MBA201a: The Bertrand Trap

1. MBA201a: The Bertrand Trap

2. Recap of the “Bertrand trap” • Even with two firms, price is driven down to the competitive price (marginal cost). • Economic profits are zero, • Accounting profits could be negative if there are sunk costs. • Note that neither higher demand nor lower costs (if both firms have the same cost) increase profits. • Examples: fiber-optic cable, railroad grain rates. • First piece of advice: Avoid this game if you can! MBA201a - Fall 2009

3. Avoiding the Bertrand trap Option 1: Be the cost leader. Remember: cost advantage must be sustainable. MC2 P1 45° BR2 BR1 P* = c2 - ε MC1 P2 MBA201a - Fall 2009

4. Additional ways to avoid the Bertrand trap • Option 2: Limit capacity • In the example we did on the board, imagine that the two firms each had maximum capacity of 20. • Option 3: Product differentiation and branding (moderates impact of price competition) • Create switching costs • Option 4: Collude • This is illegal in the U.S. and many other countries, more on that later. MBA201a - Fall 2009

5. Option 5: leverage repeated interactions • If firms interact repeatedly, they can use the future as source of leverage: threaten to punish rival if it behaves non-cooperatively. • Topsy-turvy principle: if price wars lead to a really bad situation, it is easier to deter non-cooperative behavior! • This is called tacit collusion. MBA201a - Fall 2009

6. The repeated Bertrand price game • In the Bertrand price game, we contrasted • The “cooperative” outcome: set the monopoly price, split the market, and make M/2 (M = monopoly profits). • The Nash equilibrium: price at MC, make zero. • Claim: in the repeated game, the cooperative outcome (set the monopoly price) can be a Nash equilibrium. • Equilibrium strategies: • If all firms have set the monopoly price in the past, stick to it. • If one firm ever sets price different from monopoly price, revert to pricing at marginal cost forever. (This “punishment” is what supports the equilibrium.) MBA201a - Fall 2009

7. How is cooperation an equilibrium? • If firm sets monopoly price, expected payoff is M/2 + V, where V is discounted future profit along the monopoly pricing path. • If firm undercuts rival, then expected payoff is approximately M + 0. (This assumes firm sets price just below rival and takes all of the market—for one period.) • If follows that monopoly pricing is an equilibrium if M/2 + V > M + 0, or simply V > M/2. Profits from cooperating Profits from cheating MBA201a - Fall 2009

8. Tacit collusion in words In words, “if the future is sufficiently important, then cooperation is an equilibrium.” • Temptation: deviate and capture all the monopoly profits right now. • Carrot: if you don’t deviate, you get the monopoly profits in the future. • Stick: if you do deviate, you get 0 profits in the future, forever… MBA201a - Fall 2009

9. When is cooperation easier? • Market growth (firms care more about the future) • Likelihood of survival (ditto) • Speed of response (future is close) • Market structure (numbers and symmetry) • Multimarket contact (harsh punishments) • Probability of detection MBA201a - Fall 2009

10. Comments • Punishment/retaliation is a disciplinary device that supports “cooperation.” • Along the “equilibrium path,” price wars do not actually take place, only the threat. • Explicit price-fixing is illegal, but an understanding of repeated games may produce a similar outcome legally. MBA201a - Fall 2009

11. Price wars • Price wars are supposed to be “off the equilibrium path,” but they happen in many industries on occasion. Why? • High demand • Low demand and imperfectly observable strategies • Financial distress • Signalling strength MBA201a - Fall 2009

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13. The fine print • Retail Store Price Match GuaranteeIf you find a lower advertised price on the same available brand and model prior to your purchase or during the exchange and return period, we will match that price. Simply bring in the ad of the local retail competitor or Best Buy, while the lower price is in effect and receive your price match. • The guarantee does not apply to our competitors' website pricing and the guarantee does not apply to our or our competitors': • Offers that include financing, bundling of items, free items, pricing errors and mail-in offers • Items that are limited-quantity, out of stock, open-box, clearance, Outlet Center, refurbished/used items and items for sale Thanksgiving day through the Saturday after Thanksgiving MBA201a - Fall 2009

14. Other “facilitating practices” • Most-favored customer clauses • GE and Westinghouse • Medicaid reimbursement rules MBA201a - Fall 2009

15. U.S. antitrust laws • The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have missions to “promote and protect the competitive process.” • Laws concerning: • Price-fixing (Sherman Act of 1890, Section 1). • Monopolization (Sherman Act of 1890, Section 2). • Mergers. • Price discrimination, exclusive dealing, tying. • Some things are per se illegal. In other cases, the courts apply a rule of reason. • Enforcement involves: • Both private party and government initiated proceedings. • Civil and criminal cases. MBA201a - Fall 2009

16. Competition policy outside the U.S. • All 30 OECD countries have some antitrust authority: • European Union laws very similar to U.S.. • Member countries have their own competition commissions. • Japan Fair Trade Commission. • As do a number of non-OECD countries: • For example, Argentina, Brazil, and India. MBA201a - Fall 2009

17. Antitrust and price discrimination • US law* forbids “discriminat[ing] in price between different purchasers” where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition” unless: • price differences are based on costs, or • price differences were needed to “meet the competition.” • Two categories of cases: • “Primary line discrimination”: seller practicing discrimination harms its rivals. • “Secondary line discrimination”: injury to competition takes place in the buyers’ market. • “One often hears of the baseball player who, although a weak hitter, was also a poor fielder. Robinson-Patman is a little like that. Although it does not prevent much price discrimination, at least it has stifled a great deal of competition.” • - Robert Bork • * The Robinson-Patman Act. MBA201a - Fall 2009

18. Takeaways • Price competition can be severe, even with a small number of firms. • Avoid hazards of price competition by • Having lower costs • Limiting capacity • Differentiating your product • Repeated interaction provides firms with strategic leverage over each other that may encourage cooperation. MBA201a - Fall 2009