Operations in Afghanistan Regional Command East A CJTF Perspective

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2. Regional Command East

3. CJTF-82 Campaign Plan Dated May 2010. CJTF-82 version.Dated May 2010. CJTF-82 version.

4. This slide comes from the IJC brief used by LTG Rodriguez. There are three enemies of the Afghan people Three elements that undermine our progress We know of the insurgents who are the enemy of the Afghan people Will review what we understand about them Also � there is the The Crisis in confidence That is, a loss or lack of faith in government institutions And there is us � the International community The things that we do to help the Afghans, have often hurt them From growing money-lords and enabling corruption To civilian casualties and cultural casualties we cause To antagonizing Afghans when we drive aggressively So, there is more than one enemy here This slide comes from the IJC brief used by LTG Rodriguez. There are three enemies of the Afghan people Three elements that undermine our progress We know of the insurgents who are the enemy of the Afghan people Will review what we understand about them Also � there is the The Crisis in confidence That is, a loss or lack of faith in government institutions And there is us � the International community The things that we do to help the Afghans, have often hurt them From growing money-lords and enabling corruption To civilian casualties and cultural casualties we cause To antagonizing Afghans when we drive aggressively So, there is more than one enemy here

5. What is different The way we approach counterinsurgency is people-centric We are fighting an insurgency, not the insurgents Recognize how we contribute to the insurgents goals and repairing that Responding to corruption rather than enabling it and ignoring it Immersing ourselves in the environment � from Combined Action with the security forces to the government to the local people Taking deliberate steps to repair unity of command and effort gaps � from the C2 structure to situational understanding Commitment to respond, first, to the needs of the local people � a practical understanding that there is no one right way to respond to people�s needs Empowering the lowest levels to execute the concept and intent based on the immediate requirements, and then resourcing thatWhat is different The way we approach counterinsurgency is people-centric We are fighting an insurgency, not the insurgents Recognize how we contribute to the insurgents goals and repairing that Responding to corruption rather than enabling it and ignoring it Immersing ourselves in the environment � from Combined Action with the security forces to the government to the local people Taking deliberate steps to repair unity of command and effort gaps � from the C2 structure to situational understanding Commitment to respond, first, to the needs of the local people � a practical understanding that there is no one right way to respond to people�s needs Empowering the lowest levels to execute the concept and intent based on the immediate requirements, and then resourcing that

6. Combined Action What we�ve learned: Afghan and Coalition Force Leadership have greater common situational understanding of their Area of Operations Greater understanding of Retention and AWOL issues Pay/Combat Pay, Facilities (Living/Working) Key Take Aways: Partnership/combined action requires extensive time, resources, and planning Prioritization of resources, construction, etc. Mission Variables Requires coordination/support at all levels to include MoI/MoD, IJC, CJTF/CORPS/Zone, BCTs ANSF Operational capabilities have increased Greater confidence and willingness to accept moderate risk ANSF led operations have increased 15% across RC(E) Operations incorporating ANSF have increased 20% across RC(E) Example: Kandaks ISO Operation Mastarek in RC(S) What we�ve learned: Afghan and Coalition Force Leadership have greater common situational understanding of their Area of Operations Greater understanding of Retention and AWOL issues Pay/Combat Pay, Facilities (Living/Working) Key Take Aways: Partnership/combined action requires extensive time, resources, and planning Prioritization of resources, construction, etc. Mission Variables Requires coordination/support at all levels to include MoI/MoD, IJC, CJTF/CORPS/Zone, BCTs ANSF Operational capabilities have increased Greater confidence and willingness to accept moderate risk ANSF led operations have increased 15% across RC(E) Operations incorporating ANSF have increased 20% across RC(E) Example: Kandaks ISO Operation Mastarek in RC(S)

7. Afghan leadership can be more responsive to their units� and Soldiers� needs because they can meet with them more frequently as they travel with the DCG�s throughout the battle space. Whereas, previously Corps CDR�s would take an entire day to travel to one COP on only travel to a few outposts a week. Now they can travel to several a day and visit nearly every one of their outposts once a month. Additionally our combined TOC�s have accelerated the exchange of information creating increased SA for our ANSF partners but just as importantly giving us far better visibility of the battlefield and more nested operations. We no longer hear from our ANSF counterparts, �if you had told us about this operation we could have helped with intel or engaging the populace, ect.� We�ve always had anecdotal information about the state of ANSF facilities but some were beyond what we ever really believed (see upcoming slides). Through combined action we took aggressive steps to get these improved. Additionally many of the facilities mimic our garrison structures - offices but not Operations Centers. This is dysfunctional for a country at war right now. In many cases locations were selected years ago as part of an overall construction plan that does not reflect the current tactcial reality. Additionally, we are investing a lot of money in Permanent structures that may not be in the right locations to maintain the peace once the insurgency is defeated. LTG Khalic is the example we are thinking of - contractors came in bidding over $200K for construction and he kicked them out. Ultimately it was done for far less (around $25K - confirm number with BG Fuller). Understanding the shortfalls have allowed us to take some unusual initiatives: working with TF-41 (IJC I.O. Task Force) to expand cell phone coverage to remote areas helps ANSF receive and transfer pay to families. Training and confidence has improved among ANSF in combined action. Key stats: 70% plan to reenlist, 94% would recommend enlistment to family and friends 21% AWOL due to Pay issues 20% AWOL due to leave issues Only 5% fear reprisals for serving in ANSF Other issues that can be discussed: ANSF do not have Operational level HQ or mentality CM ratings are not accurate representation or actual readiness CF Units are taking ownership of training ANSF Funding Lines have become blurred with Combined Action (example: $9000 NDS contract held up at CENTCOM level) Afghan leadership can be more responsive to their units� and Soldiers� needs because they can meet with them more frequently as they travel with the DCG�s throughout the battle space. Whereas, previously Corps CDR�s would take an entire day to travel to one COP on only travel to a few outposts a week. Now they can travel to several a day and visit nearly every one of their outposts once a month. Additionally our combined TOC�s have accelerated the exchange of information creating increased SA for our ANSF partners but just as importantly giving us far better visibility of the battlefield and more nested operations. We no longer hear from our ANSF counterparts, �if you had told us about this operation we could have helped with intel or engaging the populace, ect.� We�ve always had anecdotal information about the state of ANSF facilities but some were beyond what we ever really believed (see upcoming slides). Through combined action we took aggressive steps to get these improved. Additionally many of the facilities mimic our garrison structures - offices but not Operations Centers. This is dysfunctional for a country at war right now. In many cases locations were selected years ago as part of an overall construction plan that does not reflect the current tactcial reality. Additionally, we are investing a lot of money in Permanent structures that may not be in the right locations to maintain the peace once the insurgency is defeated. LTG Khalic is the example we are thinking of - contractors came in bidding over $200K for construction and he kicked them out. Ultimately it was done for far less (around $25K - confirm number with BG Fuller). Understanding the shortfalls have allowed us to take some unusual initiatives: working with TF-41 (IJC I.O. Task Force) to expand cell phone coverage to remote areas helps ANSF receive and transfer pay to families. Training and confidence has improved among ANSF in combined action. Key stats: 70% plan to reenlist, 94% would recommend enlistment to family and friends 21% AWOL due to Pay issues 20% AWOL due to leave issues Only 5% fear reprisals for serving in ANSF Other issues that can be discussed: ANSF do not have Operational level HQ or mentality CM ratings are not accurate representation or actual readiness CF Units are taking ownership of training ANSF Funding Lines have become blurred with Combined Action (example: $9000 NDS contract held up at CENTCOM level)

8. 8 Unity of Effort Both Dawn Liberi and I signed the Campaign Plan and Op-Order, as well all FRAGOs that come from the platform. Civilian Uplift In July of last year you would have found a POLAD at Bagram and maybe one or two civilians in support. There were only about 20-30 civilians in RC/E. About 150-160 COM Personnel (DoS, USAID, USDA) at strategic locations throughout the East (mention that you will discuss the strategy later) and growing each and every week Right now we have approximately 30 individuals at the RC/E platform whose job is to support the efforts of those out in the field. Unity of Effort Both Dawn Liberi and I signed the Campaign Plan and Op-Order, as well all FRAGOs that come from the platform. Civilian Uplift In July of last year you would have found a POLAD at Bagram and maybe one or two civilians in support. There were only about 20-30 civilians in RC/E. About 150-160 COM Personnel (DoS, USAID, USDA) at strategic locations throughout the East (mention that you will discuss the strategy later) and growing each and every week Right now we have approximately 30 individuals at the RC/E platform whose job is to support the efforts of those out in the field.

9. New Stability Organization Flat Organization � Easy to respond to any issue/task Aligned by Campaign Plan Objectives Effective integration of CIV-MIL Ability to operationalize efforts and produce measureable outcomes Creates a common operating picture Define end states and establish synergy working towards those end states Mixture of CIV-MIL leadership on teams Ability to prioritize tasks based on common operating picture New Stability Organization Flat Organization � Easy to respond to any issue/task Aligned by Campaign Plan Objectives Effective integration of CIV-MIL Ability to operationalize efforts and produce measureable outcomes Creates a common operating picture Define end states and establish synergy working towards those end states Mixture of CIV-MIL leadership on teams Ability to prioritize tasks based on common operating picture

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