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Defending Common Sense

Defending Common Sense. Direct Realism. The trouble with sense-data. Key feature of Representative Realism and anti-realist theories. But… The object/appearance argument is mistaken.

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Defending Common Sense

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  1. Defending Common Sense Direct Realism

  2. The trouble with sense-data • Key feature of Representative Realism and anti-realist theories. But… • The object/appearance argument is mistaken. • 2-D mental objects cannot resemble 3-D objects. Only another three-dimensional sphere can resemble a sphere. • Sense-data can just represent – but how to make sense of this? For X to represent Y there needs to be a representation scheme. With sense-data we can’t know the representation scheme as we can’t compare reality to the representation. • Scepticism - I am trapped behind a ‘veil of perception’. Problems for anti-realism?

  3. Where arethey? They are mental entities. • Mind is the brain - But you will not find any coloured two-dimensional objects in my brain. • If the mind is something distinct from the brain – a non-physical thing – then you do not have this problem. • The Speckled Hen and the problem of indeterminate sense-data.

  4. Saving directness… • The plausibility of direct realism can be supported by the way it deals with the criticisms it faces. • In particular the problem of how error, misperception and illusion can occur. • It is part of a common-sense realism to allow that there can be variation in the way things look. • But, The appeal to common-sense may just appear to beg the question.

  5. Perceptual states are belief states or a mixture of belief states and sensations. The problem of misperception or hallucination becomes a species of the problem of false beliefs. This is a general problem in epistemology, so the direct realist need not feel any particular embarrassment when confronted by the problem of misperception.

  6. Disjunctivism • On the realist account there is a difference between the experience of a person having a veridical perceptual experience and one who is having a non-veridical experience purportedly of the same object. • The nature of my true belief that there is a tree before me depends on it being about that tree. • The about-ness of the belief is tied essentially to the thing in the world.

  7. Even if the veridical and non-veridical perceptual beliefs feel the same, there is no ‘separable’ purely internal element which the true belief shares with the false one. • They are different and so the problem of hallucination need not arise. • Analogy – what internal features does the Mona Lisa share with a good fake?

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