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The Evolution of the APS Beamline Personnel Safety System (PSS)

The Evolution of the APS Beamline Personnel Safety System (PSS). Phil McNamara-Presenter Kenneth Belcher Greg Markovich Advanced Photon Source Safety Interlocks Group.

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The Evolution of the APS Beamline Personnel Safety System (PSS)

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  1. The Evolution of theAPS Beamline Personnel Safety System (PSS) Phil McNamara-Presenter Kenneth Belcher Greg Markovich Advanced Photon Source Safety Interlocks Group Work supported by U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of Basic Energy Sciences, under Contract No. DE-AC02-06CH11357

  2. PSS History Overview

  3. GEN1 PSS • Processors: • Dissimilar: • Chain A - Allen Bradley (AB) PLC5 – ESD, C&C intermixed • Chain B - General Electric (GE) 90-70 – ESD only – Faults were not latched • Programming Languages • Dissimilar : • Chain A – Ladder Logic • Chain B – State Logic, Ladder Logic and MegaBasic • HMI: • LEDs and mechanical PBs • I/O Interface: • Hardwired to terminal blocks • Inconsistent addressing • DIW Monitoring • LOVE process controllers, binary output, 1 channel per station • Validations • Invasive, 2-3 days • Hardwired Front-End Simulator • Laptops running DOS (Windows 98) • Communication • Relay isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat) • One-way communication to EPICS • Chain A – DH+ through a Data Communications Module (PLC writes only, no read functions) • Chain B – RS232 through a Processor Control Module (PLC writes only, no read functions)

  4. GEN1 PSS Open status Open status Closed status Open status Chain A Emergency Shutdown and Command and Control PLC Safety Shutter 1 Safety Shutter 2 Photon Shutter 2 Closed status SR Trip/Fault Beam Line Door closed Estop WDT Integral Shutters Closed status Station A ACIS Station A Beam Ready Station A Searched Global OnlineSolenoid WDT Air Supply Door closed Estop Closed status SR Trip/Fault Photon Shutter 1 Open status Chain B Emergency Shutdown PLC Closed status Open status Open status Note: No closed switch status for PS1 to ACIS

  5. GEN1 PSS Beamline PSS interface diagram Front - End Storage Ring components MPS DIW flow sensors Beamline Beamline Beamline components vacuum valves FE shutter & valve status DIW flow Front - End vacuum sensors position sensors sensors FE shutter & vacuum permit FEEPS FEEPS ( Mezzanine Rack) PSS EPICS EPICS Front - End vacuum IOC Beamline component IOC valves position DIW flow sensors Beamline EPS ( SV , FV , FEV , BIV ) PS 1 open request Remote FE shutter permit Shutter Interface BL Shutter Relay contact from Love Controllers BL Shutter status permits FES Open status PSS PLC Front - End Control System ( Mezzanine Rack) User Panels Shutter air supply Beamline Shutters ( Pushbuttons, key Pressure sensors ( 1 , 2 or 3 ) switches and LED Indicators) Closed switches Solenoid FE shutter permit PSS SR trips control GOL key status PSS Beamline Control System Remote IO link ( Station Enclosure) Open switches Solenoid control Closed switches (except PS1) Hutch doors ACIS Sector Interface Front - End Shutters Enclosure Air supply shutoff (except PS1) Search stations Remote I/O link E - stop buttons FES Closed status ACIS ACIS PLC ACIS Controlled Up to 6 stations IOC ( Main Control Equipment Room) ( RF & Dipole)

  6. GEN1 PSS Testing Methodology • 1. The Front-End Shutter (FES) Simulator is connected. • The Front-End Shutters are critical devices that can’t be operated during the validation. Therefore their operations and statuses must be simulated. • The connectors on the Front-End Relay Distribution Panel (FERDP) for the Front-End Shutters (FES), Access Control Interlock System (ACIS), Front-End Equipment Protection System (FEEPS), De-Ionized Water (DIW) and Beamline Equipment Protection System (BLEPS) systems are unplugged and the simulator connectors are plugged in their place. • The simulator allows the operator to manipulate and monitor the signals normally supplied by these devices and/or systems. • 2. An Input/Output Validation is performed. • Verify that each device is properly functioning and wired to the assigned input or output of the Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system’s PLC. • Verify chain independence. • 3. A Functional Test (Validation) is performed. • The system is monitored for proper response to inputs from the field devices and/or the simulator for each test case. • In order to facilitate specific test cases for critical devices, the Station User Panel (15U) connectors are unplugged, and a test box is plugged in series with the existing devices. • This test box is used to interrupt the signals from the field devices to simulate individual tests cases. • After these particular tests are done, the test box is unplugged and the connectors are plugged back into their original receptacles. • This process is repeated at each 15U several times during the validation. • 4. At the end of the Functional Validation, the FERDP simulator is unplugged and the connectors are plugged back in, and a functional test of the front end components is performed.

  7. GEN1 PSS Front-End Relay Distribution Panel (FERDP) GEN1 PSS

  8. GEN1 PSS Validation FES Simulator Cables Validation FES Simulator Rear Panel

  9. Validation FES Simulator GEN1 PSS

  10. GEN1 PSS DOS-based GE validation laptop

  11. GEN1 PSS Testing Methodology Problems • Disconnecting the real I/O for validation is invasive. • Problems in reconnecting the real I/O. • Not reconnected in the proper location • Not seated fully • Connectors or wires broken during the process • Maintaining laptops that are compatible with Windows 98 & DOS.

  12. GEN2 PSS • Processors: • Dissimilar • Chain A - AB PLC5, ESD • Chain B - GE 90-70, ESD • Chain C - Industrial computer utilizing Siemens I/O, Command & Control • Programming Languages • Dissimilar : • Chain A – Ladder Logic • Chain B – State Logic, Ladder Logic and MegaBasic • Chain C – Cimplicity soft PLC (Wonderware) • HMI: • Soft Panel displays & controls • I/O Interface: • Hardwired to terminal blocks • DIW Monitoring • LOVE process controllers, binary output, 1 channel per station • Validations • Invasive, 2-3 days • Front-End Simulator • Laptops running DOS (Windows 98) • Communication • Relay isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat) • One-way communication from ESD systems to Chain C using Profibus (ESD systems write only, no read functions) • Profibus between Chain C and EPICS

  13. GEN3 PSS • Processors: • Similar - AB ControlLogix L61 • Chain A – ESD • Chain B – ESD • Chain C – Command & Control • Programming Languages • Ladder Logic • HMI: • Soft Panel displays and controls • I/O Interface: • Hardwired to Circuit Boards • Consistent locations • DIW Monitoring • Initially LOVE process controllers, binary output, 1 channel per station • Migrated quickly to Analog modules in the ESD PLCs • Validations • 2-3 days • All I/O simulated (Diode injection) • Touch Panel HMI • Communication • Electronic isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat) • One-way communication from ESD systems to Chain C using Profibus (ESD systems write only, no read functions) • Profibus between Chain C and EPICS

  14. GEN3 PSS Station B Door Control E P I C S HMI & Non Critical I/O Chain A Emergency Shutdown (ESD) PLC Photon Shutter 2, Safety Shutter 1, Safety Shutter 2 data WDT, Cross Trip, Search Status, etc Chain-C Command & Control (C&C) PLC Station A Safety I/O Station B Safety I/O ACIS –PSS Interface HMI HMI data Beam Line Station A Door Control Chain B Emergency Shutdown (ESD) PLC Integral Shutters Global On/Off Line Air Supply FES limit switches are not shown but are interfaced the same as GEN1 PSS with ACIS connected directly to FES closed limit switches. ACIS does not monitor PS1 closed limit switches.

  15. GEN3 PSS Beamline PSS interface diagram Front - End Storage Ring components MPS DIW flow sensors Beamline Beamline Beamline components vacuum valves FE shutter & valve status DIW flow Front - End vacuum sensors position sensors sensors FE shutter & vacuum permit FEEPS FEEPS PSS EPICS IOC - RSI & Clock Sync ( Mezzanine Rack) EPICS Front - End vacuum IOC Beamline component valves position DIW flow sensors Beamline EPS ( SV , FV , FEV , BIV ) PS1 Open request FE shutter permit Analog PLC modules direct to transducers (8) BL Shutter BL Shutter status permits FES Open status PSS PLC Front - End Control System ( Mezzanine Rack) Shutter air supply Pressure sensors Chain A only User Panels Beamline Shutters (1,2 or 3) ( HMI’s and key Switches) Closed switches FE shutter permit PSS SR trips PSS Trip Test Solenoid Control GOL key status PSS MEZZIE Beamline Control System Remote IO link ( Station Enclosure) Open switches Solenoid control Closed switches (except PS1) Hutch doors ACIS Sector Interface Front - End Shutters Enclosure Air supply shutoff (except PS1) Search stations Remote I/O link E - stop buttons FES closed status ACIS ACIS PLC ACIS Controlled Up to 8 stations IOC ( Main Control Equipment Room) ( RF & Dipole)

  16. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology • 1. A testing system is connected in parallel. • The Front-End Shutters are critical devices that can‘t be operated during the validation. • A HMI & PLC are connected to all 3 PLCs via Ethernet. • When the Test Cover is lifted the Front-End Shutters solenoid outputs and ACIS SR Permit are disconnected through relays. • The HMI system will allow the operator to monitor signals coming from the PSS. • 2. An I/O Validation is performed. • This will still be done to verify that each device is properly functioning and wired to the assigned input or output of the Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system’s PLC. • Verify chain independence. • 3. A Functional Test (Validation) is performed. • The Validation injection hardware is connected with no field device disconnections. • The power supplies are disconnected from the field devices via electro-mechanical relays via the Validation system. • The Validation system will allow the operator to manipulate all inputs going to the PSS. • The ESD system can be monitored for proper response to inputs. • All test case scenarios can be simulated. • 4. At the end of the Functional Test, the Validation system is disconnected. • 5. The field devices, inputs and outputs are re-enabled with none of the PSS wiring being disturbed. • 6. The method of disabling and re-enabling the PSS inputs and outputs is failsafe.

  17. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology – Key Changes • Once the Validation system is connected, there is no unplugging and plugging in of connectors during the functional test. • The I/O Validation uses a touch panel HMI instead of laptop computers. • All inputs are disabled via relays instead of being unplugged. • All functional testing is done via injection of test signals. This allows for a full functional test of the system to be performed. • Upon completion of the functional test, the critical devices are re-enabled instead of reconnected.

  18. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology Normal Operation-Validation System not connected Door Switch PSS D1 Shutter Closed Limit Switch D2 2 Shutter Open Limit Switch D3 1 +24V CR1 Connections for the Validation System • Power is supplied to the PSS field device inputs via CR1 • Signals from the field devices pass through the series diodes

  19. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology - Validation System connected Door Switch PSS Shutter Closed Limit Switch Shutter Open Limit Switch 1 +24V 2 CR1 Bus Monitor Disable power to field devices Test Mode Enabled Injected Test Signals Removable Test Connector 1 Power is still supplied to the PSS field device inputs via CR1 2 Chain C verifies Validation System is connected to turn OFF its outputs

  20. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology Validation System connected Door Switch PSS Shutter Closed Limit Switch Shutter Open Limit Switch 1 +24V CR1 Bus Monitor Inject Test Signals Disable power to field devices Test Mode Enabled 2 3 Removable Test Connector 1 Power is removed from the PSS field device inputs via CR1 2 The Validation System verifies field device power is disabled 3 Test signals can now be injected for functional testing

  21. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology - Disabling of FES Validation System connected 3 2 1 • Front-End Shutter (FES) operations and Storage Ring Permit enabled via 4-pole relays • All systems can verify FES is disabled • 3 Outputs are monitored for proper operation

  22. GEN3 PSS

  23. GEN3 PSS Validation System Main menu allows for configuration of beamline

  24. GEN3 PSS Front-End Shutter Functional Validation screen

  25. GEN3 PSS Station Functional Validation screen

  26. GEN3 PSS Testing Methodology Problems 1. The connectors used in the Validation system are Multi Pin (~120) and are very fragile. 2. Real equipment is only exercised during the I/O validation.

  27. The GEN1 Mini-Upgrade GEN1 PSS with the following important but quick and cheap fixes • Hardware Changes • Changed the DIW monitoring to analog modules in the ESD PLCs (default set points are loaded at power up and allow adjust via HMI thereafter). • Added Chain B Fault Lights to the Panel. • Software Changes • Modified Chain B code to require a reset before re-granting Storage Ring Permit . • Modified Chain B code to indicate a flow fault condition by blinking the new Chain B Minor Fault LED. • Modified Chain B code so that any remote block to PLC communication loss will latch a fault, remove all shutter permits, and indicate a fault via blinking Chain B Fault LED. • Modified Chain A code so that the Storage Ring Permit was not a latched signal. • Modified Chain A code to lose station "Searched" status when it sees a Crash button pressed. • Modified Chain A code to generate a “Chain B Shutter Permit Lost" minor fault when a shutter is open and the corresponding Chain B shutter permit goes low. • Modified Chain A code to add a “quick search” when a signal, only available when the FES simulator is connected to the FERDP during validations, is asserted. • Modified Chain A code to lose search status for all stations any time a remote I/O communications fault exists. • Modified both Chains A & B to add a DIW bypass signal which is only available when the FES simulator is connected to the FERDP during validations, is asserted. • Modified both Chains A & B to remove all Shutter permits when the Storage Ring Permit is removed.

  28. The GEN1 Upgrade • Processors: • Redundant and Dissimilar: • Chain A - AB PLC5 ESD and C&C in Separate routines • Chain B - GE RX7i, ESD • Programming Languages • Similar : • Chain A – Ladder Logic • Chain B – Ladder Logic and C++ • HMI: • LEDs and mechanical PBs • I/O Interface: • Hardwired to terminal blocks • Software mapping of all I/O for standardization • DIW Monitoring • Analog modules in the ESD PLCs • Acceptance testing • Done in Lab (when changes are made or every 5 years) using a Wonderware-based software simulator • Validations • Annual, Noninvasive, 1/2 day • Touch Panel HMI Simulating the Front-End Shutters • Communication • Relay isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat) • One-way communication to EPICS • Chain A – DH+ through a Data Communications Module (PLC writes only, no read functions) • Chain B – RS232 through a Processor Control Module (PLC writes only, no read functions)

  29. The GEN1 Upgrade • Software Changes • A thorough and concise specification document • Each PLC chain separates logic routines - functionally • Input and Output map(s) • ESD – immediate radiation hazard - logic • Storage Ring Permit removing faults and trips • ESD – potential radiation hazard - logic • Front-End Shutter Permit removing faults and trips • Beamline Shutter Permit removing faults and trips • Command and Control logic (Chain A only) • Status logic • Warning logic • Major, Serious, and Minor Faults were changed to Faults, Trips, and Warnings with much clearer diagnostics for troubleshooting • ESD Permits driven by real equipment status rather than resulting fault codes • Standardized station addressing (100s = Station A, 200s = Station B) • Chain B reports the faults and trips • Chain B looks at Search status from Chain A at the leading edge of the searched signal • Doors locked when the search is complete, eliminating many Lock and Unlock buttons. • Each station now has Beam Ready, Fault/Trip, and No Access Allowed indicators.

  30. GEN 1 Upgrade PSS Open status • Hardware Changes Open status Closed status Open status Chain A Emergency Shutdown and Command and Control PLC Safety Shutter 1 Safety Shutter 2 Photon Shutter 2 Closed status SR Trip/Fault Beam Line Door closed Estop WDT Integral Shutters Closed status Station A ACIS Station A Searched Station A Beam Ready Crosstrip Crosstrip Global OnlineSolenoid WDT Air Supply Door closed Estop Closed status SR Trip/Fault Closed status Photon Shutter 1 Open status Chain B Emergency Shutdown PLC Closed status Open status ACIS now monitors PS1 as a backup for PS2 Chain B PS1 Permit added Search Status from A to B is now leading edge trigger Cross-trips were added Open status

  31. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Beamline PSS interface diagram Front - End Storage Ring components MPS DIW flow sensors Beamline Beamline Beamline components vacuum valves FE shutter & valve status DIW flow Front - End vacuum sensors position sensors sensors FE shutter & vacuum permit FEEPS FEEPS ( Mezzanine Rack) PSS EPICS EPICS Front - End vacuum IOC Beamline component IOC valves position DIW flow sensors Beamline EPS ( SV , FV , FEV , BIV ) PS1 Open request FE shutter permit EPICS clock sync Remote Shutter Analog PLC modules direct to transducers (8) Interface BL Shutter BL Shutter status permits FES Open status PSS PLC Front - End Control System ( Mezzanine Rack) Shutter air supply Pressure sensors Chain A only User Panels Beamline Shutters (1,2 or 3) ( Pushbuttons, key switches and LED Indicators) Closed switches Solenoid FE shutter permit PSS SR trips control GOL key status PSS Beamline Control System Remote IO link ( Station Enclosure) Open switches Solenoid control Hutch doors ACIS Sector Interface ALL Closed switches Front - End Shutters Enclosure Air supply shutoff (except PS1) Search stations Remote I/O link E - stop buttons FES closed status ACIS ACIS PLC ACIS Controlled Up to 6 stations IOC ( Main Control Equipment Room) ( RF & Dipole)

  32. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Testing Methodology • Internal memory tables were created to map all beamline I/O to a common addressing scheme (I/O wiring is not consistent across all beamlines). • This allows the Acceptance and Validation Systems to have a single program for all beamlines. • This allows the Acceptance and Validation Systems to control where the inputs to the ESD logic originate (i.e., from either real world devices or software signals). • This allows the Acceptance and Validation Systems to simulate the Front-End Shutters and other critical signals.

  33. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Testing Methodology – The ATS • Before PLC code is downloaded for testing at a beamline, testing is performed in a lab simulator called the Acceptance Test System (ATS) • The ATS procedures tests ALL of the PLC logic • ESD – immediate radiation hazard - logic (each fault and trip tested n+1 times) • Storage Ring Permit removing faults and trips • ESD – potential radiation hazard - logic (each fault and trip tested n+1 times) • Front-End Shutter Permit removing faults and trips • Beamline Shutter Permit removing faults and trips • Command and Control logic • Warning logic

  34. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Acceptance Test System

  35. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Testing Methodology – The VTS • I/O validation is performed first to verify that all beamline input and output devices operate correctly and are mapped properly to internal memory tables • The VTS procedures perform testing for ONLY the following PLC logic • ESD – immediate and potential radiation hazard - logic • Storage Ring Permit removing faults and trips • Shutter Permit removing faults and trips • After a Validation is complete, the Validation System is disconnected from the PSS and the PSS returns to normal with no residual data (created by the Validation System) remaining in the data tables of the PLCs. • It is of utmost importance to ensure the real inputs are mapped to the internal files/bits and no faults or trips are blocked after the Validation System is removed. This is accomplished by the following method: • A pulse, originating from the Validation System, must be present to activate any of these Validation System functions in the PLCs. • Perform End-to-End Test (PSS input through ACIS output to dump beam).

  36. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Validation Test System

  37. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Validation System Main menu allows for configuration of beamline

  38. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Functional Validation screen manipulates FES switches to create trips and faults

  39. GEN1 Upgrade PSS Main Functional Validation screen contains mezzanine based signals and allows Validator to monitor SR Permit status

  40. GEN3 Upgrade PSS • Processors: • Similar - AB ControlLogix L61 • Chain A – ESD • Chain B – ESD • Chain C – Command & Control • Programming Languages: • Ladder Logic • HMI: • Soft Panel displays and controls • I/O Interface: • Hardwired to Circuit Boards • Software mapping of all I/O • Diagnostic Modules on Front-End Shutter I/O • DIW Monitoring • Analog modules in the ESD PLCs • Acceptance Testing • Done in Lab (when changes are made or every 5 years) using a Wonderware-based software simulator • Validations • Annual, Noninvasive, 1/2 day • Touch Panel HMI simulating the Front-End Shutters • Communication • Electronic isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat) • One-way communication from ESD systems to Chain C using Produced and Consumed Tags over Ethernet • Ethernet between EPICS and Chain C using Produced and Consumed Tags

  41. APS PSS Comparison

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