Bureaucracy and Democracy (Cont’d)

1. Bureaucracy and Democracy (Cont’d) January 17th, 2005

2. Liberal Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • bureaucracy is good in that it emphasis impartiality (over participation) • dissonance • danger is if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and threatens individual rights • “Big Brother”

3. Elite Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • top-down and hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is good • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • dissonance • danger if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and undermines competition among elected/political elites • e.g. development of a permanent non-elected bureaucratic elite making decisions • ultimately decisions must be ratified by elected elites

4. Participatory Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • e.g. to put into effect the will of the majority • dissonance • top-down hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is bad • excessive focus on impartiality (over participation)

5. Main Messages!! • bureaucracy and democracy • relationship with democracy is paradoxical (but in different ways depending on model of democracy) • in tension with all models of democracy • extent of paradox depends on the model of democracy in question • range • bureaucratic model fits well with ideal model of democracy (elite democracy) • bureaucratic model has inherent characteristics that fit with democracy but also poses threat to individual rights (liberal democracy) • bureaucracy is a necessarily evil (participatory democracy) • the paradoxical relationship generates a number of imperatives for each democratic model in designing and managing bureaucracy...

6. Liberal Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • bureaucracy is good in that it emphasis impartiality (over participation) • dissonance • danger is if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and threatens individual rights • “Big Brother”

7. Liberal Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • bureaucracy is good in that it emphasis impartiality (over participation) • dissonance • danger is if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and threatens individual rights • “Big Brother” • imperative • make sure that bureaucracy is tightly constrained (e.g. tight rules)

8. Liberal Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • bureaucracy is good in that it emphasis impartiality (over participation) • dissonance • danger is if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and threatens individual rights • “Big Brother” • imperative • make sure that bureaucracy is tightly constrained (e.g. tight rules) • subject to individual rights protection (e.g. Charter, privacy protection, FOI, etc.)

9. Elite Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • top-down and hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is good • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • dissonance • danger if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and undermines competition among elected/political elites • e.g. development of a permanent non-elected bureaucratic elite making decisions • ultimately decisions must be ratified by elected elites

10. Elite Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • top-down and hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is good • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • dissonance • danger if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and undermines competition among elected/political elites • e.g. development of a permanent non-elected bureaucratic elite making decisions • ultimately decisions must be ratified by elected elites • imperative • ensure that elected elites can be reasonably held accountable for decisions

11. Elite Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • top-down and hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is good • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • dissonance • danger if bureaucracy becomes too powerful and undermines competition among elected/political elites • e.g. development of a permanent non-elected bureaucratic elite making decisions • ultimately decisions must be ratified by elected elites • imperative • ensure that elected elites can be reasonably held accountable for decisions • ensure bureaucracy with high level of professionalism, merit and commitment to public service (while ensuring that they have adequate scope to expercise these capacities)

12. Participatory Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • e.g. to put into effect the will of the majority • dissonance • top-down hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is bad • excessive focus on impartiality (over participation) is bad

13. Participatory Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • e.g. to put into effect the will of the majority • dissonance • top-down hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is bad • excessive focus on impartiality (over participation) is bad • imperative • ensure that bureaucracy is representative of the population

14. Participatory Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • e.g. to put into effect the will of the majority • dissonance • top-down hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is bad • excessive focus on impartiality (over participation) is bad • imperative • ensure that bureaucracy is representative of the population • provide opportunities for democratic participation (e.g. consultations, citizen input, bottom-up initiatives)

15. Participatory Democracy and Bureaucracy • confluence • effective mechanism to pursue the general welfare • e.g. to put into effect the will of the majority • dissonance • top-down hierarchical nature of bureaucracy is bad • excessive focus on impartiality (over participation) is bad • imperative • ensure that bureaucracy is representative of the population • provide opportunities for democratic participation (e.g. consultations, citizen input, bottom-up initiatives) • ensure accessibility and transparency

16. Public Administration in Canada... • the structure of the Canadian bureaucracy (and its interface with elected officials) represents a particular response to these various concerns and imperatives!! • What is that response???

17. Part II: The Structure of Bureaucracy and the Canadian Political System The Political-Bureaucratic Interface

18. Cabinet Government • what is it? • collective sharing of executive power • how is the structure of cabinet government determined? • the Prime Minister • who becomes PM? • prerogatives of the Prime Minister (vis-a-vis cabinet) • size and structure of cabinet • departmental organization • cabinet committee structure • appointments to cabinet • cabinet agenda • cabinet decisions

19. Principles/Roles/Actors in Cabinet Government • relationships NOT roles • not generally legally prescribed • considerable room for manoeuvre • organic link between different relationships • nature of any given relationship has implications for the nature of other relationships • change in any one set of relationships implies changes in other sets of relationships • relationships are based on tradition but also on continuing acceptance of the obligations/rights inherent in them • implicit bargains

20. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility • what is “responsible government”? • the executive must maintain the confidence of Parliament • what is collective ministerial responsibility? • all ministers must resign if the cabinet loses the confidence of Parliament • what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament? • what pre-conditions would the operation of collective cabinet ministerial responsibility require?

21. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility • requirements (enforced by PM) • cabinet solidarity • cabinet secrecy • cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information • the problem of leaks • why would cabinet ministers agree? • price of being in cabinet • collective self-interest

22. Diffuse Accountability: Individual Ministerial Responsibility • what is individual ministerial responsibility?

26. Diffuse Accountability: Individual Ministerial Responsibility • what is individual ministerial responsibility? • do ministers typically resign for errors committed in their department? • no...not if they can help it!! • why not? • minister is answerable publicly (to parliament) for the actions of their department • regardless of whether the minister was in charge at the time a problem occurred • ministers are responsible for correcting problems within their department

29. Diffuse Accountability: Individual Ministerial Responsibility • why would individuals agree to accept this role? • price for exercising power

30. Centralized Accountability (Collective Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse Accountability (Individual Ministerial Responsibility) • the individual minister and cabinet • collective vs. individual ministerial paradox • ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet control • ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct other ministries • the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility • cabinet/departmental link • minister represents department in cabinet • minister represents cabinet to the department

31. The Structure of Government: Centralized and Diffuse Accountability • Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an attempt to ensure political control... • over the centre of government (Prime Minister) • over individual departments (Ministers) • structure of government is an attempt to balance between collective ministerial responsibility (centralized accountability) and individual ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability)

32. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability • cabinet structure and operation • size • 30 ministers with portfolio • 6 ministers of state • cabinet committees • importance and number • central agencies vs. line departments • line departments – e.g. HRSDC, DFO, Agriculture • central agencies – PCO, PMO, Finance, Treasury Board • role of the Deputy Minister • technically accountable to minister • appointed by PM • receives direction from PCO

33. Individual Ministerial Responsibility – Shaping the Political/Bureaucratic Relationship • the individual minister demands from their senior bureaucrats... • loyalty in service • honesty in advice • refrain from public comment = public service neutrality

34. Individual Ministerial Responsibility – Shaping the Political/Bureaucratic Relationship • the senior bureaucrats agree to public service neutrality in exchange for... • official anonymity • promotion based on merit • security of tenure