showed there was no suitable landing sites where high ground could be seized between New Carthage and Grand Gulf so Grant ordered the march continue to Hard Times

  23. Grand Gulf • Across the river from Hard Times was the Confederate defensive position at Grand Gulf • Grant had a truly joint plan for Grand Gulf • Porter and the navy would silence the Confederate batteries followed by rapid landings by McClernand’s Corps to seize the fortifications and secure a foothold for the rest of the army

  24. Grand Gulf: April 29, 1863 • Porter’s ironclads opened fire on Grand Gulf but could not defeat it • Porter declared, “Grand Gulf is the strongest place on the Mississippi.” • Grant decided to outflank Grand Gulf by moving south to Bruinsburg View from Fort Cobun

  25. Crossing at Bruinsburg • Grant received intelligence from a local slave that there was an unguarded landing site at Bruinsburg, roughly halfway between Grand Gulf and Rodney • Early on the morning of April 30, McClernand's corps boarded Porter's ironclads and transports and steamed downstream to Bruinsburg

  26. Rodney and Bruinsburg Roads • Unopposed landing of over 17,000 men • Largest amphibious operation in American history until the Allied invasion of Normandy during WWII • Grant advanced on Rodney and Bruinsburg Roads toward Port Gibson

  27. Confederate Missed Opportunity • Although the landing was unopposed, there was a bluff line that represented high, dry ground about a mile inland from the Bruinsburg landings. • If the Confederates established defensive positions at the bluffs before Grant reached them, it would be a repeat of Chickasaw Bayou • However, the Confederates had misread Grant’s intentions • Pemberton was confused by all the diversions and conflicting reports • “Thus, the Battle of Bruinsburg, potentially the most important engagement of the Vicksburg campaign, never took place.” (CGSC Vicksburg Staff Ride Handbook)

  28. Result of Port Gibson • Grant moved by the Rodney and Bruinsburg Roads to Port Gibson where he defeated Confederates under the command of Brigadier General Bowen • Victory secured Grant’s position on Mississippi soil and forced the evacuation of Grand Gulf Grant declared Port Gibson was “too beautiful to burn”

  29. Bruinsburg and Port Gibson as a Turning Movement A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.

  30. Logistical Considerations • Grant’s efforts to move south had left him with two well-stocked advance depots • One below Vicksburg and several just above it • As Grant moved away from his new base at Grand Gulf, Pemberton expected him to stay close to the river to take advantage of these depots • Grant’s move inland caught Pemberton by surprise Van Dorn and Forrest had disrupted Grant’s supply lines early in the campaign

  31. Pemberton’s Confusion • With Grant closing in, Pemberton was left with a choice— defend from Vicksburg or strike Grant. • Johnston ordered Pemberton to unite his forces and attack Grant, even if that meant abandoning Vicksburg. • President Davis instructed Pemberton to “hold both Vicksburg and Port Hudson.” • Pemberton lacked the flexibility to deal with such a confused and complicated situation. Crossing at Bruinsburg placed Grant between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, LA which was being threatened by Federal General Banks

  32. Logistics • “Up to this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of supplies, detach McClernand’s corps to Banks and cooperate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson.” • Now Grant “determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg or invest or capture the city.” • Grant, Memoirs

  33. Grant “Cuts Loose” • Grant says he “cut loose” from his line of supply, but he didn’t mean this completely • He still had a strong system that brought wagons from Young’s Point to Bower’s Landing where the supplies were loaded on steamboats and carried to Grand Gulf • From Grand Gulf huge wagons escorted by brigades brought the supplies forward to the main force Winslow Homer Print of Civil War Wagon Train

  34. Grant’s Strategy • Cut off Pemberton’s communication and supplies by controlling the railroads • Feint toward the Big Black with the true objective being the Southern RR that connected Jackson and Vicksburg • Once the Southern was in his control, Grant could turn and attack Vicksburg • Led to the Battle of Raymond March 12

  35. Grant Changes Plan • Success at Raymond convinced Grant to shift his focus from the Confederate railroads to the capitol of Jackson • Allowed him to isolate Vicksburg from reinforcements under Johnston • Took advantage of central position between Confederates at Edwards and Jackson • Required audacity

  36. Isolation of Vicksburg • Success at Jackson allowed Grant to “isolate” Pemberton from support from Johnson • Isolate: • A tactical task given to a unit to seal off (both physically and psychologically) an enemy from his sources of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.

  37. Battle of JacksonMay 14, 1863 • Jefferson Davis ordered Johnston to Jackson to salvage the rapidly deteriorating situation in Mississippi. • Johnston arrived May 13. • He quickly learned of the troop strength and the condition of the fortifications around Jackson. • He immediately wired President Davis saying, “I am too late” and ordered the city evacuated

  38. Battle of JacksonMay 14, 1863 • Brigadier General John Gregg was left to fight a delaying action, but the Federals entered Jackson at 3:00 pm on the 14th • Grant neutralized Jackson militarily: • burned the machine shops and factories • cut telegraph lines • destroyed railroad tracks • Jackson became known as “Chimneyville” • With Vicksburg isolated, Grant began his move west • Sets up the decisive battle of Champion Hill

  39. Champion Hill as the Decisive Point • The decisive point: “A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack.” • Vicksburg National Military Park website calls Champion Hill “The decisive engagement of the Vicksburg campaign” and concludes that “victory at Champion Hill guaranteed the success of [Grant’s] campaign.” • http://www.nps.gov/vick/vcmpgn/chmpnhl.htm • “The drums of Champion Hill sounded the doom of Richmond.” • J.F.C. Fuller

  40. Battle of Champion Hill • Grant received word Pemberton was at Edwards Station preparing to march east • Grant advanced west from Bolton and Raymond on three parallel columns • Overcame the Confederate defenses and forced a Confederate withdrawal • Why is this considered decisive?

  41. Big Black River • The armies fought again at the Big Black River on May 17 but Pemberton’s army managed to escape back to Vicksburg thanks to well placed infantry and artillery on the bluffs along the west bank of the river and the successful burning of the bridge • Pemberton beat Grant to the safety of the Vicksburg defenses • Grant arrived outside Vicksburg on May 18 and began plans to assault the Confederate positions

  42. Assaults on Vicksburg • Grant was eager to finish Pemberton off and he conducted assaults on the Vicksburg defenses on May 19 and 22 • Both failed and Grant gave up the idea of taking Vicksburg by assault and began siege tactics

  43. Civilians • About 3,000 lived in Vicksburg • Many took shelter in caves • Some held up to 200 • Toward the end of the siege, the daily ration was “two common biscuits, two rashers (slices) of bacon, a few peas and a spoon full of rice ...”

  44. Siege Operations • The Navy played a big role in the siege • Porter fired 11,500 projectiles from his ironclads and mortarboats • He also landed 13 heavy cannon from his gunboats for the Army to use as siege artillery • These fired 4,500 rounds • The Navy also ensured supplies and reinforcements reached Grant’s Army without interference from the Confederates • After 47 days, Pemberton surrendered

  45. Surrender • Confederate soldiers had to give up their arms, but they were the paroled (allowed to go free if they promised not to fight until properly exchanged later for Federal prisoners) • Officers were allowed to keep their side arms, clothing, and one horse each • Some 29,500 men were surrendered • By allowing parole, Grant prevented himself from being encumbered by so many prisoners • He also assumed many of the despondent men would have no interest in fighting again even if exchanged later

  46. Federal Control of the Mississippi Splits the Confederacy

  47. Next • Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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