Download
1 / 21
210 likes | 417 Vues
Coercion. PLSC 379r Lecture 5. The Game. Anarchy leads to mistrust which makes cooperation difficult Very hard to issue a deterrent threat that hurts you as well as your adversary Coercion even more difficult than deterrence. Coercer makes threat. Target concedes. Target resists.
E N D
Coercion PLSC 379r Lecture 5
The Game • Anarchy leads to mistrust which makes cooperation difficult • Very hard to issue a deterrent threat that hurts you as well as your adversary • Coercion even more difficult than deterrence
Coercer makes threat Target concedes Target resists Coercion succeeds Coercer attacks Coercer backs down Coercion fails Complete military victory Coercion fails Target gives in Coercion succeeds Coercer gives up Coercion fails
Pape • Puzzle: What types of strategies do states use to coerce? What explains why coercion works or fails? • The conventional wisdom is that the best way to coerce is to induce suffering on civilian population. Is this correct?
Theories of Resolve • Balance of resolve • Balance of interests • Vulnerability of target’s civilian population • Balance of forces • Can’t explain variation with a constant! • Vietnam War: Johnson’s 1965 bombing campaign failed to coerce the North Vietnamese, but Nixon’s 1972 campaign succeeded.
Three Strategies • Punishment • Risk • Denial
The Logic of Coercion (Pape 16) • R = B * p(B) – C * p(C) • R = value of resistance • B = potential benefits of resistance • P(B) = probability of attaining benefits by continued resistance • C =potential costs of resistance • P(C) =probability of suffering costs • Usually nothing a coercer can do to manipulate benefits • Coercers focus on raising costs
Punishment • Punishment: inflicting damage on civilian population • Sparta forced Athens to surrender by cutting off food • Bombing on London in WWI caused riots and people even attacked members of the Royal Flying Corps. Attacks in WWII far more severe but did not cause such tumult. • No gas used (tit for tat?) • USAF fire bombings did more damage than the two atomic weapons that were dropped on Japan • EXPECTATIONS • During WWII, Germany first reported overestimated reports of damage done by allied bombing, so that later they reported a “corrected” report and it didn’t seem so bad
Punishment Why it fails: • Issue importance is such that populations are willing to accept high costs • It is difficult to inflict a significant amount of damage on populations • Relatively easy to defend against (evacuation, economic adjustments) • Rally around the flag
Risk • Risk: incrementally increasing the amount of civilian damage inflicted • Why it fails: • Based on fear of damage rather than real damage • Produces less damage than punishment (and remember that it was hard to produce enough damage via punishment) • Limited nature of attacks can be interpreted as political weakness or lack of resolve
Decapitation • Decapitation strategies attempt to remove or isolate the target’s leadership. • US strategy in Iraq and Somalia • Why it fails: • Very hard to find and kill individuals • Leader’s preferences are often a reflection of society’s preferences • Succession is unpredictable
Denial • Denial: Take away the enemy’s physical ability to control territory • Direct support of ground forces • Effective when fronts are static • Strategic interdiction: destroy source of target’s military production or isolate it from combat theaters • Only effective in protracted wars • Operational interdiction: attacks rear area support or maneuvering forces • Most effective when front lines are fluid (breakouts, maneuvers)
Denial When it works: • Rarely • When it takes opponent’s strategy into account • Limitations • Only works over specific territory • Military pressure must be constant • Expensive
Regime Type • Is coercion (especially punishment) more likely to coerce democracies than autocracies? • Since democratic leaders know they can be removed, will they give into demands to avoid suffering even small costs? • Since democratic populations can more easily remove governments, the logic of punishment might work better • On the other hand, because democratic populations have a greater connection to the government, the rally might be stronger
Horowitz and Stam • H&S found that the regime type of the target has no effect on whether a state can be coerced (so a democratic country no more or less likely to be coerced)
Economic Coercion: Pape (again!!!) • Puzzle: are economic sanctions an effective coercion tool? If so, under what conditions are they likely to succeed • Look only at political coercion • Do not count minimal concessions • Do not count if it was really military force that brought concessions • Only 5 of 115 cases indicated successful economic coercion
Explaining Failure • Modern nation states are simply not very frail • Iraq lost 48% of its GNP over 5 years and still held out • Cuba • Nationalism makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than have policy dictated by a foreign power
Duh!(?) • If sanctions so rarely work, why do states use them? • Strategic interaction • Selection
Coercer threat ~threat Target No coercion Back down Resist Coercers can be resolute or irresolute. Targets can be compliant or resilient Coercer Coercion succeeds Sanctions Back down Target Coercion fails Give in resist Coercion succeeds Coercion fails
Coercer Resolute Irresolute Compliant Target Resilient
Threats • When sanctions are likely to be successful, the threat will be sufficient • States that ignore the threat of sanctions, are not likely to give in when facing sanctions • Even failed sanctions may have a positive effect on the coercer’s reputation, making future opponents more likely to believe threats (commitment problem)
