I – Africa, a cradle of the humanitarian action and peace operations

1. Humanitarian action and peace operations in AfricaDavid Ambrosetti(CNRS – Université Paris Ouest Nanterre)

2. I – Africa, a cradle of the humanitarian action and peace operations II – Effects and stakes of this international interventionism

3. I – Africa, a cradle of the humanitarian action and peace operations A) Two founding « episodes » in current humanitarian action: Biafra and Ethiopia B) UN peace operations and Africa

4. A) 1. Biafra (1967-1970) Nigeria Abuja Ibo Lieutenant-colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu Joint Church Aid – 55 000 tons of supplies International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – 22 000 tons Bernard Kouchner Médecins sans frontières (1971) Jacques Foccart Nuclear test in Reggane (déc. 1960) Félix Houphouët-Boigny Léopold Sédar Senghor (Sénégal) Markpress (Genève)

5. 2. Ethiopia (1984-1985) Wollo (nord) charity business Bob Geldof Band Aid (nov. 1984) Live Aid (juil. 1985) 1 200 000 tons of aid The Derg Mengistu Haïle-Mariam Tigrean People’s Liberation Front Eritrean People’s Liberation Front Forced displacements of 600 000 persons, 200 000 died

6. B) UN peace operations and Africa 1. ONUC: a turn 2. The post Cold War renewal (1988-1993) 3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999) 4. The current unprecedented rise of UN peace operations (2000 decade, till now)

7. 1. The ONUC (1960-1964) Congo-Léopoldville / République démocratique du Congo (RDC) / Zaïre (Congo-Kinshasa) Patrice Lumumba Katanga Moïse Tshombé Dag Hammarskjöld (†en sept. 1961) Resolution 143 of the UNSC  withdrawal of Belgian forces 19 500 personals 30 contributor states (Africa and Asia)

8. 2. The end of the Cold War and the renewal of peace operations (1988-1993) Perestroïka Namibia Angola Mozambique Somalia : Restore Hope (UNITAF / Dec. 92- March 93) et ONUSOM II (ONU / March 93 – March 95) 28 000 personals Mohamed Farah Aideed June 1993 (24 Pakistani blue helmets) 3 October 1993 (18 US Marines and one UN Malaysian) US Congress (Jesse Helms) Boutros Boutros-Ghali UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Deputy-UNSG Chief of the DPKO

9. 3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999) MINUAR in Rwanda (5 October 1993) General R. Dallaire Michael Barnett – US delegation to the UN President J. Habyarimana († 6 April 1994) Rwandan Patriotic Front (P. Kagamé) Hutu Power Col. Théoneste Bagosora Resolution 925 – withdrawal of 2 000 Blue Helmets in the heart of the genocide (« g »-word) 500 000 to one million died Then Bosnia - Zaïre 1996-1997 Withdrawal: 70 000 UN personals in 1993, 13 000 in February 1998. Budget decline (from 3,6 billion $ to 1 billion $)

10. 4. The current unprecedented rise (decade 2000) Lakhdar Brahimi report (July 2000) Peace building, even state building Security Sector Reform Regionalization (African ownership) UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999-2005) UK leader, rescuing the UN in May 2000 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah

11. African dossiers = some 70-75 % of the UNSC agenda In 2010, Africa = half of the UN operations deployed around the world (8 out of 16) = three-quarters (73 500) out of the 100 000 personals in uniform deployed around the world Sudan alone = a third (30 000, 20 000 for Darfur and 10 000 for South Sudan) DRC = 20 000 Liberia = 11 000 Côte-d’Ivoire = 8500 Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (3 major troop contributors) = 28% of the total 9 African states among the 20 major contributors Negligible financial contributions: Zambia and Somalia = 0,001% of the UN budget each ; South Africa = 0,29%

12. II – Effects and stakes of this international interventionism • Some figures: a call for modesty • Strategic learning from African actors • The « Africanization » of peace and security matters in Africa: towards a new peace and security architecture in Africa

13. A) Some figures: a call for modesty 1. The decrease of death tolls due to armed violence in Africa • Human Security Center: Death tolls related to armed conflicts regularly increased from 1960 to 1990. Decreasing since then. • In 1960, Africa = 68 % of the total of people killed in armed conflicts around the world ; 13 % in 2005 (African bank for development). • Proposed causes : transformations of the forms of violence and improvement of sanitary conditions and humanitarian relief.

14. 2. Engaged means remain modest Multidimensional operations, very intrusive  Security Sector Reform (Sierra Leone, RDC, Liberia, Côte-d’Ivoire) But limited means: • UN peace operations = 7,7 billion $ per year around the world; UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (750 million $ per year in 2002 for 17 500 personals in uniform) • Comparison : arms trade around the world = 30 billion $ per year; and the total of state military budgets around the world = 800 billion $ per year. • 20 000 personals in uniform to cover the whole Darfur (size of France, very divided habitat, rudimentary or inexistent infrastructures) Weak strategic commitment, short-term objectives, improvisation, personal professionalization improved but still insufficient  scandal of sexual abuses (Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC)

15. B) Strategic learning from African actors • Commitment of African states in peace operations • Access to foreign currencies, opportunities for training (Burundi), “risky” military kept away, multilateral visibility as a regional power • Sidelining and direct opposition strategies • Political weakness of international forces rapidly analyzed and exploited (Somalia 93, Rwanda 94, Sierra Leone 2000, UA au Darfur 2004-2007) • Obstacles, UN (Western) personal expelled (Eritrea and the border commission for Badme 2005 ; Sudan and Jan Pronk 2006 ; Chad et MINURCAT 2010) • Medias, humanitarian action and military strategies • Kamajors and LURD (Danny Hoffman)

16. C) The « Africanisation » of peace and security in Africa 1. Context • Pan-African Movement  Organization of the African Unity (OAU, May 1963) • Bilateral interferences from ex colonial powers  20 French armed operations from 1963 to 1983. • First OAU peace operation in Chad in 1981. Withdrawn in June 1982 on a failure. • OAU Mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflict in 1990 (military observation missions in Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros) • Continental integration weakened by a rapid process of sub-regional cooperation  seven regional organizations in Africa today  ECOMOG by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990-1997) and Sierra Leone (1991-1999)

17. 2. The African Union (AU) in 2002 • Innovations • Inspired by the European Union (Commission) and the UN (PSC) • Article 4 of the constitutive Act • Department of Peace and Security • Operations in Burundi, Darfur and Comoros • The African Stand By Force and the Continental Early Warning System (AU and the five Regional Economic Communities): in progress

18. 3. Limits • External: • Strong commitment of foreign partners: • Peace Facility of the EU, then the Europe / Africa Partnership in Lisbon, financial support from the G8  « a rush among donors  » in the context of a “new scramble for African mineral resources” • Donor conditionality: strong presence of foreign (Western) experts in Addis Ababa surrounding these projects • AU used in a ad hoc way, selectivity according to the interests of the foreign powers with important projection forces in Africa (US, France, UK) • Reluctance to provide the African forces with better military equipment • Internal: • Weak political commitment of the African states  only when competition for regional hegemony • Military contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda • Financial contributors: Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya • Difference to make between « Africanization » and « ownership » (Benedikt Franke)