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A short introduction to honeypots

A short introduction to honeypots. Εμμανουήλ Βασιλομανωλάκης Υποψήφιος Διδάκτωρ Telecooperation Group, Technische Universität Darmstadt Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED) Συνεργάτης Εργ. Δικτύων ISLAB, ΙΠΤ, ΔΗΜΟΚΡΙΤΟΣ manolis @cased.de. Outline. Introduction

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A short introduction to honeypots

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  1. A short introduction to honeypots Εμμανουήλ Βασιλομανωλάκης Υποψήφιος Διδάκτωρ Telecooperation Group, Technische Universität Darmstadt Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED) Συνεργάτης Εργ. Δικτύων ISLAB, ΙΠΤ, ΔΗΜΟΚΡΙΤΟΣ manolis@cased.de

  2. Outline • Introduction • Classifications • Deployment Architectures • Open source vs. nothing • 2 Honeypots • SURFcert IDS & experiences from Demokritos • Future work - ideas Telecooperation Group | CASED

  3. Introduction • Definition: “A security resource who's value lies in being probed, attacked or compromised” • Doesn’t have to be a system: Honeytokens • We want to get compromised! • Certainly not a standalone security mechanism. • Why? • FUN! • No false-positives! • Research: Malware analysis/reverse engineering • Reducing available attack surface/early warning system Telecooperation Group | CASED

  4. Honeypot Classifications • Low interaction: simulate network operations (usually at the tcp/ip stack) • [Medium interaction: simulate network operations(with more “sophisticated” ways)] • High interaction: real systems(e.g., VMs) • Other classifications: • Purpose: Generic, Malware collectors, SSH, etc. • Production – Research (not reallyuseful) Telecooperation Group | CASED

  5. Honeypot Deployment Architectures Telecooperation Group | CASED

  6. Open Source vs. nothing (really!) Telecooperation Group | CASED

  7. Dionaea • Low Interaction honeypot for collecting malware • Nepenthes successor • Basic protocol simulated: SMB (port 445) • Others: HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, TFTP, MSSQL and SIP (VOIP) • Also supports IPv6 and TLS • Malware files: stored locally or/and sent to 3rd party entities (CWSandbox, Norman Sandbox, Anubis, VirusTotal) Telecooperation Group | CASED

  8. Kippo (1/2) • Low interaction SSH honeypot • Features: • Presenting a fake (but “functional”) system to the attacker (resembling a Debian 5.0 installation) • Attacker can download his tools through wget, and we save them for later inspection (cool!) • Session logs are stored in an UML- compatible format for easy replay with original timings (even cooler!) • Easy to install, but hard to get hackers! Telecooperation Group | CASED

  9. SURFcert IDS • An open source (GPLv2) distributed intrusion detection system based on honeypots • Sensors, act as proxies, forwarding network traffic from the monitored network to the system’s center using OpenVPN • Supported Honeypots: Nepenthes, Dionaea, Argos, Kippo • Three parts: • Tunnel – honeypot server • Web – Logging server • Sensors Telecooperation Group | CASED

  10. SURFcert IDS • Also: • Supports p0f for attackers’ OS detection • Statistics, nice web-GUI, sensor status, geographical visualizations, and more… Telecooperation Group | CASED

  11. SURFcert IDS @ Demokritos • Some stats: • 21.000 attacks on 3 different sensors (1 month) • 1500 malware files downloaded • Main target: port 445 • Successfully detected infected systems, inside our network (mostly with a Conficker Worm variant) • Automatic malware analysis can give us valuable informationon Botnets (and their C&C IRC servers) • Possible to find zero-date exploits / new malware (or different variants) Telecooperation Group | CASED

  12. Future Work - Ideas • Features: • Better visualization • Anti-evasion techniques • Cheap & easy mobile sensors:Raspberry Pi • Advertising honeypots • Honeypots: • Mobile honeypots (e.g., Android) • SCADA – Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Attacker scans our system Attacker trying to connect to our “ftp” server Telecooperation Group | CASED

  13. Thank You  Questions? Telecooperation Group | CASED

  14. Backup slides Telecooperation Group | CASED

  15. Useful Links • Interesting stuff: • http://www.islab.demokritos.gr– Many honeypot-related thesesavailable • https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/support/proactive-detection/proactive-detection-of-security-incidents-II-honeypots - Report from ENISA regarding honeypots • http://publicids.surfnet.nl:8080/surfnetids/login.php - Demo version of SURFcert IDS • Honeypots: • http://www.honeynet.org – General information on honeypots • http://dionaea.carnivore.it – Dionaea honeypot • http://amunhoney.sourceforge.net – Amun honeypot • http://map.honeynet.org – Honeypots visualization Telecooperation Group | CASED

  16. SURFcert IDS @ Demokritos [outside main firewall] [inside main firewall] Telecooperation Group | CASED

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