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Ireland and European integration, 1961-1968

Ireland and European integration, 1961-1968. Dr Maurice FitzGerald Lecturer in European and International Studies Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies (PIRES) Loughborough University email m.fitzgerald@lboro.ac.uk

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Ireland and European integration, 1961-1968

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  1. Ireland and European integration, 1961-1968 Dr Maurice FitzGerald Lecturer in European and International Studies Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies (PIRES) Loughborough University email m.fitzgerald@lboro.ac.uk web http://www-staff.lboro.ac.uk/~eumf2/index.htm

  2. abstract This paper − “Ireland and European integration, 1961-1968” − argues that one of the most important contributions by Seán Lemass, and in turn Jack Lynch, in terms of Irish foreign policy in the period under examination, has been the way in which Ireland now views itself, and the manner in which it is itself perceived. In personifying strong and pragmatic leadership at a time of rapid change, it is argued here that there was a major shift in emphasis away from overly-active participation at the United Nations to the mainstreaming of policy within a twin-pronged reorientation that saw improved Anglo-Irish relations and fuller support for, and participation in, European integration. The “traditional nationalist and insular outlook” of Irish politicians in general was radically altered by the dynamism of the new political elite nurtured under Lemass, and by the Dublin government’s less jaundiced attitude to the world and, in particular, towards Europe. The Lemass approach was basically intended to engender economic growth, and it did so at the expense of political dogma, succeeding to a large extent. The attitude to foreign policy was thus marked by a significant departure because, as the 1960s progressed, the Irish government became ever more western in its orientation, less self-absorbed and decreasingly likely to be maverick. This led to some sacred foreign policy cows being challenged, negated and/or reversed, none more so than in relation to military neutrality. This does not mean that Ireland did not act in its own self-interest or that allegiances did not shift, that policy was always pursued coherently or that mistakes were not made. In truth, though, it can be argued that Lemass, and subsequently Lynch, helped to modernise attitudes, making them more European in essence and nature rather than just Gaelic, Anglophobic and/or Atlanticist by tradition or reaction, gearing them towards the world as it is, rather than how some would wish it to be. More than that, however, Irish foreign policy has never been the same again as a result of this period, years in which Ireland sought (1961 to 1963), and then reapplied (1967), to enter the European mainstream.

  3. liberal intergovernmentalist view how were European integration policies viewed in Ireland during the first half of the 1960s? industrial tariff removal: reluctantly accepts tariff removal, while trying to work at ways around it, fears dumping and for the future of indigenous industry, but even if it needs time to adapt it generally favours the free movement of goods and the elimination of duties and quantitative restrictions between member states, and is increasingly keen on attracting foreign direct investment CAP: under pressure from farmers who were strongly in favour, the government would like to have had an input in shaping the actual policy, even if it is fundamentally disposed to the idea anyway external tariff policy: slow to respond to GATT, it wants high agricultural protection, but needs time so that it could gradually come into line with EC policy British membership: realises that if the UK is in it must be in as well because, while admission will require constitutional change, its main fear is being left out in the cold; happy to conclude the AIFTA as a precursor to EC internal trade harmonisation transport: worries about the country's peripheral nature, the government wants only gradual liberalisation, but was not going to look for derogations or any special arrangements foreign policy cooperation: weakly in favour of European cooperation, but wants to avoid making military neutrality an issue at home or in Brussels, though in practice this means that it is opposed to NATO while supporting an eventual but as yet undefined European defence mechanism, at least in rhetoric institutions: not interested in the ECSC or Euratom although it will join both, it is strongly in favour of the EEC by the end of this period, and wants an equal voice in decisions, thus tacitly supporting the Luxembourg compromise; realises early on that it will have to accept, and provide constitutionally for, the acquis communautaire, but is quite happy with other benefits such as the European Investment Bank and the European Social Fund * This table is based on the model presented in Andrew Moravcsik, The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp.162-163, and adapted from “appendix xi - Irish preferences according to Moravcsik's model of Common Market consolidation” in Maurice FitzGerald, Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966 (Florence: EUI PhD thesis, 1999), p.424

  4. timeline, 1961 to 1968 5 July 1961 Dublin government aide-mémoire almost sinks Irish application before it is even submitted 31 July 1961 Ireland applies to join the EEC ten days before the United Kingdom and Denmark do the same November 1961 negotiations for UK entry open, but the EEC Council of Ministers does not approve Irish proposals for negotiations to begin until October 1962 14 January 1963 Charles de Gaulle effectively vetoes the UK’s application, and Ireland’s application falls into limbo November 1966 Seán Lemass resigns as taoiseach, and is replaced by Jack Lynch 11 May 1967 Ireland reactivates its EEC and ECSC applications, and submits a Euratom application November 1967 de Gaulle vetoes the UK’s second application, and once more Ireland’s EEC application stalls

  5. relevant Irish government figures Seán Lemass taoiseach, 1959-1966 Jack Lynch taoiseach, 1966-1973 & 1977-1979 T.K.Whitaker D/F secretary, 1955-1969 Frank Aiken D/EA minister, 1951-1954 & 1957-1969

  6. EEC application, 31 July 1961 treaty basis and Irish government application On 31 July 1961, the Irish government submitted its application (see across) for full EEC membership under the relevant provision in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Article 237 EEC; it read as follows: “Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”

  7. ECSC application, 7 January 1963 treaty basis and Irish government application On 14 January 1963, the Irish government presented its application (see across) for full ECSC membership under the relevant provision in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Article 98 ECSC; it read as follows: “Any European State may apply to accede to this Treaty. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the High Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of accession, likewise acting unanimously. Accession shall take effect on the day when the instrument of accession is received by the Government acting as depositary of this Treaty.”

  8. other alternatives? • the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area agreement of December 1965 • associate EC membership? • the European Free Trade Association? other foreign policy developments? • the abatement of United Nations activism? • the end of military neutrality? • the normalisation of relations with Northern Ireland?

  9. Euratom application, 10 May 1967 treaty basis and Irish government application On 11 May 1967, the Irish government presented its application (see across) for full Euratom membership under the relevant provision in the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 205 Euratom; it read as follows: “Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”

  10. renewed ECSC application, 10 May 1967 renewed Irish government application On 11 May 1967, the Irish government renewed its application (see across) for full ECSC membership.

  11. renewed EEC application, 10 May 1967 renewed Irish government application On 11 May 1967, the Irish government renewed its application (see across) for full EEC membership.

  12. conclusions • why did Ireland’s 1961-1963 and 1967 EEC applications really fail? • how did Dublin governments really perceive the economic and political exigencies of European integration? • what was the situation Ireland faced once its second application did not succeed?

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