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Prosecuting cartels in terms of the Competition Act (1998) Presentation to the

Prosecuting cartels in terms of the Competition Act (1998) Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 29 February 2008 Shan Ramburuth : Competition Commissioner Tel: 012 394 3332 E-mail: ShanR@compcom.co.za. Format of presentation.

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Prosecuting cartels in terms of the Competition Act (1998) Presentation to the

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  1. Prosecuting cartels in terms of the Competition Act (1998) Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 29 February 2008 Shan Ramburuth: Competition Commissioner Tel: 012 394 3332 E-mail: ShanR@compcom.co.za

  2. Format of presentation • Introduction and background • Strategic planning • Prioritisation • Cartel cases • Infrastructure project • Going Forward • Q & A’s

  3. The competition authorities The Competition Authorities E X T E R NA L P A R T I E S Competition Appeal Court Appeal of Tribunal decisions Appeal of Tribunal decisions Competition Tribunal Appeal of exemptions, intermediate mergers or non-referral decisions, defence of referral decisions Referral of complaints & large mergers Competition Commission Exemption applications, complaints and merger notifications

  4. Commission’s mandate • Prosecuting anti-competitive business practices • Merger control – approving large and intermediate mergers • Advocating pro-competitive practices and policies

  5. Anti-competitive practices • Horizontal restrictive practices • Price fixing • Division of markets • Collusive tendering • Vertical restrictive practices • Exclusive agreements, resale price maintenance • Abuse of dominance • Excessive pricing, exclusionary acts and price discrimination

  6. Priorities: 2000 to 2005 • Setting up the institution • Developing expertise • Clarifying the law • Focus on merger control

  7. Demand for change • Demonstrable impact: “concentration persists” • Access to the economy: “barriers to entry” • Benefits to consumers: “prices must fall” • Prioritising for effectiveness under resource constraints

  8. External environment • OECD Peer Review - 2002 • Presidency 10 year review - 2004 • AsgiSA - 2006 • National Industrial Policy Framework - 2007 • State of the Nation speeches -2006/2007 • Recognition of the role of competition policy in regulation

  9. Internal environment • Consolidating experience • Retain staff and skills • Knowledge management • Focusing on the important issues • Creating organisational efficiencies

  10. Strategic planning: Enforcement • Step up enforcement activities • Prioritise cases • Re-organise structures and resource allocation for effectiveness

  11. Basis for prioritisation • Commission’s experience • Government policy • Review of other jurisdictions • Setting criteria for selection

  12. Criteria • Impact on poor consumers • Costs of intermediate goods into labour absorbing manufacturing • Impact of cost of doing business

  13. Priority sectors: 2007 to 2010 • Agro-processing, specifically food processing and forestry • Intermediate industrial products: chemicals, steel • Infrastructure and construction, including bid-rigging • Financial sector, specifically banking

  14. Enforcement powers • Investigate and prosecute • Summons, search and seizure • Consent orders • Recommend fines, behavioural and structural remedies • Corporate leniency policy

  15. Penalties received Source: Commission Finance Department

  16. Corporate leniency policy • Indemnity from prosecution for providing information of a cartel • “First through the door” • Cooperate fully with and assist Commission • CLP has played a key role in detecting major cartels currently being prosecuted • Currently being reviewed

  17. Cartels(1) • …on both a moral and practical level, there is not a great deal of difference between price fixing and theft… (Whish, 2001)

  18. Cartels (2) • Operates in secret • An agreement not to compete • Effect is to increase price and/or reduce output. • International studies find a median price mark-up from cartels of • +/- 15%

  19. Cartels (3) • Purpose is to maximise profits • Occurs through price fixing, market allocation and collusive tendering • Busting cartels means prices to consumers will be lower, over time, than under collusion

  20. The bread cartel(1) • Premier Foods (Blue Ribbon), Tiger Brands (Albany) and Pioneer Foods (Sasko) agreed, in the Western Cape: • to uniformly increase price of bread to customers; • to fix their discounts to distributors; • not to poachdistributors

  21. The bread cartel(2) • Premier confessed and was granted indemnity • Premier gave information of agreements • in the WC • outside the WC • In the national milling industry • Commission completed and referred its WC investigation on 14 February 2007

  22. The bread cartel(3) • Tiger settled on baking and milling and paid a penalty of 5.7% of national bread turnover – R98 million • Western Cape bread cartel against Pioneer referred, trial date to be set • National bread cartel against Pioneer and Foodcorp to be referred shortly • National milling cartel against 11 respondents currently being investigated

  23. Consumer price of bread, flour, and wheat price (trade) per 700g loaf

  24. The milk cartel(1) • Clover, ParmalatLadismith Cheese, Woodlands Dairy, Lancewood, Nestle and Milkwood Dairy • Referred to Tribunal on 7 December 2006, hearing set for September 2008

  25. The milk cartel(2) • Investigation found that firms: • fixed prices indirectly by co-ordinating the removal of surplus milk from the market • allocated geographic areas in which they would not compete • exchanged sensitive information on procurement prices of raw milk

  26. The pharmaceutical cartel • Adcock Ingram Critical Care, Fresenius KabiSA, Dismed and Thusanong agreed to: • tender collusively for Contract RT299 – state tender for intravenous solutions; and • divide the private hospital market amongst each other

  27. The pharmaceutical cartel • Fresenius confessed, provided information and was granted indemnity • Commission completed and referred its investigation on 11 February 2008

  28. Collusion in construction(1) • SA committed to major infrastructure investment • Wide concern about high prices in building materials – cement, bricks, aggregates, steel

  29. Collusion in construction(2) • International experience of bid rigging in construction • Commission scoped area’s of concern • Initiate investigations where competition concerns occur • Leniency applications received

  30. Price trends in construction are substantially above inflation

  31. Future issues • Strengthening the competition authorities • Corporate governance and corporate accountability • Appropriate disincentives • Compensating the losers

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