Ross Buck University of Connecticut Presented at Yale University Emotion Interest Group, Spring semester, 2003

1. Emotional Experience, Expression, and Communication :A Developmental-Interactionist Approach to Biological and Higher-Level Social, Cognitive and Moral Emotions Ross Buck University of Connecticut Presented at Yale University Emotion Interest Group, Spring semester, 2003

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3. PART I: DEFINITIONS • MOTIVATION • EMOTION • COGNITION

4. MOTIVATION is conceptualized as the potential inherent in a system of behavior control.

5. EMOTION is conceptualized as a readoutof motivational potential when activated by a challenging stimulus.

6. EMOTION is conceptualized as a readoutof motivational potential when activated by a challenging stimulus. • ANALOGOUS TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF MATTER AND ENERGY IN PHYSICS

7. EMOTION is conceptualized as a readoutof motivational potential when activated by a challenging stimulus. • ANALOGOUS TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF MATTER AND ENERGY IN PHYSICS • ONE NEVER SEES ENERGY DIRECTLY, ONLY ITS MANIFESTATION IN MATTER (HEAT, LIGHT, FORCE)

8. EMOTION is conceptualized as a readoutof motivational potential when activated by a challenging stimulus. • ANALOGOUS TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF MATTER AND ENERGY IN PHYSICS • ONE NEVER SEES ENERGY DIRECTLY, ONLY ITS MANIFESTATION IN MATTER (HEAT, LIGHT, FORCE) • ANALOGOUSLY, ONE NEVER SEES MOTIVATION DIRECTLY, ONLY ITS MANIFESTATION IN EMOTION.

9. BIOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND EMOTIONS ARE BASED UPON SPECIFIABLE NEUROCHEMICAL SYSTEMS THAT ARE GENETICALLY STRUCTURED

10. BIOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND EMOTIONS ARE BASED UPON SPECIFIABLE NEUROCHEMICAL SYSTEMS THAT ARE GENETICALLY STRUCTURED Genetic Systems

11. BIOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND EMOTIONS ARE BASED UPON SPECIFIABLE NEUROCHEMICAL SYSTEMS THAT ARE GENETICALLY STRUCTURED Genetic Systems Neurochemical Systems Neurotransmitters with agonists and antagonists Receptor beds

12. BIOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND EMOTIONS ARE BASED UPON SPECIFIABLE NEUROCHEMICAL SYSTEMS THAT ARE GENETICALLY STRUCTURED Genetic Systems Neurochemical Systems Neurotransmitters with agonists and antagonists Receptor beds Primary Motivational/Emotional Systems Motivation Potential inherent in systems of behavior control

13. Genetic Systems Neurochemical Systems Neurotransmitters with agonists and antagonists Receptor beds Primary Motivational/Emotional Systems Motivation Emotion Potential inherent in systems of behavior control Readout of motivational potential BIOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND EMOTIONS ARE BASED UPON SPECIFIABLE NEUROCHEMICAL SYSTEMS THAT ARE GENETICALLY STRUCTURED

14. Cognition: The challenging stimulus.

15. Cognition: The challenging stimulus. • Often, “emotion” and “cognition” are seen as incompatible: at opposite ends of a continuum.

16. Cognition: The challenging stimulus. • Often, “emotion” and “cognition” are seen as incompatible: at opposite ends of a continuum. • But, emotion involves a kind of knowledge; a kind of cognition.

17. Cognition: The challenging stimulus. • Often, “emotion” and “cognition” are seen as incompatible: at opposite ends of a continuum. • But, emotion involves a kind of knowledge; a kind of cognition. • Analytic cognition (reason): Linear, sequential, mediated

18. Cognition: The challenging stimulus. • Often, “emotion” and “cognition” are seen as incompatible: at opposite ends of a continuum. • But, emotion involves a kind of knowledge; a kind of cognition. • Analytic cognition (reason): Linear, sequential, mediated • Syncretic cognition-emotion: holistic, synthetic, direct

19. Cognition: The challenging stimulus. • Often, “emotion” and “cognition” are seen as incompatible: at opposite ends of a continuum. • But, emotion involves a kind of knowledge; a kind of cognition. • Analytic cognition (reason): Linear, sequential, mediated • Syncretic cognition-emotion: holistic, synthetic, direct • Developmental-interactionist theory posits an interaction between emotional and rational cognition occurring over the course of development.

20. The Schachter and Singer study illustrates an interactionist conception of emotion

21. Qualitative aspect Cognitive factors Emotion Quantitative aspect Physiological arousal The Schachter and Singer theory of emotion

22. However, Schachter and Singer did not recognize the complexity of the physiological contribution to the interaction

23. New Mammalian Brain REASON (6 layered Neocortex) EMOTION Old Mammalian Brain (3-5 Layered Paleocortex) Reptilian Brain

24. Moreover, Schachter and Singer did not recognize that the interaction occurs in a developmental context

25. The Developmental-Interactionist view of this interaction is illustrated by the Affect-Reason-Involvement (ARI) model

26. The ARI Model ANALYTIC COGNITION (REASON) Relative influence SYNCRETIC COGNITION (EMOTION) The Emotion/Reason Continuum

27. Social Learning/ Cultural Factors Relative influence Biological Factors The Emotion/Reason Continuum Situational Differences: Phylogenetic Scale: Developmental Scale: Emotional situations Simple creatures Infant Rational situations Complex creatures Adult

28. Relative influence Reason Emotion The Emotion/Reason Continuum FUNCTION: STRUCTURE: REFLEXES SUBCORTICAL AFFECTS NEOCORTEX The ARI Model shows the essential relationship between reason and emotion in the control of behavior, and is essential to Developmental-Interactionist Theory

29. The Affect-Reason-Involvement Model (ARI Model) includes a measurement model based upon this conceptualization • Affect and Reason are measured by the CASC Scale (Communication via Analytic and Syncretic Cognition Scale): Buck, Chaudhuri, and others. • A/R ratio defines relative influence of affect and cognition in response to a given stimulus. • Involvement measured as (A + R /2).

30. The Evolution of Cognition:Ecological Realism

31. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness

32. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness • Gibson’s theory of ecological realism provides a detailed and coherent account of the evolution of knowledge from the earliest organisms to human perception.

33. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness • Gibson’s theory of ecological realism provides a detailed and coherent account of the evolution of knowledge from the earliest organisms to human perception. • Species evolved to be sensitive to those aspects of the environment which afford possibilities or opportunities for behavior: affordances.

34. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness • Gibson’s theory of ecological realism provides a detailed and coherent account of the evolution of knowledge from the earliest organisms to human perception. • Species evolved to be sensitive to those aspects of the environment which afford possibilities or opportunities for behavior: affordances. • Affordances are informative: that is, they constitute information.

35. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness • Gibson’s theory of ecological realism provides a detailed and coherent account of the evolution of knowledge from the earliest organisms to human perception. • Species evolved to be sensitive to those aspects of the environment which afford possibilities or opportunities for behavior: affordances. • Affordances are informative: that is, they constitute information. • Affordances are defined jointly by organism and environment.

36. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness • Gibson’s theory of ecological realism provides a detailed and coherent account of the evolution of knowledge from the earliest organisms to human perception. • Species evolved to be sensitive to those aspects of the environment which afford possibilities or opportunities for behavior: affordances. • Affordances are informative: that is, they constitute information. • Affordances are defined jointly by organism and environment. • Affordances come naturally to be "picked up" by perceptual systems evolved via natural selection as phylogenetic adaptations.

37. Cognition: J. J. Gibson’secological realism and awareness • Gibson’s theory of ecological realism provides a detailed and coherent account of the evolution of knowledge from the earliest organisms to human perception. • Species evolved to be sensitive to those aspects of the environment which afford possibilities or opportunities for behavior: affordances. • Affordances are informative: that is, they constitute information. • Affordances are defined jointly by organism and environment. • Affordances come naturally to be "picked up" by perceptual systems evolved via natural selection as phylogenetic adaptations. • Gibson termed “raw” perception “awareness.”

38. There are three sorts of "raw" awareness Gibson (1966; 1979).

39. There are three sorts of "raw" awareness Gibson (1966; 1979). • 1. Awareness of affordances in the terrestrial environment, such as those provided by physical objects as support, obstacles to motion, etc.

40. There are three sorts of "raw" awareness Gibson (1966; 1979). • 1. Awareness of affordances in the terrestrial environment, such as those provided by physical objects as support, obstacles to motion, etc. • 2. Awareness of social affordances provided by other animals. Emotional displays can be conceptualized as social affordances.

41. There are three sorts of "raw" awareness Gibson (1966; 1979). • 1. Awareness of affordances in the terrestrial environment, such as those provided by physical objects as support, obstacles to motion, etc. • 2. Awareness of social affordances provided by other animals. Emotional displays can be conceptualized as social affordances. • 3. Awareness via interoceptors of vague sensations of internal origin--feelings and emotions--the "pangs and pressures of the internal environment" (Gibson, 1966, p. 31). These may be conceptualized as bodily affordances.

42. There are three sorts of "raw" awareness Gibson (1966; 1979). • 1. Awareness of affordances in the terrestrial environment, such as those provided by physical objects as support, obstacles to motion, etc. • 2. Awareness of social affordances provided by other animals. Emotional displays can be conceptualized as social affordances. • 3. Awareness via interoceptors of vague sensations of internal origin--feelings and emotions--the "pangs and pressures of the internal environment" (Gibson, 1966, p. 31). These may be conceptualized as bodily affordances. • In the present view subjectively experienced affects--feelings and desires--constitute awareness of bodily affordances.

43. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE

44. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE.

45. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE. • COGNIZANCE: KNOWLEDGE-BY-DESCRIPTION.

46. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE. • COGNIZANCE: KNOWLEDGE-BY-DESCRIPTION. • Pavlovian Conditioning: Simple association.

47. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE. • COGNIZANCE: KNOWLEDGE-BY-DESCRIPTION. • Pavlovian Conditioning: Simple association. • Instrumental conditioning: Goal oriented.

48. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE. • COGNIZANCE: KNOWLEDGE-BY-DESCRIPTION. • Pavlovian Conditioning: Simple association. • Instrumental conditioning: Goal oriented. • Higher-level cognitive processing.

49. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE. • COGNIZANCE: KNOWLEDGE-BY-DESCRIPTION. • Pavlovian Conditioning: Simple association. • Instrumental conditioning: Goal oriented. • Higher-level cognitive processing. • UNDERSTANDING: LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE.

50. COGNITION IS DEFINED AS KNOWLEDGE • AWARENESS: DIRECT PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE-BY-ACQUAINTANCE. • COGNIZANCE: KNOWLEDGE-BY-DESCRIPTION. • Pavlovian Conditioning: Simple association. • Instrumental conditioning: Goal oriented. • Higher-level cognitive processing. • UNDERSTANDING: LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE. • Unique to human beings?