BSAI Crab Rationalization

1. BSAI Crab Rationalization Coastal Community Issues and Alternatives

2. Important After 2 years of Council-facilitated negotiations that have included harvesters, processors, crew member organizations and coastal communities, we believe the BSAI Crab Rationalization options being considered are unique to this fishery and should not be viewed as an sort of a precedent for any other fishery.

3. Why? Congress has said: “…the NPFMC shall analyze individual fishing quotas, processor quotas, and quotas held by communities. The analysis should include an economic analysis of the impact of all options on communities and processors as well as the fishing fleets.”

4. The NPFMC has said: “As a necessary step in the continued process of comprehensive rationalization, prompt action is required to protect the crab resource and to promote stability for those dependent on the crab fisheries, which includes harvesters, processors, and coastal communities.”

5. And the State of Alaska says: “In a September 21, 2000 letter to Senator Ted Stevens… Governor Knowles went on record … for the (BSAI) crab fisheries, he wanted some assurance of participation by all sectors of the fishing industry, including coastal fishing communities, as elements and options for a rationalization program…”

6. Opilio landings analysis by community,1995-1999

7. Regionalized Opilio Landings, 1995-1999 48.74% 50.72%

8. Rationalization Goals • Industry should be profitable and competitive in global marketplace • Allow orderly decapitalization of harvesters and processors • Increase safety by ending race for fish • Reduce bycatch and deadloss

9. Options available to communities: • Community ownership of quota (CFQ’s) • Increased CDQ allocations • Broad-based tax redistribution schemes • Individual/specific port landings • Regionalized IFQ’s • Regionalized Co-ops • Regionalized Two-Pie

10. Community Ownership of Quota (CFQ’s) • BSAI crab is an industrial fishery requiring capital intensive investments, highly concentrated landings. Decapitalization and efficiency are difficult to achieve. • Unlike some other fisheries, crab communities are primarily interested in landings, not fishing rights. • Global marketplace competition will require flexibility over time.

11. Why Community Ownership of Quota is Not Currently Preferred : Decapitalization, competitiveness problems

12. Increased CDQ Allocations • The CDQ program spreads allocations across a wide area, rather than targeting crab dependent communities. • Major crab communities have invested millions to support the open access fishery. Marginal increases in CDQ allocations do not protect or compensate for these investments. • Many crab dependent communities exist outside the CDQ program.

13. Tax Redistibution Schemes • High value of crab is important foundation for lesser-value fishing activities in rural communities. • Community goal is to create jobs and businesses, not additional welfare programs. • Public infrastructure investments need same ROI consideration as private investments.

14. Individual and Specific Port Landings • Would require very small community landings - often less than 1%. • Race for fish has skewed landings - don’t import old problems. • Certain private sector participants would be highly penalized. • May not be legal under Port Preference laws.

15. Regionalization • Two regions are defined, consistent with recent landings patterns.

16. Regionalization • Two regions are defined, consistent with recent landings patterns. • Allocations to the industry have a “Regional Landing” endorsement consistent with individual vessel and/or processor history.

17. Regionalization • Two regions are defined, consistent with recent landings patterns. • Allocations to the industry have a “Regional Landing” endorsement consistent with individual vessel and/or processor history. • Harvesters may land crab at any qualified port and to any processor within the specified region.

18. Regionalization • Two regions are defined, consistent with recent landings patterns. • Allocations to the industry have a “Regional Landing” endorsement consistent with individual vessel and/or processor history. • Harvesters may land crab at any qualified port and to any processor within the region specified on the endorsement. • Shares should be fully transferable, to allow for consolidation, new entrants, efficiency, etc

19. Regionalization • Two regions are defined, consistent with recent landings patterns. • Allocations to the industry have a “Regional Landing” endorsement consistent with individual vessel and/or processor history. • Harvesters may land crab at any qualified port and to any processor within the region specified on the endorsement. • Shares should be fully transferable, to allow for consolidation, new entrants, efficiency, etc • There could be an “open delivery” component that can move between regions.

20. Regionalization Northern Region Southern Region

21. Regionalization Opilio Example Region 95-99 15% Open Min. Max. Southern 50.7% 7.6% 43.1% 58.3% Northern 48.8% 7.3% 41.5% 56.7%

22. Regionalization Kodiak / Opilio Example 95-99 Landings Potential Without Potential With Open Delivery Open Delivery 00.14% 00.14% 15.14%

23. Co-op’s, One or Two-Pie? • This decision is being driven by industry, and there is a majority of the NPFMC committee that supports Two-Pie. • Co-ops may be possible but could also be too complex and reduce harvester freedoms. The industry studied and rejected this option early. • Time is the enemy of all of us.