Coping with Terrorism through Good Governance: the Pakistan Case

1. Coping with Terrorism through Good Governance: the Pakistan Case Dr. Rifaat Hussain Professor and Chair, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

2. The causal connection between Governance and Terrorism • Good governance mitigates both greed (interest based) and grievances (fact based) as drivers of violent conflict. • With its emphasis on inclusion, participation and empowerment, good governance overcomes citizen’s sense of political alienation with the existing political order and reduces incentives for violent behaviour

3. The Greed Factor • According to Paul Collier, economic motivations and opportunities (“loot-seeking”) are more highly correlated with the onset of conflict than ethnic, socio-economic, or political grievances (“justice-seeking”). This leada to the hypothesis that resource wealth makes rebellion feasible by providing the opportunity and even the motivation for rebellion.

5. The causal connection between Governance and Terrorism • Good governance denies political and moral space to terrorist groups to pursue their agendas with impunity. • Poverty, unemployment, economic deprivation and despair create enabling environment for terrorists to thrive.

7. Rising graph of terrorist violence

8. Why Focus on Armed Groups? • Pose most direct challenge to the authority of the state. • Enhanced capability to do widespread violence • Rising importance in the post-Cold War period (9/11 only underscored the global reach and lethality of the activity of some of these groups). • Insights into changing forms of violent behavior

9. Categorizing Armed Groups • Trans-national Agenda. • Local grievances • Secessionist and national liberation movements • Mercenary militias • Anti-state agendas • Criminal syndicates

10. Key elements of strategic logic of violence There are five principal strategic logics at work in terrorist campaigns: (1) Attrition – ability to impose costs unless target’s behavior is changed (2) Intimidation – convince populations that terrorists are strong (3) Provocation- inducing adversary to engage in indiscriminate violence (4) Spoiling- convincing the adversary that moderates on terrorists side are weak (5) Outbidding – convincing public that terrorists have greater resolve to fight than other groups and thereby worthy of its support

11. Key goals of extremist/terrorist groups • Five goals are of enduring importance: 1.Regime change, 2. Territorial change 3. Policy change, 4. Social control 5. Status quo maintenance.

12. Militant Organizations in Pakistan

13. Militant Organizations in Pakistan

14. Key FATA Militant Outfits

15. Key FATA Militant Outfits

16. Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Compared

17. Selected Human Deprivation Indicators for Pakistan 80% 51% 45% 38% 38% 38% 35% 10% Without access to essential drugs Without Improved Drinking water Without Adequate Sanitation Without Access to Health Services In One Room Households Underweight Children (under 5 years) Children not fully immunized Births not attended by skilled health personal

18. Physical Facilities Available at Educational Institutions in Pakistan,2001-01 71.3% 39.6% 57.0% 51.7% 12.0% 14.7% 8.3% Access to Primary School, (Over 2 KM) Without Building Kacha Building Without Electricity Without Drinking water No Latrine Without Boundry Wall

19. Expansion of Madaris between 1947 and 2000 by Region

20. Expansion of Madaris (1988-2002)

21. The Key Question • When, why, and how do people become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against fellow humans and what can be done about it? • Effective counterstrategies cannot be designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives extremist/ terrorist violence.

22. What are we trying to counter: • An ideology or religion? • A tactic or a mindset? • Symptoms or root-causes? • A malleable state of mind or a permanent condition? • A search for remedial response or a social engineering project? • Or a combination of all these. • How valid and sharp are our diagnostic tools?

23. The key is process…. • “It is very rare for someone to wake up and randomly decide to commit a violent act; there is almost always a process of radicalization and a network of like-minded people who become enablers.”

24. At the Policy Level • Develop a comprehensive counter strategy based on an understanding of: • Beliefs • Mentality • Background • History • Ideology and • Motives and • Organizational structure of of Extremists and Radicals.

25. At the Policy Level • Doing so would require a very detailed mapping of the modus operandi of the extremist forces and the mindsets underpinning their violent behaviour. • Connecting the dots would be as important as identifying the right dots. • Issue of context would be critical in developing an effective policy response

26. A Firm and consistent policy • Setting and sticking to a firm policy that would deal decisively with infringements of the rule of law. • Threats of punitive action must be backed by adequate coercive power to enforce the rule of law. • The military and law enforcement apparatus must work in unison to produce the desired results

27. At the Policy Level • Have an outreach to the moderates – influential locals, community leaders, teachers will be the key. • Engagement without empowerment • Seek to isolate the extremists from the larger society. • Guard and offer protection to those who are willing to speak against the extremists. • State must become visible in defense of moderates.

28. At the policy level… • Engage in the struggle of ideas – AmarBilMaroof, NahiAnaliMunkir. • Invest in Education and Development. • Defuse sources of hatred and violence • Improve intelligence and law enforcement entities. • Combat sources of Jihadist funding and recruitment. • Rekindle hopes of a non-Jihadi future for youth

29. Reassure people of the following: • Terrorism does not pay and it does no work • Terrorism is not a winning coercive strategy • Shift the focus from cause and form to consequences of extremism and violence for the society at large. • Terrorism is strategically irrational behaviour . • Terrorist success to be judged along a spectrum ranging from zero success, to partial, to limited to near-success.

30. At the society level • Balancing positive externalities with negative externalities. “Providing support for human rights and/or women’s organisations may or may not help prevent terrorism, but it strains the imagination to envisage it causing any major damage. Fighting poverty, providing education and health services or promoting (by peaceful means) democracy and human rights may not have much effect on terrorism, but even so, such initiatives will help many people in other ways.

31. Where do we go from here? • Treat armed insurgency as a complex problem in which multiple factors are at play. • Address Pakistan-Afghanistan challenges by focusing on the needs of disenfranchised Pashtun communities on both sides of the border. • Identify the legitimate grievances of different armed groups; • Identify those groups with legitimate grievances and those that are fighting for economic reasons; • Separate these groups from the Jihadist elements of the insurgency; • Target these groups as partners for peace in a peace process.

32. Options for Pakistan • Evolve a comprehensive counterinsurgency security strategy to deal with the rising menace of terrorism; • Turn inward and focus on the rising threat of armed militancy within the country. • Reverse country’s drift into extremism by strengthening liberal and progressive forces • Be ready to pay the necessary price for establishing the writ of the Pakistani state. • Resolve the crisis of governance afflicting the country. • Terrorists are like fish that survives and swims in a pool of water. This water must be dried up by winning the hearts and minds battle.