PRESENTATION ON IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING ON SECURITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

1. PRESENTATION ON IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING ON SECURITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 2014

2. TABLE OF CONTENT • Introduction • Strategy To Manage Overcrowding • Impact Of Overcrowding Strategy On Population Level • Impact Of Overcrowding On Security • Summary: Impact Of Overcrowding • Statistical Analysis: Correlation Between Inmate Population And Negative Security Related Matters

3. INTRODUCTION Overcrowding is a global phenomena that undermines the efforts of Correctional Systems to rehabilitate offenders. The problem of overcrowding within the South African Correctional System has been identified as a key challenge which negatively affects the ability for the South African Correctional System to deliver effective rehabilitation programs to offenders. Correctional Centres are on average 32% overpopulated (2013/2014 Financial Year). Section 35 (2)e of the Bill of Rights and encapsulated in the Constitution of Republic of South Africa states that offenders have the right “to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercises and the provision, at state expense of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment”.

4. INTRODUCTION (CONT…) Overcrowding within correctional centres means that it is a challenge for South Africa to guarantee these rights for all inmates. It is widely recognized that the solution to overcrowding does not reside solely with DCS. An Integrated Justice System Development Committee and its structures i.e. Case Management Task Team and Intersectoral Committee on Child Justice are responsible to identify and address blockages that result in overcrowding. The role-players in these structures includes the following departments: DCS, Safety and Security, DoJ & CD, NPA and DSD.

5. STRATEGY TO MANAGE OVERCROWDING DCS in collaboration with other JCPS Cluster Departments follows a multi-pronged strategy consisting of the following dimensions: • Managing levels of Remand Detainees (RD’s) through IJS Case Management Task Team & Inter-Sectoral Committee on Child Justice; • Managing levels of sentenced offenders through improving effective & appropriate use of conversion of sentence to community correctional supervision, release on parole, & transfers between correctional centres to attempt to establish some degree of evenness of overcrowding; • Ensuring progress with DCS capital works programme to upgrade correctional facilities & to build new correctional centres that are both cost effective & rehabilitation oriented;

6. STRATEGY TO MANAGE OVERCROWDING (CONT…) • Encouraging debate in South Africa about reason for incarceration as a sentence & encouraging an approach to appropriate sentencing that is focused on facilitating rehabilitation; • Enhancing community correctional supervision so that it can be better utilized as an appropriate sentence for less serious crimes; • Improving correction & development programmes within DCS to ensure enhanced facilitation of rehabilitation that targets offending behaviour;

7. STRATEGY TO MANAGE OVERCROWDING (CONT…) • Encouraging improvement of first & second levels of correction in family & social institutions & social & economic sector government departments respectively to decrease rate of entry into criminal justice system; and • Encouraging community involvement in social reintegration of offenders back into their community in order to assist in reducing levels of repeat offending.

8. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING STRATEGY ON POPULATION LEVEL

9. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING STRATEGY ON POPULATION LEVEL (CONT…) The implementation of the multi-pronged strategy by DCS in collaboration with its JCPS partners, culminated in a significant 34% reduction in the average population level of correctional facilities from 2002/2003 to 2013/2014. The DCS is committed to continue with the implementation of the Inter-Sectoral Multi-Pronged Strategy in down managing the inmate population.

10. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING ON SECURITY • The lack of adequate space is only one of the numerous problems that are experienced as a consequence of overcrowding. • Overcrowding also impacts negativelyon the following: • Quality of nutrition; • Sanitation; • Inmate activities; • Health services; • Care of vulnerable groups; and • Ability of CMCs’ to process mandatory as well as intervention review sessions for consideration of release dates/ applications for transfers, etc.

11. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING ON SECURITY (CONT…) • In addition to the aforementioned, overcrowding also: • Affects the physical and mental well-being of inmates; • Generate inmate tension and violence; • Exacerbates existing mental and physical health problems; • Increases the risk of transmission of communicable diseases; • Poses inmate management challenges in terms of classification and separation of different categories, direct supervision by staff, dealing with inmate complaints, idleness and delivery of programmes. • Creates an environment where Gangs use the dissatisfaction of inmates with above conditions to further their own cause and lead protest / violent actions.

12. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING ON SECURITY (CONT…) • The following relates to the impact of overcrowding on specifically staffing, separation / classification and safety / security: • Staffing: • Staff resources do not usually keep pace with inmate numbers. As a result, the ratio of staff per inmate declines; • Challenges presented by overcrowding can have a profound impact on staff performance and attitudes, with a negative impact on their ability to fulfil their duties professionally; • In such circumstances staff will often take on a more authoritarian and less positive role; and • The combination of overcrowding and inadequate staff numbers are lethal i.t.o the delivery of core security functions such as direct supervision, movement control and handling of emergencies.

13. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING (CONT…) • Separation and classification: • Classifying and separating offenders according to their age, gender and the risk they pose to others becomes difficult; and • It may also lead to the further criminalisation of offenders held for minor offences, as a result of being accommodated, for extended periods, with more serious and violent offenders.

14. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING (CONT…) • Safety and Security: • Overcrowding has a major impact on the safety and security of inmates and staff, where the inmate to staff ratio increases; • In such instance tensions can be high and inmates become angry and frustrated about the conditions in which they are held; • Experience in many countries have shown that the risk of violence, inmate protests and other disturbances in overcrowded correctional centres are acute; • In many correctional systems, the lack of staff to supervise the growing number of inmates has led to selected inmates informally being given supervisory and disciplinary roles to keep order and maintain security in correctional centres;

15. IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING ON SECURITY (CONT…) • This violates e.g. a basic principle contained in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, and increases the risk of abuse of vulnerable inmates by those who are stronger, as well as of corrupt practices; • Vulnerable groups, such as children, young inmates, women, offenders with mental health care needs, with disabilities and older inmates are particular at risk of being bullied and abused in overcrowded conditions, where different categories of inmates are not separated and in an environment where the control of the correctional centre administration will have weakened; and • In the South African context the situation is worsened by the current shift system which negatively impact on inmate staff ratio that often leave correctional centres with only a 50% staff complement on duty. This matter is currently being attended to.

16. SUMMARY: IMPACT OF OVERCROWDING • Overcrowding including understaffing seriously impact on the ability of correctional centres to deliver effective services in terms of, among others,: • Provision of basic health, nutrition, sanitation, hygiene services; • Engaging inmates in programmes and labour to relief idleness; • Delivery of core security functions of supervision, movement control and separation; • Consideration for release, classification and requests for transfers. • Aforementioned factors lead to frustration and dissatisfaction, both among inmates and staff, which often culminates in incidences of violence (such as recent incidents at St Albans and Groenpunt): • Fights amongst inmates; • Violent protest action by inmates (often orchestrated by gangs); • Reaction by staff where allowed use of force get out of hand due to high frustration levels.

17. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: CORRELATION BETWEEN INMATE POPULATION AND NEGATIVE SECURITY RELATED MATTERS • Analysis based on information for financial years during which special remission of sentence was granted by the President. • However, the following aspects affected the analysis: • Escapes – mass escapes makes it difficult to determine a correlation; • Assaults – were severely under reported in earlier years which nullify any attempt to draw a correlation. • Unnatural deaths – different interpretation in earlier years on what was regarded as unnatural death compared to current definition.

18. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: CORRELATION BETWEEN INMATE POPULATION AND NEGATIVE SECURITY RELATED MATTERS (CONT…) • Observations for 2005/2006 to 2006/2007: • Inmate population decreased from 162 659 to 158 955 (-2.27%) • Escapes decreased from 113 to 95 (-15.92%) • Assaults decreased from 2001 to 1822 (-8.94%) • Unnatural deaths increased from 56 to 57 (+1.78%)

19. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: CORRELATION BETWEEN INMATE POPULATION AND NEGATIVE SECURITY RELATED MATTERS (CONT…) • Observations for 2011/2012 to 2012/2013: • Inmate population decreased from 160 245 to 152 205 (-5%) • Escapes increased from 41 to 43 (+4.87%) • Assaults increased from 5284 to 6884 (+30.28%) • Unnatural deaths increased from 46 to 58 (+26%)

20. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: CORRELATION BETWEEN INMATE POPULATION AND NEGATIVE SECURITY RELATED MATTERS (CONT…) Although there is no doubt that overcrowding affects security in correctional facilities, there is currently no valid statistical indication that the size of the inmate population relates directly and consistently with negative security related incidents in South Africa.

21. SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ARRANGEMENTS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Date of Presentation: 12 NOVEMBER 2014

22. BACKGROUND • The Port Folio Committee requested a briefing regarding the status of security infrastructure and arrangements. • Briefing to cover DCS’ capacity to provide secure detention with focus areas: • Access Control. • Monitoring and control of activities inside facilities. • Gang management strategies. • Vetting of officials. • Management of inmate population (overcrowding).

23. INTRODUCTION : THE DCS SECURITY SYSTEM • The security system of DCS is guided by theMinimum Security Standards (MSS) for Correctional Centres which provide for a holistic, coordinated and synchronized approach to security based on security challenges facing Correctional Centres. • The MSS is based on six key pillars of security complimenting each other and when operating together constitute the security system of DCS: • Pillar 1 – Personnel Security measures • It is vital that the role of personnel in effective security must be clearly defined. • Pillar 2 – Physical Security measures • Physical security measures such as walls, fences, access and exit control points, etc. form the very first line of our defence against the threat of escapes.   • Pillar 3 – Technological Security measures • Technological security measures such as closed circuit television are very important and useful in any security system to assist security personnel and managers in the effective performance of their security tasks. It is important therefore that these must be utilized as part of a range of security measures (pillars) and not as stand-alone measures.

24. INTRODUCTION:THE DCS SECURITY SYSTEM continue • Pillar 4 – Information Security Management • Information management allows for the cost effective deployment of all security measures. Accurate information about the threat is the key to informed decisions and the extent of utilization of all other resources of security. • Pillar 5 – Operational Security measures • It is important for any security system to be backed by a set of clear and concussive security procedures to guide staff in the day to day execution of their security duties. • Pillar 6 – Management supervision • Managers and supervisors must have an in depth understanding and knowledge of the duties they are expected to perform. It is imperative that each manager and supervisor be actively and visibly involved in the management, supervision, inspection, checking and control of his/her unit including operational guidance and support to his/her staff members.

25. ACCESS CONTROL

26. ACCESS CONTROL • Access Control to Correctional Centres is conducted at four (4) distinctive levels: • ManualAccess Control Measures. • Electronic Access Control. • Security Fences. • Electronic Access Control as part of a fully integrated security system. • Manual Access Control Measures • Applicable to all Correctional Centres. • Access Control Officials deployed at Access Control Points identify and manually search persons moving into and out of Correctional Centres. • Officials assisted by the use of hand held metal detectors and x-ray scanners for searching of parcels where available. • Manual recording of persons moving in and out of centres.

27. ACCESS CONTROL continue • Electronic Access Control • Electronic Access Control systems consisting of turn stile gates, biometric finger print readers, CCTV cameras (only at access control points), bypass gates, walk through metal detectors and control software was installed at 65 Correctional Centres (Contract HK2/2005). • Purpose of system to assist access control staff in the performing of their access control functions and to provide management with a electronic monitoring capacity. • System was not part of a fully integrated system. • The maintenance contract expired and systems are outdated. • The Independent Development Trust (IDT) is currently in the planning phase for the procurement of upgrades and maintenance of above systems. • The procurement will include the upgrading and maintenance of security fences and access control systems at 47 Correctional Centres previously installed under Contract HK24/2005. • A total number of 106 sites for the upgrading and maintenance of access control and fences considered for inclusion in this project.

28. ACCESSCONTROL continue • Security Fences • In addition to the 47 sites with security fences mentioned above the Department also engaged in the further rollout of security fences at 27 Correctional Centres. • This Project is also managed by the IDT. • Security Fence (Inner and Outer) with security lighting, CCTV cameras, alarm detection. • The Project includes the installation of security fences as well as access control systems (access control buildings, CCTV cameras, biometric finger print readers, electronic locks, x-ray machines and walk through metal detectors). • Work on 15 Correctional Centres at work completion stage where after hand over processes will commence. • Work on remainder of sites commenced in May 2014 with planned completion date September 2015.

29. ACCESSCONTROL continue • Electronic Access Control as part of a fully integrated security system • Currently DCS has 14 Correctional Centres with fully integrated security systems installed under management of Department of Public Works: • Goodwood. • Malmesbury. • Emthonjeni. • Pietermaritzburg. • Qalakabusha. • Kokstad SM. • Kokstad Med. • Klerksdorp. • Tswelopele. • Brandvlei. • Van Rhynsdorp. • Ceres. • Tzaneen. • Pretoria C-Max. • Systems include all equipment for access control as described above.

30. ACCESS CONTROL continue • In addition the system include CCTV cameras in passages and court yards, cellphone detection, video recording, intercoms, public address system, pneumatic controlled doors, electronic locks, panic button fire detection and suppression, access control visitation management system, guard tour system, intelligence gathering, metal detectors and x-ray machines.

31. MONITORING AND CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES INSIDE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES

32. MONITORING AND CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES INSIDE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES • Monitoring and control of activities in Correctional Centres is done at different levels. • Level 1: Supervision, monitoring and control by staff • DCS officials which include security officials and case officials in units are specifically deployed to deliver direct supervision, monitoring and control services over inmates and their activities. • These services include security services (supervision, movement control, searching, etc.), inmate management services (supervision, sentenced plans, corrective programmes, dealing with complaints and requests, ensuring delivery of basic services, etc.). • Level 2: Supervision, monitoring and control by direct line managers • The DCS management system provide for line function managers to perform direct supervisory, monitoring and control functions over staff performing duties in Correctional Centres. • These managers include your security managers, operational managers, unit managers and it is their direct responsibility to ensure that officials deliver services as required and to monitor, control and report on any security or operational breaches which include corrupt activities and improper relationship between officials and inmates.

33. MONITORING AND CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES INSIDE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES CONTINUE • Level 3: Supervision, monitoring and control by indirect line managers • Indirect line managers from Centre Level, Management Area, Regional and National Level has the responsibility to oversee and monitor the delivery of services at Centre Level through reports, visits to points of service delivery and interaction with staff and inmates. • Delegated authorities for taking action when incidents / breaches of policies / security / operational procedures occur. • Level 4: Supervision, monitoring and control by over site bodies • DCS Inspectorate and Internal Auditors visit centres to monitor and report on levels of service delivery and areas of concern. • Departmental Investigation Unit investigate sensitive cases and cases reported through the whistle blowing system (hot line, anonymous letters, etc.). • DCS Anti Corruption Unit and Anti Corruption Strategy – whistle blowing policy and process. • Judicial Inspectorate monitor services and none delivery of services, complaints, etc. via independent visitors to Correctional Centres.

34. MONITORING AND CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES INSIDE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES CONTINUE • Level 5: Electronic Monitoring via CCTV cameras • This is an area where the Department can still improve on. • CCTV cameras with recording capacity can assist officials and managers to monitor activities in Correctional Centres. • Currently CCTV cameras are only installed at perimeter fences, access control points and passages, court yards, exercise yards, hospital section, kitchens, etc.

35. DCSAC01 DCSA01: REPAIR, UPGRADE, INTEGRATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS OF ACCESS CONTROL AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY SYSTEMS

36. BACKGROUND The Independent Development Trust (IDT) was appointed for the implementation of access control and associated security systems at various Department of Correctional Services (DCS) facilities in 2012 by the Department of Correctional Services. The new programme was to be a follow-on contract to the: • Access Control Contract (“Sondolo contract” HK2/2005) as per the DCS letter to IDT dated 15th February 2012 • Security fencing contract ( “Phezulu contract” HK24/2005) as per DSCS letter to the IDT received on 18th October 2012.

37. BACKGROUND (cont’d) • Subsequently, the IDT appointed Tsepa Consulting cc through an open tender process in November 2012 as the electronic security consulting engineers.

38. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Below is a summary of findings: • Non-compliance with minimum DCS standards, statutory requirements and national standards • The existing infrastructure largely obsolete • Gap between existing systems and latest technology identified; • Gaps between end-user client requirements and the existing security system identified; • The sub-systems were not fully integrated • There were several single-points of failure identified • There was no structured maintenance in place • Manual and cumbersome call logging procedure. • The Disaster Recovery Centre was non-functional • Proprietary software had expired and rendering most subsystems non-functional

39. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS • Recorded video footage not practically usable • System availability & reliability low • Various sub-systems not operational eg. access control, intrusion detection system, etc. • Existing perimeter lighting is generally inadequate. • No fire detection and automatic suppression equipment installed in control/equipment rooms. • Single room used as both equipment and control room. • Poor ergonomics eg. small control rooms, air-conditioning, furniture • Client exposure to security risk was high

40. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES The objectives of the programme are to achieve the following on the Access Control and associated systems • Enhance security in compliance with DCS minimum security requirements. • To define the boundaries of security and other areas. • Enhance verification and evidence availability. • Improved flow control of inmates, visitors and members. • Ensure training for maintenance personnel and system operators. • Ensure provision of a secondary option for control room operations should the facility not comply with its obligations to provide operators.

41. HOW TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES • Repair of access control, associated subsystems and components to an acceptable functional and maintainable state. • Upgrade of obsolete, under capacity, proprietary systems and components to comply with the minimum DCS specifications, latest standards and statutory requirements. • Enhance early warning systems. • Improve or introduce system scalability, redundancy, availability, reliability, maintainability, integration and manageability. • Integration of all subsystems at the centre, regional and national level. • Implementation of a national disaster recovery centre. • Implementation of a structured maintenance programme. • Compliance with all relevant security system operational requirements.

42. PROJECT SCOPE The project scope includes the following: • Access Control System (including turnstiles, gates, doors, etc.) • CCTV Surveillance System • Fire Detection & Suppression within the control rooms • Power Backup Systems (UPS & Generators) • Air conditioning within the control rooms • Control Room Building, Fixtures & Fittings • Access Points Intercom Systems • Security Lighting • Security Fence & Components • IT Network Architecture • IPTV System Infrastructure • Decommissioning and Disposal of old assets

43. PROJECT SCOPE (cont’d) • The following sub-systems not in scope but will be integrated into the electronic security system: • Public Address Systems • Cell Phone Detection System • Cell Intercom Systems • Prison/ Inmate Management System • Body scanners

44. PROGRAMME OVERVIEW NATIONAL CONTROL NEW DISASTER RECOVERY CENTRE CENTRE EASTERN CA PE (EC) FREE STATE / GAUTENG (GP) KWAZULU - NATAL (KN) LIMPOPO/MPUMALANGA WESTERN CAPE (WC) REGIONAL CONTROL NORTHERN CAPE (FNC) REGI ONAL CONTROL REGIONAL CONTROL REGIONAL CONTROL /NORTH WEST (LMN) CENTRE REGIONAL CONTROL CENTRE CENTRE REGIONAL CONTROL CENTRE CENTRE CENTRE CORRECTIONAL CORRECTIONAL CORRECTIONAL CORRECTIONAL CORRECTIONAL CORRECTIONAL CENTRES (22) CENTRES (12) CENTRES (15) CENTRES (16) CENTRES (20) CENTRES (14) • National Control Centre (1) • Regional Control Centres (6) • Correctional Centres (99) • New Disaster Recovery Centre (1)

45. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES The objectives of the programme are to achieve the following on the Access Control and associated systems • Enhance security in compliance with DCS minimum security requirements. • To define the boundaries of security and other areas. • Enhance verification and evidence availability. • Improved flow control of inmates, visitors and members. • Ensure training for maintenance personnel and system operators. • Ensure provision of a secondary option for control room operations should the facility not comply with its obligations to provide operators.

46. PROGRAMME STATUS Preliminary Stage • Requirements gathering; • Field investigations • Concept design & approval; Design Stage • Detailed designs; • Tender documentation & Estimate; Procurement Stage • Stage 1: Pre-qualification open tender (Ready for advertising) • Stage 2: Closed tender for pre-qualified prospective Tenderers Repair & Upgrade • Project implementation; • 12 month defect liability period; 3 Year Maintenance • Routine Preventative, Corrective and Breakdown; Close-out Stage Completed Completed

47. PROCUREMENT STAGE Procurement Stage • Stage One Pre-qualification open tender ready to proceed • Stage Two Closed tender to proceed after conclusion of Stage One • Appointment of Contractor(s) • Participants: National DCS , IDT & Tsepa Consulting

48. GANG MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

49. BACKGROUND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GANG MANAGEMENT STRATEGY • Gang Management Strategy developed and implemented in April 2010. • Regions / Management Areas / Centres were to develop own action plans based on National Strategy as a guideline. • Gang Management Task team appointed in Feb. 2012. • Gang “Hotspot “ centres identified. • Gang management checklist / monitoring tool implemented in June 2013 to assist implementation process. • HCC to report progress to RC’s on implementation from 1 July 2013. Focus on identified Hotspot Areas. • Reports to be tabled at Regional Gang Management Task Team meetings for elevation to National Gang Management Task team. • Gang reference group identified and appointed -July 2013 – source of knowledge, manuals, training etc.

50. BACKGROUND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GANG MANAGEMENT STRATEGY continue • Matter of gangs elevated to National Joint Operations and Intelligence Structures (NATJOINTS) – to formulate more dynamic and integrated approach. • National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) lead interdepartmental Gang Management Task Team – DCS represented. • Fact finding visits were brought to Pollsmoor and St Albans. Further visits planned for other Regions. • Awareness training for Heads of Centres on Gangs and Implementation of Gang Management Strategy currently in progress – will be rolled out to other staff levels. • Department currently in negotiation with CSIR for signing off a MoU to assist with research on various topics of which gangsterism is included.