Challenger Analysis Project

1. Challenger Analysis Project Andrea Hansen BS 311

2. Introduction of Crew51 (Clockwise starting in left back row) • Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist • Sharon Christa Mc Auliffe, Teacher • Greg Jarvis, Payload Specialist • Judy Resnick, Mission Specialist • Ron McNair, Mission Specialist • Dick Scobee, Commander • Mike Smith, Pilot

3. Purpose • My purpose is to analyze the communication and organizational behavior components that played a significant role in the Challenger space shuttle tragedy. • Image of the Challenger Space Shuttle crash of 1986.

4. Questions that will be answered… • Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this tragedy? • What could have been done to have prevented these communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion? • How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of command influence the events? • Are the communication problems that led up to the launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical organizations? • What role did structural design play in this event?

5. Communication • Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this tragedy? • NASA was unaware of recommendations by MTI (Morton Thiokol International) advising against the launch. • Temperatures below 53 degrees were deemed unsafe (NASA, 1986). • Constant opposing views on safety by MTI engineers and upper management further contributed to the breakdowns in communication. • They disagreed over the seriousness of the O-ring problem • They failed to use the same communication style for better understanding. • (Winsor, 1988).

6. Communication • Winsor states, “Communication is not just shared information; it is shared interpretation” (p. 101, 1988). • Implies that information was received, but there was a failure by NASA to properly interpret its severity. • The O-ring failure should not have been as unexpected as it was. • Management at Marshall appeared to have the tendency to withhold important information rather than bringing it forward (NASA, 1986). • Portrayed Marshall as a part of the system not interfacing or communicating with the other parts to produce successful flight missions

7. Communication • What could have been done to have prevented these communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion? • There could have been more coordination between MTI, Marshall and NASA. • Integration would have ensured that the overall goals of each organization were achieved (Anthony, Gales, & Hodge, 2003). • Major goal: To have a safe, successful flight mission • The engineers and managers of MTI could have developed a communication style that Marshall and NASA would have been able to interpret and understand.

8. Organizational Behavior • How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of command influence the events? • Three main organizations put pressure on NASA to launch the Challenger as quickly as possible. • Military • Congress • Media • (Neuner & Rider, n.d.) • Without the pressure from these organizations, the Challenger wouldn’t have been rushed to launch. • May have prevented overlooking technical problems with the shuttle

9. Organizational Behavior • Morton Thiokol International (MTI) • Contractor responsible for solid rocket boosters • (Winsor, p. 101). • Between MTI engineers, management in NASA, and Marshall Space Center, news moved slowly. • “News moved slowly among the organizations because they were in a hierarchical relationship, with MTI dependent on Marshall for the contract and Marshall dependent on NASA for funds and career opportunities” (Winsor, p. 101).

10. Organizational Behavior • Are the communication problems that led up to the launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical organizations? • Miscommunication is inevitable to some extent when dealing with different corporate roles, agendas and personalities. • Because there are so many levels, communication is especially vital. • Unfortunately, in this situation, it was a matter of life and death.

11. Organizational Behavior • Differences in corporate roles lead to greater difficulty in communicating (Winsor, p. 101). • Concerns and values often differ • Levels of experience are broad • Lower-level employees are more likely to pass bad news upward than middle- high level management. Why? • In this situation, politics were involved at the higher level. • Pressure to succeed grows stronger as you go up the hierarchical ladder.

12. Organizational Behavior • What role did structural design play in this event? • The structural design of NASA was lacking.. • Adequate planning and control systems • Adequate procedures and policies for safe practices • Structure for centralized decision-making • Decisions were being made at all levels of employment • The military, Congress, and the media swayed the decision to launch, thus straying further away from centralized decision-making • With as big of an organization as NASA, decision-making should be centralized.

13. Analysis • Failure to communicate effectively allowed warnings to be dismissed on the part of MTI, Marshall and NASA. • Communication breakdowns resulted from opposing perspectives and mismatched communication styles. • Hierarchical pressure was evident and the decision to launch was influenced by this pressure. • Structural design impacted the ability to effectively communicate.

14. Conclusion • It seems that MTI and Marshall both did not want to acknowledge safety standards were not all up to par because of hierarchical pressure to launch on time. • “Even when MTI engineers came to believe that a problem existed, they had a difficult time convincing management” of the severity, as well as Marshall, which both shared the same opposing perspective (Winsor, p. 106). • Although the Challenger crash was the result of various technical problems, the ultimate cause of the crash was the communication breakdown.

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16. References • Anthony, W. P., Gales, L. M., & Hodge, B. J. (2003). Organization Theory: A Strategic Approach (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc. • NASA. (1986, February 3). Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved August 24, 2010, from: http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/table-of-contents.html • Neuner, K., & Rider, J. (n.d.). The Challenger Disaster. Retrieved on August 24, 2010, from: http://studenthome.nku.edu/~riderj/challenger%20report.pdf

17. References • Winsor, D. A. (1988). Communication Failures in the Challenger Accident. IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication,vol. 31, no. 3. 101-107. doi: 0361-1434.1988.0900.0101. Retrieved August 24, 2010, from: http://people.emich.edu/jsteichma/winsor_challenger.pdf • Cover Image http://www.starstryder.com/2008/01/28/remembering-the-role-models-on-the-challenger/ • Seven Astronauts Image http://www.webbooks.com/eLibrary/ON/B0/B58/070MB58.html

18. References • Challenger Explosion Image- http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/nasa/ • Astronaut in Air Image- http://www.allbestwallpapers.com/space-nasa_ _space_shuttle_challenger_astronaut_mccandles_wallpapers.html