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A Formal Analysis of Onion Routing 10/26/2007

A Formal Analysis of Onion Routing 10/26/2007. Aaron Johnson (Yale) with Joan Feigenbaum (Yale) Paul Syverson (NRL). Papers. A Model of Onion Routing with Provable Anonymity Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2007

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A Formal Analysis of Onion Routing 10/26/2007

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  1. A Formal Analysis of Onion Routing10/26/2007 Aaron Johnson (Yale) with Joan Feigenbaum (Yale) Paul Syverson (NRL)

  2. Papers • A Model of Onion Routing with Provable AnonymityFinancial Cryptography and Data Security 2007 • A Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box ModelWorkshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2007

  3. Anonymous Communication • Sender anonymity: Adversary can’t determine the sender of a given message • Receiver anonymity: Adversary can’t determine the receiver of a given message • Relationship anonymity: Adversary can’t determine who talks to whom

  4. Anonymous Communication • Sender anonymity: Adversary can’t determine the sender of a given message • Receiver anonymity: Adversary can’t determine the receiver of a given message • Relationship anonymity: Adversary can’t determine who talks to whom

  5. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 User u running client Internet destination d 4 Routers running servers

  6. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers

  7. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers

  8. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers

  9. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d

  10. How Onion Routing Works {{{m}3}4}1 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  11. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 {{m}3}4 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  12. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 {m}3 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  13. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u m d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  14. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d m’ 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  15. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 {m’}3 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  16. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u {{m’}3}4 d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  17. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 {{{m’}3}4}1 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged

  18. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged. • Stream is closed.

  19. How Onion Routing Works 1 2 u d 3 5 4 • u creates 3-hop circuit through routers • u opens a stream in the circuit to d • Data is exchanged. • Stream is closed. • Circuit is changed every few minutes.

  20. Results

  21. Results • Formally model onion routing using input/output automata

  22. Results • Formally model onion routing using input/output automata • Analyze relationship anonymity • Characterize situations with possibilistic anonymity • Bound probabilistic anonymity in worst-case and typical situations

  23. Related Work • A Formal Treatment of Onion RoutingJan Camenisch and Anna LysyanskayaCRYPTO 2005 • A formalization of anonymity and onion routingS. Mauw, J. Verschuren, and E.P. de VinkESORICS 2004 • Towards an Analysis of Onion Routing SecurityP. Syverson, G. Tsudik, M. Reed, and C. LandwehrPET 2000

  24. Model • Constructed with I/O automata • Models asynchrony • Relies on abstract properties of cryptosystem • Simplified onion-routing protocol • No key distribution • No circuit teardowns • No separate destinations • Each user constructs a circuit to one destination • Circuit identifiers

  25. Automata Protocol u v w

  26. Automata Protocol u v w

  27. Automata Protocol u v w

  28. Automata Protocol u v w

  29. Automata Protocol u v w

  30. Automata Protocol u v w

  31. Automata Protocol u v w

  32. Automata Protocol u v w

  33. Automata Protocol u v w

  34. Automata Protocol u v w

  35. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3

  36. Creating a Circuit [0,{CREATE}1] u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED

  37. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 [0,CREATED] • CREATE/CREATED

  38. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED

  39. Creating a Circuit [0,{[EXTEND,2,{CREATE}2]}1] u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED

  40. Creating a Circuit [l1,{CREATE}2] u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED

  41. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 [l1,CREATED] • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED

  42. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 [0,{EXTENDED}1] • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED

  43. Creating a Circuit [0,{{[EXTEND,3,{CREATE}3]}2}1] u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED • [Repeat with layer of encryption]

  44. Creating a Circuit [l1,{[EXTEND,3,{CREATE}3]}2] u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED • [Repeat with layer of encryption]

  45. Creating a Circuit [l2,{CREATE}3] u 1 2 3 • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED • [Repeat with layer of encryption]

  46. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 [l2,CREATED] • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED • [Repeat with layer of encryption]

  47. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 [l1,{EXTENDED}2] • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED • [Repeat with layer of encryption]

  48. Creating a Circuit u 1 2 3 [0,{{EXTENDED}2}1] • CREATE/CREATED • EXTEND/EXTENDED • [Repeat with layer of encryption]

  49. Adversary 1 2 u d 3 5 4 Active & Local

  50. Possibilistic Anonymity

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