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King’s Cross Underground Fire 1987

King’s Cross Underground Fire 1987. [Group 3] Abby Asher Evan Davis Timmy Doonan Carlton Marshall. ChBE 285 Chemical Engineering Safety Case Study. Overview. November 18, 1987 Large flashover fire on an escalator Killed 31 people Injured more than sixty

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King’s Cross Underground Fire 1987

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  1. King’s Cross Underground Fire1987 [Group 3] Abby Asher Evan Davis Timmy Doonan Carlton Marshall ChBE 285 Chemical Engineering Safety Case Study

  2. Overview • November 18, 1987 • Large flashover fire on an escalator • Killed 31 people • Injured more than sixty • Result of many safety hazards • Aftermath of fire included implementation of numerous safety regulations

  3. Existing Hazards • Old wooden escalators • Dirty running track (grease, hair, paper, etc.) • Toxic paint • Smoking ban consistently ignored • 46 similar small fires in about 30 years • 32 result of careless smoking • No assigned safety personnel • No safety procedures

  4. Timeline • 7:25 p.m. Fire started • 7:30 p.m. Fire reported • 7:39 p.m. Police began evacuating passengers through escalators • 7:40 p.m. Trains ordered not to stop at King’s Cross • 7:43 p.m. Fire engines arrived on site • 7:45 p.m. Large flashover occurred • 7:46 p.m. Full evacuation from station ordered • 1:46 a.m. Fire extinguished

  5. Root Causes • Several combustion points found on escalators • All on right hand side • Several gaps in escalator treads found • Large build-up on track analyzed • Found to be easy to ignite • Fires extinguished themselves in 9 minutes • No evidence of flash fire

  6. Root Causes • Debated continued over the cause of the flash fire • Ceiling paint? • Piston effect? • Neither explanation was very good

  7. Root Causes • Computer modeling done by a research establishment (Harwell) • Simplifications made • Several configurations considered • Unexpected occurred: • Hot gas remained in the trench of the escalator • Flames burned parallel to 30º angle of the track • Thought to be impossible • Model was suspected to be faulty

  8. Root Causes • Scale replica of the escalator was built and lit • Flames performed as in simulation • Situated themselves parallel to the escalator • Heated wooden treads to 500-600ºC • Led to treads flashing • New phenomena now known as the “trench effect”

  9. UltimateResults • Buildup of grease and hair allowed fire to ignite and spread • Containment of escalator guided flames like a trench, causing overheating and flashover • Smoke was clean until reaching toxic ceiling paint • Particular combination of circumstances led to the trench effect

  10. Ultimate Results • Why was this the first time a small fire flashed over? • Complete lack of attempt to put out the fire • Exact position of fire across width of escalator • Found to be conducive to trench effect

  11. Ultimate Results • Damage from fire fixed quickly • Ticket hall and platforms for most lines opened next day • Ticket halls for most affected lines opened in stages over next four weeks • Nobody was prosecuted for this disaster • No justification for charges

  12. Lessons Learned • 26 recommendations made by DoT’s investigator • Wooden escalators replaced with all-steel ones • Smoking banned again • Sale of smoking materials in station banned • Installation of sprinklers and heat detectors in escalators • Non-executive director of safety • Mandatory safety training for staff • Public telephones, radios, and televisions put in place • Paint restrictions

  13. Lessons Learned • Only 8 out of 26 recommendations implemented four years later • Cigarette butts still found on floors ten years later

  14. Lessons Learned • Most important lesson: • Fluid flow phenomenon – Trench effect • Restrictions on escalator material help avoid repeating set up for this phenomenon

  15. References • [1] Fennel, Desmond. Investigation into the King’s Cross Underground Fire. The Department of Transport, November 1988, London. • [2] “Kings Cross Fire 1987 News Footage” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sj21xNbNKBQ • [3] “King’s Cross fire” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King%27s_Cross_fire • [4] “Kings Cross Fire – London 2007 from the London Fire Journal” http://www.firetactics.com/KINGSCROSS.htm • [5] “Safety fears linger, decade after Kings Cross fire” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/31723.stm • [6] “BBC On This Day – 1987: King’s Cross station fire ‘kills 27’” http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/18/newsid_2519000/2519675.stm

  16. Questions?

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