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Export Controls and CSU

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16 diapositives · 383 Views · Sep 17, 2014

Export Controls and CSU. Export Control Administrator Grant.Calhoun@colostate.edu. Why Have Export Controls?. The U.S. Government’s larger interests: Protecting military technology from distribution abroad.

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  1. Export Controls and CSU Export Control Administrator Grant.Calhoun@colostate.edu

  2. Why Have Export Controls? The U.S. Government’s larger interests: • Protecting military technology from distribution abroad. • Protecting the domestic technology that was funded and conducted to further U.S. economic security. • Tracking the distribution of allowed exports to uncover wider individual or organizational behaviors that threaten U.S. interests. • Furthering U.S. foreign policy.

  3. What are Export Controls? “Export Controls” generally include several federal laws and regulations: • Arms Export Control Act • Export Administration Act • International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) • Export Administration Regulations (EAR) • Treasury/OFAC Regulations • Dept. of Energy Regulations Through these laws, the federal government seeks to control the export of goods, money, and technology to certain countries, corporations, and individuals. Under certain circumstances, a license must be applied for and received from an agency prior to an export. In some cases, a license will be denied.

  4. What is an Export? An export can be any of the following: • actual shipment of any covered goods or items; • the electronic or digital transmission of any covered goods, items, or related goods or items; • any release or disclosure, including verbal disclosures or visual inspections, of any technology, software or technical data to any foreign national wherever located; or • actual use or application of covered technology on behalf of or for the benefit of any foreign entity or person anywhere.

  5. What are Export Controls? There are three primary areas of attention for CSU: (1) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), enforced by the Department of State under 22 CFR §§ 120-130. • The ITAR covers defense related articles and information used for military purposes such as: explosives, chemicals delivery systems, and biological agents. These items and technologies often appear in sponsored research from federal agencies or private contractors.

  6. What are Export Controls? (2) Export Administration Regulations (EAR),enforced by the Department of Commerce under 15 CFR §§ 730- 774. • Included in this section are “dual-use” items. This means an item or technology not primarily of a military nature, but which could be utilized or incorporated into a military device or activity.

  7. What are Export Controls? (3) Economic Sanctions and Blocked Individuals, as enforced by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). • OFAC restricts trade with certain individuals and elements within particular countries, as dictated by U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, U.S. citizens may also be restricted from certain transactions. Blocked party lists are updated regularly in the Federal Register. • Emerging areas of concern include China, Iran, and Syria.

  8. Fundamental Research Exclusions • The Fundamental Research Exclusions of EAR and ITAR state that no license is required to disclose to a foreign person information that is: “published and which is generally accessible or available to the public [through for example] fundamental research in science and engineering at universities where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community.” • The majority of University research falls in this category.

  9. Dr. John Reece Roth • Electrical Engineering Professor, University of Tennessee • Expert in Industrial Plasma Engineering • Subcontracted sponsored research for U.S. Air Force on plasma actuators for unmanned aircraft. • Utilized Chinese and Iranian graduate students, and took his technology with him to China, against University counsel. • In 2008, Arrested and Convicted of violating the AECA. • Heavily fined, and currently serving 4 years in prison. • Co-P.I. also convicted, restricted from participating in any future federally-sponsored research.

  10. CSUS Board of Governors: Export Control Policy Statement • Adopted 10/5/2012. • “[CSUS] is committed to the highest level of compliance with all applicable U.S. export control laws and regulations…” • “Each institution shall develop specific policies and procedures as necessary to comply with this Policy…and shall maintain such…to remain current with changes in applicable laws.”

  11. A Renewed Emphasis on Export Controls • Prior to 9/11, universities claimed that their operations fell completely under the “Fundamental Research Exclusions” that are included within both EAR and ITAR. As such most universities paid little thought to the issues surrounding export controls. • Post 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security and the various agency enforcement arms are tracking the sponsored research from groups such as DoD, NASA, and DoE, as well as Universities generally, much more closely in the area of export-controlled technology. • Advances in monitoring technology and a proliferation of agents are leading to greater enforcement.

  12. Penalties for Non-Compliance • Institutional Liability and Personal Liability • Criminal and Civil Penalties • Example: University of Tennessee • Department of State (Directorate of Defense Trade Controls) • Personal and Institutional fine of up to $1,000,000 and up to 10 years in prison. • Department of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security) • “Willful” violation: Personal fine up to $250,000, and up to 10 years in prison. Institutional fine up to $1,000,000. “Knowing” violation: $50,000 and up to 5 years in prison. • Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Asset Control) • Criminal: Fine up to $1,000,000. Civil: Fine up to $55,000 per violation.

  13. Export Controls in the University Setting • “Deemed Exports” • Disclosing controlled technology to a foreign national in the U.S. • Graduate Students/Employees • International Visitors • International Research • Shipping or using technical equipment abroad • International Collaboration • Exchanging information with international research partners • International Travel • Taking information abroad, i.e. on a laptop or flash drive

  14. Export Controls in the University Setting • Hiring/Human Resources • Screening for hires/visiting scholars • I-129 attestation forms • Visa applications • Purchasing • Transactions with SDNs/Blocked Parties • Transactions with Embargoed Countries • Shipping • Material destinations and end users

  15. CSU and Export Controls Role of the Export Control Administrator: • Help educate and protect P.I.s and other University personnel • Protect the Institution • Conduit between University personnel and federal agencies • Be Practical and Facilitative • Answer Inquiries Promptly and Give Full Assistance

  16. CSU and Export Controls • Questions? • Contact me: grant.calhoun@colostate.edu • PDI: Monday 1/14, 2pm, 220 LSC