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(antiwar/hirsch)

(www.antiwar.com/hirsch). Is Iran in violation of the NPT? Is Iran pursuing nuclear weapons?. Feb. 27, 2006: Report by the IAEA Director General:. Represents a radical departure from the past and the most fundamental rethinking of the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in almost

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(antiwar/hirsch)

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  1. (www.antiwar.com/hirsch)

  2. Is Iran in violation of the NPT? Is Iran pursuing nuclear weapons? Feb. 27, 2006: Report by the IAEA Director General:

  3. Represents a radical departure from the past and the most fundamental rethinking of the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in almost a quarter-century. Instead of treating nuclear weapons in isolation, it considered them as an integrated component of American military power. (Linton Brooks, National Nuclear Security Administration Director, addressing Senate Armed Services Committee, 2004) New US Nuclear Weapons Policies *Nuclear Posture Review: delivered to Congress December 2001 *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations: Pentagon draft document, September 2003, March 2005 Military guidelines for implementation of new Nuclear Posture *Washington Post article, September 2005

  4. Excerpts from "Nuclear Posture Review" of 2001: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends." (p. 9) Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." (p. 12-13)

  5. NY Times March 2002

  6. Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation. Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets.... 1. Time sensitivity. 2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target. 4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level of damage... More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes... Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." . Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities. . Nuclear Non-nuclear

  7. Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation. Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets.... 1. Time sensitivity. 2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target. 4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level of damage... More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes... Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." . Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities. . Nuclear Non-nuclear

  8. Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation. Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets.... 1. Time sensitivity. 2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target. 4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level of damage... More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes... Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." . Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities. . Nuclear Non-nuclear

  9. Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation. Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets.... 1. Time sensitivity. 2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target. 4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level of damage... More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes... Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." . Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities. . Nuclear Non-nuclear

  10. Real life example: Iran Suppose a military confrontation starts: Iran is accused by US State Department of having chemical and biological weapons Iran has missiles that can reach Iraq and Israel Missiles could potentially have chemical warheads Iran has very large (>106) conventional forces U.S. has 1.5x105 conventional forces in Iraq

  11. FAS January/February 2001 By Greg Mello May/June 1997 pp. 28-32 (vol. 53, no. 03) © 1997 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists The B61 "mod-11" gravity bomb is the first new nuclear capability added to the U.S. arsenal since 1989. It was developed and deployed secretly, without public or congressional debate, and in apparent contradiction to official domestic and international assurances that no new nuclear weapons were being developed in the United States. The B61-11's unique earth-penetrating characteristics and wide range of yields allow it to threaten otherwise indestructible targets from the air--or, in Pentagonese, to hold such targets "at risk." That makes the B61-11 a uniquely useful warfighting tool.

  12. Are tactical nuclear weapons (B61-11) deployed in the Persian Gulf region? National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/ NSPD 26 Intelligence Priorities NSPD 27 U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy 25 April 2003 NSPD 28 Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, Safety, and Security (source) 20 June 2003 NSPD 29 [Transition to Democracy in Cuba] 30 November 2003 NSPD 31 ["Vision" for NASA and Goals for Space Science] NSPD 32 [Latin America Policy] NSPD 33 Biodefense for the 21st Century 28 April 2004 NSPD 34 Fiscal Year 2004-2012 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan May 2004 NSPD 35 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization May 2004 NSPD 36 United States Government Operations in Iraq 11 May 2004 NSPD 40 U.S. Space Transportation Policy 21 December 2004 NSPD 41 Maritime Security Policy 21 December 2004 NSPD 43 Domestic Nuclear Detection 15 April 2005

  13. Who decides whether nuclear weapons will be used? NSC-30 of 1948: "the decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required." Congress has no say in this Who advises the President?

  14. Basis for 'Nuclear Posture Review' (2001) (2001) Director, National Nuclear Security Administration Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence National Security Advisor Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Chairman, Pentagon's Defense Science Board NBC News 12/12/05

  15. Basis for 'Nuclear Posture Review' (2001) (2001) Director, National Nuclear Security Administration Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence National Security Advisor Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Chairman, Pentagon's Defense Science Board NBC News 12/12/05

  16. US "negative security assurance" to non-NW states, 1995: "Legal" foundations to "justify" US attack and nuclear use Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations UN SC Resolution 1540

  17. The targets:

  18. Why would the US want to use small nuclear weapons against Iran * Deter a response to the attack * Destroy underground facilities that can't be destroyed otherwise * Establish the credibility of the US nuclear "deterrent" against non-nuclear states Nuclear Posture Review, 2001: U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends." (p. 9)

  19. Why it would be catastrophic if the US uses nuclear weapons in an attack on Iran: * US waging a nuclear war of aggression * No more Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 182 non-nuclear nations current signatories of the NPT, many will rush to get nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attack by nuclear nations * No longer a "taboo" against use of nuclear weapons * Any regional conflict could explode into all-out nuclear war * Nuclear weapons are 106 times more powerful than other weapons * An escalating nuclear war can wipe out humanity

  20. Nuclear Weapon Effect Calculator Largest US bomb: 15 megatons Hiroshima bomb: 15 kilotons The Hiroshima bomb killed 100,000 human beings World's nuclear arsenals > 200,000 Hiroshima bombs http://www.stardestroyer.net/Empire/Science/Nuke.html There are at least 20,000 nuclear bombs today, of average power 150 kilotons = 10xHiroshima each http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd02norris

  21. http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/ Petition by physicists on nuclear weapons policy, September 2005 As physicists we feel a special responsibility with respect to nuclear weapons; our profession brought them into existence 60 years ago. We wish to express our opposition to a shocking new US policy currently under c onsideration regarding the use of nuclear weapons. We ask our professional organizations to take a stand on this issue, the Congress of the United States to conduct full public hearings on this subject, and the media and public at large to discuss this new policy and make their voices heard. This new policy was outlined in the document Nuclear Posture Review delivered to Congress in December 2001, part of which has been made public, and is further defined in the unclassified draft document Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations dated March 15, 2005, which is in the final stages of being adopted and declared official policy by the US government, according to reports in the Washington Post and the New York Times (9/11/05). It foresees pre-emptive nuclear strikes against non-nuclear adversaries, for purposes which include the following ( Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Page III-2): ....................................................................... This dangerous policy change ignores the fact that nuclear weapons are on a completely different scale than other WMD's and conventional weapons. Using a nuclear weapon pre-emptively and against a non-nuclear adversary crosses a line, blurring the sharp distinction that exists between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and heightens the probability of future use of nuclear weapons by others. The underlying principle of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is that in exchange for other countries forgoing the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states will pursue nuclear disarmament. Instead, this new U.S. policy conveys a clear message to the 182 non-nuclear weapon states that the United States is moving strongly away from disarmament, and is in fact prepared to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries. It provides a strong incentive for countries to abandon the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons themselves and dramatically increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, and ultimately the risk that regional conflicts will explode into all-out nuclear war, with the potential to destroy our civilization. We urge members of Congress, professional organizations and the media to raise public awareness and promote discussion on these issues, and we express our repudiation of these dangerous policies in the strongest possible terms. 1796 physicists have signed the petition as of Mar, 15 2006 3:26 PM PST

  22. What can be done today: Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the US Constitution: The Congress shall have Power: To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; Congress could pass a law regulating the Armed Forces: "The Armed Forces of the United States shall not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state in the absence of prior Congressional authorization to that effect" As members of the UC community we have a special moral responsibility. Congress should limit the authority of the President to order the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state

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