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Course Material

Course Material. Overview of Process Safety Compliance with standards Process Hazard Analysis Standard Operating Procedures Safe Work Procedures Mechanical Integrity Management of Change Auditing Process Safety systems Emergency response procedures. 5. Safe Work Procedures.

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Course Material

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  1. Course Material • Overview of Process Safety • Compliance with standards • Process Hazard Analysis • Standard Operating Procedures • Safe Work Procedures • Mechanical Integrity • Management of Change • Auditing Process Safety systems • Emergency response procedures

  2. 5. Safe Work Procedures 29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4) Process Safety Management for Biofuels This material was produced under grant SH-19479-09-60-F-36 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

  3. 5. Safe Work Procedures 29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4) Process Safety Management for Biofuels This material was produced under grant SH-19479-09-60-F-36 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

  4. Piper Alpha Oil Platform Explosion

  5. Failure of Lock out / Tag out Procedure

  6. Safe Work Permit Permit-To-Work System

  7. Safe Work Procedures Lock out / Tag out

  8. Each Craft Should have Their Own Lock

  9. Safe Work Permit OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147 Lock out / tag out

  10. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147 Try the Lock Out

  11. Additional information on Lock out / Tag out procedures can be found in the document referenced in the below link. Additional Information

  12. Hot Work Permit 29 CFR 1910.119 (k)

  13. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.252 Hot Work Permit Requirements

  14. Hot Work Permit Failure

  15. Closing the Permit Joint inspection when the nonroutine work is complete • Valve alignment • Blinds removed • Sewer drains reopened • Vents • Rotating equipment • Locks and tags • Utilities • Barricades removed

  16. Confined Space Fatalities

  17. CSB Bulletin

  18. Confined Space Entry Permit Permit-Required Confined Spaces (PRCS) standard 29 CFR 1910.146 Safe Work Procedures http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS

  19. “Opening Process Equipment” Fatalities 29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4) www.csb.gov

  20. “Opening Process Equipment” Fatalities 29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4) www.csb.gov

  21. BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001 www.csb.gov CSB Video on BP Amoco Incident Can be viewed from video time 6:45 – 10:20

  22. BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001 www.csb.gov Fact: Three maintenance workers were fatally injured. 1. Why? The workers were working on the “Polymer Catch Tank”. The polymer catch tank was still pressurized. The workers partially removed the cover.

  23. BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001 www.csb.gov Fact: The polymer catch tank was still pressurized 2. Why? Loss of gas venting capability by catch tank. Decomposition generating gas in core of vessel. Pressure gauge was inoperative. No de-energizing procedure for vessel.

  24. BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001 www.csb.gov Fact: There was no de-energizing procedure for tank. 3. Why? Pressure gauge and drain used as indication of de-energized status. Process had been shut down, was not operative. Outdated vessel cleaning procedure was being used.

  25. BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001 www.csb.gov Fact: Outdated vessel cleaning procedure was being used. 4. Why? Foaming of the polymer product was not well understood by operations. The plugging capacity of the foaming polymer was not well understood by operations.

  26. BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001 www.csb.gov Foaming and plugging of product was not well understood by operations. 5. Why? Operations had not taken advantage of opportunities to learn from near misses on product foaming and plugging. Operations’ safe work procedures had not been modified to consider foaming of polymer material.

  27. Applicability of Previous Material • Overview of Process Safety • Compliance with standards • Process Hazard Analysis • Standard Operating Procedures • Safe Work Procedures

  28. Remaining Course Material • Overview of Process Safety • Compliance with standards • Process Hazard Analysis • Standard Operating Procedures • Safe Work Procedures • Mechanical Integrity • Management of Change • Auditing Process Safety systems • Emergency response procedures

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