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USCGC BLACKTHORN

USCGC BLACKTHORN. Lesson’s learned from the Coast Guard’s “worst peace-time accident” By CWO VANDEN HEUVEL.

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USCGC BLACKTHORN

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  1. USCGC BLACKTHORN Lesson’s learned from the Coast Guard’s “worst peace-time accident” By CWO VANDEN HEUVEL

  2. Blackthorn (WLB 391) 1of 39 180’ buoy tenders. Commissioned on Mar 27,1944. She served all over the U.S., from Ice-breaking on the Great Lakes to buoy tending in San Pedro, Calif. It spent most of its life in the Gulf of Mexico at Mobile. Ala., before being assigned to her final homeport of Galveston, Texas in 1976.

  3. On January 28 • The BLACKTHORN had 50 men aboard. 44% of the crew had less than one year of shipboard experience; 7 crewmembers were sailing for the first time on the day of the accident. 5 of those 7 went down with BLACKTHORN.

  4. Many units immediately responded to perform Search and Rescue efforts.

  5. A survivor cries after receiving treatment late into the night. Of 14 bodies found after the Blackthorn was raised, 13 were in the Engine Room.

  6. “Blackthorn tragedy forced Coast Guard to rethink training”

  7. Civilian Investigation: National Transportation Safety Board • NTSB recited recommendations they had issued from the 13-month earlier Cuyahoga incident, arguing that recency of service had again been ignored in selecting the CO of Blackthorn. • NTSB remained steadfast, that CO’s should not be selected for command without first having been assigned to a comprehensive refresher course. • The course according to the NSTB, at the very least should include instruction from a CO of a CG cutter similar to the cutter which he/she was being assigned.

  8. NTSB Investigation Con’t • The board revealed during the CO’s five years ashore since last being assigned to a ship, that he underwent no such refresher training. Testimony indicated, the only professional training that he had completed was a Rules of the Road correspondence course, which he actually finished after assuming command of Blackthorn. • The Coast Guard Marine Casualty report and Commandant's action findings, sighted both vessels at fault for failure to adhere to the Rules of the Road.

  9. NTSB Conclusion • NTSB cited that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the Blackthorn to keep to the proper side of the channel when meeting another vessel in a bend and because the CO failed to adequately supervise the actions of an inexperienced officer-of-the-deck. • Contributing to the accident was the failure of the CO of Blackthorn and the pilot/master of Capricorn to establish passing arrangement with bridge to bridge radiotelephone or whistle signals and failure of the CO to remain aware of all traffic in the channel. • The high loss of life was attributed to the Capricorn’s anchor getting caught in Blackthorn’s shell plating and rapidly dragging her astern before she quickly capsized.

  10. In 1982, the rusting Blackthorn was recommitted to the deep to become part of Pinellas County’s artificial reef program. The estimated cost of her salvage was estimated at several million dollars.

  11. A few of many safety changes implemented in Tampa Bay since 1980 As a result of this collision, additional range lights were added throughout Tampa. Buoy optics have been upgraded using LED technology on the aids located closest to the Skyway Bridge. • CVTS (Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service) has been implemented as a joint partnership between the Coast Guard and the Tampa Port Authority. Their primary function is to coordinate safe and efficient vessel movement and prevent marine accidents and waterway incidents in Tampa Bay and also the associated loss of life and damage to property and the environment. • The CVTS is in the process of becoming a regulated traffic service under the Code of Federal Regulations. 2009. (Coast Pilot 5, CH. 5)

  12. Tampa Bay Navigation Guidelines & CVTS requirements Tampa’s navigational guidelines are recommended by the COTP (Sector Commander) and the Port of Tampa Bay harbor Safety Committee. A few guidelines: During periods of restricted visibility, vessels should not transit the bay unless at least two sets of channel buoys are visible ahead. Vessels should proceed at speeds safe to prevailing conditions. All meeting and passing situations should be made at the safest location possible, with due regard to the size of vessels, width of the channel, and existing conditions. Light draft vessels should give way to deep draft vessels if conditions permit. CVTS requirements: Radio traffic monitored 24/7. Security Broadcast system/reporting points are designated to give Masters, Pilots, and persons in charge of vessels real-time information on the density of marine traffic throughout Tampa Bay. This includes detailed vessel descriptions and ETA info for Sunshine Skyway Bridge traffic in both directions.

  13. Coast Guard changes the training and qualification requirements for command and establishes a school to focus on command operations. • SUBJ: COAST GUARD DECK WATCH OFFICER (DWO) EXAMINATION PROGRAM A. COAST GUARD DECK WATCH OFFICER EXAMINATION PROGRAM, COMDTINST 16672.5 (SERIES) 1. REF A REQUIRES A PROSPECTIVE CO, XO, OINC OR XPO OF AN AFLOAT UNIT TO PASS THE APPLICABLE DWO EXAM (INITIAL OR RENEWAL) NO MORE THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF PCS ORDERS. THIS STANDARD APPLIES EVEN IF THE MEMBER IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A CUTTER AND/OR POSSESSES A VALID MERCHANT LICENSE. • SUBJ: PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER FAMILIRIZATION TRAINING. A. CUTTER TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION MANUAL, COMDINST M3502.4 (SERIES) 1. REF A, PARA 7.D, REQUIRES COMMANDING OFFICERS/OFFICERS IN CHARGE TO SPEND A PERIOD OF UNDERWAY FAMILIRIZATION ON A CUTTER OF THE SAME CLASS AS THEIR NEW COMMAND,BUT NOT THE SAME CUTTER. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS ISSUED AS ARESULT OF THE NSTB RECCOMENDATIONS FOLLOWING THE COLLISIONS AND LOSS OF LIBE ABOARD CGC CUYAHOGA AND CGC BLACKTHORN. EXEMPTIONS EXIST FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO PREVIOUSILY SERVED AS CO/OIC/XO/XPO OF THE SAME CLASS OF VESSELS WITH AUTHORIZED WAIVER APPROVAL THROUGH CG-751.

  14. The Commandant’s precept (2009) for selection board panels considering officers for Command Afloat assignments. A highly stringent, similar process is conducted for Enlisted afloat command selections. • Assignment to command afloat represents the highest degree of trust and confidence the Coast Guard can place in an officer. A Commanding Officer at sea can expect to be involved in situations requiring immediate life and death decisions. Those selected must reflect the highest standards of conduct, character, capability, attitude, and military bearing. These challenges are best met by professional mariners who have successfully demonstrated their operational expertise at sea. Those selected must have a proven record of superior leadership. We must ensure that CG personnel serving under the officers you select do so in an environment that inspires and develops our junior ranks. If we are to be successful in retaining a quality, diverse, and motivated work force, we must ensure that only the best leaders command our cutters. • In view of our 218-year legacy as a military, multi-mission, maritime service, we must select our most capable and responsible officers for command afloat assignments. You and your fellow Panel members are the principal guarantors of this commitment. You have been very carefully selected to accomplish this task. • The Panel shall refer to the provisions of Section 14.A of reference (b) and the Commandant’s Guidance to PYO9 Officer Selection Boards, enclosure (1), in the development of criteria for determining the officers recommended for selection.

  15. The Command and Operations School was established as the Prospective Commanding Officer/Prospective Executive Officer (PCO/PXO) School in 1986. The sinking of the cutters CUYAHOGA and BLACKTHORN highlighted the need for a course that refreshed the collision avoidance and damage control skills of senior leaders aboard cutters prior to assuming their duties. For several years before the PCO/PXO School was established, there was an attempt to meet training through a variety of other Navy and commercial schools. The current school was established to consolidate training, save money, and take advantage of the visual simulator AD NAUTAS, PER NAUTAS For Sailors, By Sailors Command and Operations School PCO/PXO

  16. Blackthorn Memorial Galveston, TexasNote, the Black memorial buoy numbering 23 to represent the lives lost. It remains permanently lit.

  17. A memorial ceremony is held on the anniversary in St Petersburg, Fl. A time to honor both, our living and fallen shipmates. • SUBJ: CGC BLACKTHORN (WLB-391) COLLISION - 30TH ANNIVERSARY. 28 JANUARY 2010 MARKS THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE USCGC BLACKTHORN (WLB-391) TRAGEDY. • IN 1980, CGC BLACKTHORN COLLIDED WITH THE 605 FOOT TANKER CAPRICORN IN THE TAMPA BAY SHIP CHANNEL, TAKING THE LIVES OF 23 OF BLACKTHORN'S 50 CREWMEMBERS. • .ON WEDNESDAY, 28 JANUARY 2010 AT 1100 EST, A MEMORIAL CEREMONY WILL BE HELD TO HONOR THE LIVES OF OUR FALLEN SHIPMATES AT THE NORTH END OF THE SKYWAY BRIDGE IN PINELLAS COUNTY, ST PETERSBURG, FL. • WE ALSO HONOR THE SACRIFICES OF THE CGC BLACKTHORN CREW BY OUR DEDICATION TO CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TODAY'S CUTTERMEN. • I ENCOURAGE ALL SHIPMATES TO TAKE A MOMENT TO REFLECT ON THIS TRAGEDY AND ITS REMINDER OF THE DANGERS WE FACE ON A DAILY BASIS WHILE EXECUTING OUR MISSIONS. THOSE WHO ARE AVAILABLE ARE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND THE CEREMONY. • VADM R. J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDER, COAST GUARD ATLANTIC AREA, AND 13TH GOLD ANCIENT MARINER, SENDS.

  18. Memorial site in St. Petersburg, FL.(approx 2 miles N. of the collision site)

  19. Seaman Apprentice Flores, GuardianSA William Flores died while saving the lives of many others after the BLACKTHORN sank. With less than 3 months onboard, he held open the lifejacket locker and passed them out to his shipmates in the water. He then swam below decks to aid crew that were trapped inside, never returning to the surface. He was posthumously awarded the CG Medal for heroism.

  20. END • “ Morn not for them, they sail with One more divine”

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