1 / 46

Balkan Endgame and Economic Transformation

Balkan Endgame and Economic Transformation. Vladimir Gligorov. Contents. The game International actors Emerging economic region EU prospects. The game. The choice was: to democratize and negotiate a proper federal structure, or take control over the party and the army and either

yuli-morris
Télécharger la présentation

Balkan Endgame and Economic Transformation

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Balkan Endgame and Economic Transformation Vladimir Gligorov

  2. Contents • The game • International actors • Emerging economic region • EU prospects

  3. The game • The choice was: • to democratize and negotiate a proper federal structure, or • take control over the party and the army and either • centralise Serbia and then Yugoslavia, or • integrate Serbian lands.

  4. International environment • American authority, • European Union conditional promise of integration, • regional normalization, and • UN cooperation.

  5. Economic transformation • Relatively fast and sustained growth based on growth of productivity, i.e., on increased efficiency and not on growth of employment. • High and sustained inflow of foreign investment due to relatively fast decrease of risks due to political stability, institutional change and the prospect of EU integration. • Delayed restructuring of the public sector and recurrent fiscal problems.

  6. Balkan specifics • Slow reindustrialization • High external imbalances • Distorted labour market

  7. Balkan specifics • Macroeconomic stability not really a problem, at least when it comes to inflation • Exchange rate stability not a problem • Fiscal prudence

  8. Annual GDP growth rateschange in % against preceding year

  9. GDPreal change in % against previous year 2004 2005 2006 2007 wiiw forecast Bulgaria 5.6 5.5 5.3 5 Croatia 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.8 Romania 8.4 4.1 4.5 4.5 Turkey 8.9 5.8 6 6 Albania 6.7 5.5 5.5 6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.0 6.5 6 6 Macedonia 4.1 3.6 4 4 Montenegro 3.7 4.0 5 5 Serbia 9.3 6.5 5 4

  10. Industrial production in South Eastern Europe (1990 = 100)

  11. Gross industrial production in NMS-5 and SEEC year on year, growth in %, 3-month moving average

  12. Labour productivity in industry in SEEC and NMS-5, 1990 = 100 Note: CS data 2005 Serbia only.

  13. Exports per capita in NMS-5 and SEEC in EUR (goods trade only)

  14. FDI stock per capita in NMS-5 and SEEC 1990-2005, EUR

  15. FDI, exports and balances • FDI increasing but not dramatically • Exports growing • Level low • Deficits high • Comparative advantages in labor or resource intensive sectors

  16. FDI stock per capita in NMS-5 and SEEC EUR

  17. Foreign trade: Exports cumulated period, annual change in % 27.3.06 AL, BA: Data refer to bolance of payment statistic.

  18. Foreign trade: Imports cumulated period, annual change in % 27.3.06 AL, BA: Data refer to bolance of payment statistic.

  19. Trade balance (commodities) in % of GDP in SEEC and NMS-5 2005customs statics Note: Montenegro Data refer to 2003

  20. Current account in % of GDP in NMS-5 and SEEC 2005

  21. Private transfers in SEE % GDP

  22. Average monthly gross wages in industry, EUR (ER), in SEEC and NMS-5 Note: RO net wages, Serbia data 2000 refer to 2001, Montenegro 2005 data refer to 2003

  23. Labor market • Employment low • Unemployment high • Shadow economy significant

  24. Employment in NMS-5 and SEEC 1990 = 100 1996=100

  25. Unemployment Rates, 2000, 2005in % of labour force, average, LFS Note: Albania, registration data, end of period

  26. Policy responses • Fiscal policy prudent • Monetary policy the main instrument • Credit controls not the proper instrument

  27. General government budget% of GDP 27.3.06 Montenegro: Central budget.

  28. Consumer price inflation, 2000-2007change in % against preceeding year 27.3.06

  29. 2004 2005 2006 2007 Prognose Bulgarien 6.1 5.0 8 5 Rumänien 11.9 9.0 8.5 8.0 Kroatien 2.1 3.3 3.5 3 Mazedonien -0.4 0.5 3 3 Türkei 8.6 8.2 9.0 6.0 Albanien 3.0 2.4 2.5 2 Bosnien und Herzegowina 0.7 2.9 6 4 Montenegro 2.4 2.3 3 3 Serbien 11.4 16.2 15 15 VerbraucherpreiseVeränderungen gegen das Vorjahr in % Quelle: wiiw-Jahresdatenbank, Prognosen: wiiw, Juli 2006.

  30. Current account and gross external debtin % of GDP 27.3.06 Current account Gross external debt

  31. Share of total foreign debt in GDP, 2000-2005in % 27.3.06

  32. Anteil der privaten an der gesamten Auslandsverschuldung, 2000-2006in % Quelle: Nationalbank des jeweiligen Landes.

  33. Reale Wechselkurse, 2003-2006 (EUR per NCU, VPI-deflationiert, Veränderung gegenüber Vorjahr) Anmerkung: Ansteigende Linie bedeutet reale Aufwertung.Quelle: wiiw-Monatsdatenbank, nationale Statistiken.

  34. Nominal growth (cumulative, in percent) (lhs) Real growth (compound rate, % per year) (rhs) 300 45 38 37 40 250 35 34 28 200 30 25 20 150 18 20 16 100 15 12 13 10 10 50 5 3 5 2 0 0 CS RO BG TR AL HU BA HR SI MK PL SK CZ EUR Bank credit to the private sector, 2002-04 Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; national data; BIS estimates.

  35. Bank credit to the private sector, 2000-04 (increase in percent of GDP, annual average) Sources: National data; BIS estimates.

  36. Real growth of credit, 2003-04(cumulative growth rate, in percent) BG Enterprises 85 RO BA CS 65 AL SI 45 TR HU MK 25 HR CZ 5 PL SK -15 Households RO 300 CS 250 BG AL TR 200 MK 150 HU BA SK CZ 100 HR SI PL 50 0 Source: National data; BIS estimates.

  37. Time, savings and foreign currency deposits Foreign liabilities 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 RO BG SK HR SI HU PL TR MK CZ Commercial bank liabilities, 2002-04(annual pct change, quarterly average ) Source: IMF; BIS estimates.

  38. Capital controls Quantitative restrictions Reserve requirements Albania 10% Bosnia and Herzegovina 15% Bulgaria 23% per year increasing after the limit Croatia 17 % to 55% (marginal) Macedonia 10% Montenegro 23 % Romania 35% to increase to 40% Serbia 18% to 38% on foreign currency

  39. Western Balkan free trade area • Free trade area from January 1, 2007 • The area is small and the intra-regional trade is segmented • Distortions through different trade regimes with the EU and the rest of the world

  40. SEE trade: exports as % of total (2004)percentage point change in shares 2001-2004 * EU-4 = Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy.

  41. SEE trade: imports as % of total (2004)percentage point change in shares 2001-2004 * EU-4 = Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy.

  42. Bulgarien 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 6.3 1.2 1.7 2.3 Kroatien - 0.1 0.8 0.0 Mazedonien - 0.3 - 0.2 0.0 - 0.2 0.4 - 0.4 0.0 1.0 - 1.8 Rumänien 0.0 - 0.1 0.8 0. 0 0.2 1.2 - 4.8 1.2 - 1.3 Serbien & Montenegro - 0.6 - 0.3 0.4 1.7 Russland 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.6 0.3 0.0 - 16.9 - 5.9 - 2.4 - 4.6 8.3 - 4.5 - 2.7 - 2.2 EU - 4* 1.2 1.4 4.4 1.8 5.9 SOE - 7 0.8 0.3 0.7 Exportanteile 2005 Veränderung der Anteile in Prozentpunkten, 2001-2005 von: ALB B&H BUL CRO MAC ROM S&M RUS nach: Albanien 0.1 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 2.3 5.0 Bosnien und Herzegowina 0.0 - 0.1 - 0.3 0.1 0.0 Gesamtveränderung, Mrd. USD 0.4 1.4 5.9 4.4 0.8 14.4 1.9 153.6 * EU-4 = AUT, GER, GRE, ITA.Quelle: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

  43. Political challenges • Unfinished process of disintegration • Montenegro referendum • Kosovo negotiations • Bosnia and Herzegovina connection • Regional integration

  44. Stability Inflation speeding up Real exchange rates apreciating Policies mainly prudent

  45. EU prospects • The Hague Tribunal • Stabilization and Association Agreement • Democratization • Threat of populism

  46. SEE EU accession forecast

More Related