Deliberation and Choice

1. Deliberation and Choice • Deliberation is an intellectual process of examining the consequences of actions prior to acting. It is a hypothesis about where we want to go, but don't yet know how. Before implementing actions (means) the principle of deliberation is invoked. It involves • a felt difficulty, conflict or discrepancy; something is clearly wrong; • b) clarification of the specific problem to be solved. • c) development of hypotheses concerning the nature of the problem and possible solutions; this means that traditional theories are not to be accepted a priori as correct; they may well be a mixture of folk beliefs and facts; • examination of the logical consequences of proposed hypotheses; but we rehearse in imagination the possible hypotheses and lines of action. No action has been taken beyond recall. And finally • e) Choice is hitting in imagination upon a line of action that permits overt action.

2. Reasonable Choice and Valuation and Choice In the circumstance of institutional adjustment, deliberation leads to reasonable choice and routine habit to unreasonable ones. The analytical process is concerned with discovering whether our possible choices or action plans will prove reliable or unreliable. Like all other plans, it is relevant to a problem, a response to a situation. It arises to solve a recognized difficulty. Ideas are plans of action because they suggest themselves as problem solvers. Of two plans of action, we seek to choose the one that is perceived as "better," "more satisfactory," or "more successful" for the problem in hand. In this context, it is analogous to saying this diagnosis is "better or "more successful" than that. The "success" or "satisfactoriness of a plan of action is to be defined exclusively in terms of predicted consequence, e.g., any map in any system is "true” (i.e., valid) if its operation use produces the consequences that are intended to be served by the map. In science a general pattern of inquiry has been develop which is competent to integrate and test our beliefs about the nature of the world. The hypothesis here is that the rationale of scientific method is just as applicable to the field of value judgments as to the world of nature, and that in any particular situation, by the use of intelligent methods of analysis, one course of conduct can be established as "better" than another. These include,

3. sensitivity to the uniqueness of different situations, • b) patience and persistence to carefully formulate the problem, • c) creative imagination to envision new possibilities, • d) a bias for objectivity and ability to discount one's own prejudices, • e) the courage to revise one's beliefs in the light of new experience. • In a reasonable choice multiple hypotheses may be considered in dealing with the problematic situation. No one is to be given precedence over the others; meaning that one is just as diligent in looking for knowledge that may question it as knowledge that questions the other hypotheses; the same with respect to knowledge tending to confirm one or another hypothesis. We criticize our hypotheses or ends by inquiring into what results from the use of the means designed to realize them. When action is intelligent and responsible, the means are part of the end. We carefully consider the probable consequences of acting upon one or another hypothesis.

4. Unreasonable choice leads to a path of action in which some preconception, some desire over-rides all alternatives and secures the sole right of way. Dewey points to our educational system as example of the undesirable outcome of separating means and ends. It espouses the idea that education is a preparation for the future (ends) and so looks upon education as a production process of taking raw material and modifying it with a view to turning out a product that conforms to certain specifications. This encourages the practice of more or less blindly following tradition. It does not try to make education a thoroughly rewarding experience while it is going on. It also encourages society to orient education along class and status lines where vocational or industrial education is reserved for the lower classes. The upper classes get an education that gives them an ability to give the big commands and to determine the "ends" for which the industrial system is to be used. But even for these people, education is dominated by the prevailing ideology and norms and the fixed ends are seldom questioned. An experimental society such as Dewey had in mind would think it irrational to allow interest groups composed mainly of businessmen, political blocs in government, and labor union leaders to enjoy the power they have in control! public policy and in achieving monopoly positions of advantage at the expense of the rest of the community. Mention the capital concept as part of the ideology that makes this kind of power possible.

5. Relativism/Instrumentalism compared Here is a summary of the relation between (1) positivism or logical positivism /cultural relativism, and (2) the Dewey/Ayres position. I shall call the above (1) and (2) for shorthand. (1) Values relative in two senses: (a) they are relative to the culture in which they are found; e.g., monogamy is traditional here and polyandry traditional there; we cannot we' one is better than another, and (b) "moral relativism," meaning that values are merely statements of personal or group preferences and tastes about which there can be no argument. The Implication here is that it is impossible to say that democracy is better than totalitarianism. (1) holds there is no way to either verify or refute value statements because they cannot be put into testable propositions. (1) holds that science is concerned with what it, not what ought to be. Science is descriptive, not normative. (1) holds to the dualism of fact/value. It assumes the dualism is valid. holds that science can determine the best means to accomplish given end. (1) holds that science can deal only with descriptive ethics; e.g., can verify statement that goodof people oppose killing; it cannot say whether people ought to kill.

6. The Fact/value dualism holds facts and values are two distinct realms of phenomena. The (2) view holds: It agrees with (1) as follows: There is great diversity among the values of different cultures in both time and place and mores can make conduct seem good here that is deemed bad there. (1) holds that we should not use our own tribal values as a standard by which to judge the values of other cultures. This was a tolerant and humane view at a time when we were ignorant enough and arrogant enough to impose our values ‑ the white man's burden ‑ upon aliens. A large proportion of the values of all peoples are non-logical because they appear to have originated from inadequate information and/or false information and false conclusions. Agrees that some value statements are untestable, as, values based on divine authority, revelation, faith, etc. Agrees that it is not possible to use the experimental method in the domain of human affairs in the customary and controlled way that it is used in the natural sciences. Agrees that at one level of discourse and generalization it is important to distinguish between fact and value; that work should be carried on in a manner independent of biases and hopes or of deliberate manipulation or slanting of evidence. (1) and (2) differ as follows: (2) holds that historically there has consistently been two loci of values (not one, as positivists maintain): one technological and the other non­-technological.

7. Historically, humans have relied on observation, trial and error, recollection and experiment to not only invent tool‑skills but also to determine that some forms of human behavior (individual and collective are better than others because of their consequences. (2) holds that values are capable of objective verification or refutation by using the critical methods of inquiry of the natural sciences. Science is not merely a matter of fact‑finding nor of controlled experimentation; it is a critical method of knowing that seeks out all pertinent evidence, is objective, truthful, puts propositions in testable form, etc. Technological behavior is that which is oriented in terms of problem­ solving, in terms of knowledge, and critical methods of evaluation. Dewey called this approach to values "Instrumentalism"; Ayres called it technological values. (2) rejects the sharp dualism of means/ends; questions the validity of the dualism; substitutes for ends seen as absolute ideals or ultimate termini of action the concept of ends‑in‑view. Here means are judged in terms of their consequences in accomplishing an end‑in‑view. There are no ultimate ends; rather, there are an indefinite series of ends‑in‑view and in which one end‑in‑view becomes the means to the accomplishment of a succeeding end‑in‑view. In one context phenomena are means, in another ends‑in‑view.

8. These values are not ethical certainties or absolutes; they are tentative truths or warrantable assertions. They are true (appropriate) only in a context or specific situation. (2) also rejects the sharp dualism of fact/value, depending on the level of generalization. It holds that facts are facts in relationship to a paradigm, hence it is most important to examine the assumptions or paradigm employed in inquiry. Point out that this is not inconsistent with the agreement (top of this page) that it is important to distinguish between fact and value in all efforts to avoid bias. ‑Implication of (2) is that humans have a degree of freedom, that there is no rigid determinism. The universe is determined in sense that every event has a cause, but not a pre‑determined one. Indeed, it is the fact that every event has a cause that makes choice meaningful because we can use critical inquiry to determine the consequences of moral choice A or B.

9. The idea of freedom is meaningful when seen in terms of freedom of choice within some specified context with some end‑in‑view in mind or to determine which end‑in‑view to choose. (2) agrees with the relativists and positivists that we should not use our tribal values as a standard for judging the values of a foreign culture. holds that the dualism is not valid, that it is an intellectual carry­over from earlier cultures when people believed there were two distinct realms of being: mind/body, spirit/flesh, natural/supernatural Instrumentalists point out that the fact/value and means/ends dualism does not hold up when we observe scientists in action. The latter make value judgments about methodology, truth, objectivity, relevancy, reliability, significance levels, and such. Scientists, including positivists and instrumentalists, make such value judgments as: (1) we ought to employ scientific methods of inquiry rather than authority, faith, dreams, revelation (because of consequences, the best method of obtaining facts); (2) we ought to be truthful (because of consequences); (3) we ought to examine all the evidence (because it provides more reliable factual statements). These values and facts and knowledge are themselves considered worthwhile ends‑in‑view because they are instrumental (as means) in the conduct of further inquiry. It is mistaken to say that scientists as scientists do not make value judgments on rational grounds (which consider consequences). They do what the instrumentalists advocate as being applicable to human affairs.

10. Positivists sometimes make this criticism: it is impossible to make ethical choices based on knowledge of consequences because we cannot obtain all relevant knowledge and know all consequences, hence some (many) value judgments will be wrong. (2) agree that some choices will be wrong because of inadequate knowledge of consequences but that this is (1) superior to irrational choice and acceptance of the implications of the positivists, and (2) positivists are here engaged in a quest for certainty, absolute truth at the same time they claim that values are meaningless, and (3) they are making a moral judgment about right and wrong at same time they deny this is possible. The majority of economists today are relativists or positivists. They hold that science is value‑free and that the science of economics is value‑free. This position has been modified to this extent: much macroeconomics is concerned with public policy and they freely admit that this area is normative. But they hold that the normative goals are not those that derive from the science of economics; rather, they are goals set by the public through the political process. Taking these goals as "given” they can use the science of economics to best achieve (means) the goals {ends).