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Collective Security in Space: An Australian Perspective

Collective Security in Space: An Australian Perspective. Talk to Collective Security in Space Conference Tokyo, Japan 23 April 2007 Brett Biddington Disclaimer: Views expressed in this talk are personal and are neither endorsed by nor commit Cisco to any liability or obligation.

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Collective Security in Space: An Australian Perspective

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  1. Collective Security in Space:An Australian Perspective Talk to Collective Security in Space Conference Tokyo, Japan 23 April 2007 Brett Biddington Disclaimer: Views expressed in this talk are personal and are neither endorsed by nor commit Cisco to any liability or obligation.

  2. Introducing me 1970s BA(Hons) politics (LaTrobe Uni) diplomat university lecturer 1980-2002 – RAAF intelligence security capability development ($2bn portfolio of projects with associated R&D sponsorship) Nov 2002 joined Cisco – “internet in space” 1 of a team of 15 world-wide Canberra-based

  3. Agenda • Introduction • A lesson from World War 2 • Some requisites for cooperation • Australia’s involvement in Space • 4 Key questions • The limits of influence: Australia and the Chinese Test • A breeze for change

  4. A lesson from WW 2 Tatuo Kawai, Japanese Ambassador to Australia, Mar 1941 – Aug 1942 John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, 1941 – 1945 Basic understandings: • 1. That Australia was a sovereign nation that needed to shed its remaining colonial vestiges • 2. That Australia’s long term security lay with a close and enduring relationship with the United States as the emergent great power in the Pacific • 3. That Japan, had legitimate cause for complaint because it had denied access to raw materials and markets.

  5. Timeline • 7 Dec 1941 Pearl Harbour • 15 Feb 1942 Fall of Singapore • 19 Feb 1942 Darwin was bombed (for the first of 64 times) • 7-10 May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea • 31 May 1942 Midget submarines attack Sydney Harbour (3 boats, all lost, 4 bodies recovered, the remaining boat was recently discovered north of Sydney and is now a designated War Grave) • 4 June Battle of Midway

  6. Question What has any of this to do with Asian Perspectives on Acceptable Approaches to Collective Security in Space? Answer: Quite a lot!

  7. Some Requisites • institutions to provide continuity and context • competent people, who have a healthy respect for each other, and who have a sound appreciation of the other’s point of view • opportunities for these people to meet in order that they can share experiences, talk about the mundane and build trust • mechanisms for operational cooperation – ‘rules of the road’ (not unlike the Vienna or Hague conventions) that are actually put into effect • real determination by national leaders, beyond the rhetoric, to collaborate and cooperate and the flexibility to do so • real projects which transcend national and other institutional boundaries and which provide opportunities to build friendships, trust and related collaborative behaviours.

  8. Four Emerging Policy Challenges • 1. militarisation and weaponisation • 2. spectrum allocation and management • 3. service guarantees in an imperfect market for highly assured access to space utilities – including earth observation, communications, navigation and timing services • 4. monitoring and managing the near space environment

  9. Space: Implicit in Australian National Strategy (1) Late 40s – 60s Woomera UK and European launch programs nuclear tests 1960s programs terminated 1960s – present host US and other nation ground stations Australia contributes ~ 2% of the world’s wealth – at best a small player

  10. NEW EQUITIES – PILOT??, satellites??, Other?? Driver REAL ESTATE Time Space: Implicit in Australian National Strategy (2) Australia has gained for the price of wise diplomacy, peppercorn rentals and modest investment has gained enormous benefits from space. Personal view: Australia needs to and soon will invest in new equities

  11. Militarisation and weaponisation Australia is a player – like it or not missile defence – 3 air warfare destroyers over-the-horizon radar host of US facilities Tokyo Beijing Cooperation/competition?? Commerce Washington Security Canberra - today ‘cake and eat it too approach’

  12. Spectrum Allocation and Management Global allocations: space communications, air traffic management, marine, global SAR – very difficult Governments: need to balance needs for national security vs desire to make money by licensing spectrum ITU: venerable institution but too slow

  13. Service Guarantees for Space Utilities Militarisation/weaponisation question may be the most urgent BUT Resolving this question may be the most important – and may provide the common cause needed by which the harder national security issues may be addressed. Climate change and global warming affects us all – eg. more extreme weather events, rising sea levels essential concerns to all nations in SE Asia and Oceania The Antarctic Treaty and wider Antarctic management regime may provide a useful model.

  14. Monitoring and managing the near space environment Space surveillance and space situational awareness – an area ripe for international cooperation Common baseline from which all space faring nations can proceed with confidence PILOT project at Dome C in Antarctica – possibility to make a low cost regional contribution (dual use optical telescope)

  15. The Australian response to the Chinese ASAT test Some interesting questions 1. Why did Australia call in the Ambassador at all? 2. What did Australia seek to achieve by calling in the Ambassador? 3. How did Australia propose to measure the impact or the effect of its expression of displeasure? Turning this around, there are some further questions we might usefully ask 1. What did the Ambassador write in her account of the dressing down to Beijing? 2. Has Chinese policy and behaviour been influenced one iota by the Ambassador having been called in? If so, how? If not, why not? 3. As a result of the Ambassador’s dressing down, is China more or less likely to conduct further ASAT tests?

  16. Breeze for Change • Defence investment • More people • Missile Defence • 4-6bn over next 10 years for space segment and apps. • Network Centric Warfare • Drought – 10bn water plan • First Space Science Decadal Plan • Prediction – GEO and LEOs within the next decade • Policy and Governance • Chapman Report • Kokoda Study

  17. The Last Word “Now only the stars are neutral” John Curtin 8 Dec 1941 “I’m afraid it has gone too far; the momentum is too great”. Tatuo Kawai Nov 1941 space embraces us all

  18. Thank you bbidding@cisco.com

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