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Review & Preview

Review & Preview. The Classical Trinity, parts 2 and 3 Teleological argument, version 3 Seems unsound now that we have Darwin’s theory of evolution Ontological Argument Perhaps(?) has something wrong with it… but what?!? The problem of evil Pascal’s Wager William James. A note on Hume.

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Review & Preview

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  1. Review & Preview • The Classical Trinity, parts 2 and 3 • Teleological argument, version 3 • Seems unsound now that we have Darwin’s theory of evolution • Ontological Argument • Perhaps(?) has something wrong with it… but what?!? • The problem of evil • Pascal’s Wager • William James

  2. A note on Hume • Cleanthes: “A further objection: in tracing an eternal series of items, it seems absurd to ask for a general cause or first author of the enitre series. How can something that exists from eternity have a cause, since the causal relation implies priority in time and a beginning of existence?”

  3. A note on Hume • Demea is giving a version of the First Cause argument: • (P1) Everything exists must have a cause. • (P2) The chain of causes can’t be infinitely long. • (C) So there must be a first cause: God. • We asked: why believe (P2)?? • Demea’s answer: “[To deny (P2)] is absurd… the whole chain… obviously requires a cause… as much as any particular thing that begins to exist in time.” • Cleanthes’ point: this doesn’t make sense

  4. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL An argument against the existence of the Basic JCM God

  5. Some preliminaries • If God exists, He is omniscient (all knowing), omnipotent (all powerful), perfectly good, and loves mankind. • But there has been and continues to be an enormous amount of suffering in the world.

  6. Some preliminaries • Some suffering is caused by people • War, torture, unkindness • Some suffering is not caused by people • Disease, hurricanes • Among the sufferers are people (e.g. young children) who cannot be guilty of any sin or wickedness. • Why would God do that?

  7. Some preliminaries • The existence of this suffering seems incompatible with the existence of the Basic J-C-M God: • If God is omnipotent (all powerful), He could prevent the suffering if he wanted to.

  8. Some preliminaries • If God is omniscient, He has always known that the suffering would occur. Indeed, he knew it when he created the Universe. • not like US foreign policy • It is impossible to be good and loving, and to allow suffering that you can prevent. • An omnipotent, omniscient Being who allowed vast suffering to occur would not be morally good. He would be a sadist!

  9. The Problem of Evil argument, version 1 (P1) The world contains vast amounts of suffering. (P2) If there was a Basic JCM God, the world would not contain this suffering. (C) There is no Basic JCM God.

  10. Objections to Version 1 • Plantinga’s distinctions: • Logical vs. Evidentiary problems • Defense vs. Theodicy • An easy defense: God might have reasons that we cannot understand.

  11. The Problem of Evil argument, version 2 (P1) The world contains vast amounts of suffering. (P2) If there was a Basic JCM God, we would not expect the world to contain this suffering. (C) We have strong evidence against the existence of the Basic JCM God.

  12. Theodicy: The attempt to answer the Problem of Evil Argument (v2) • Warning: Beware of the “bait & switch” strategy – using an ordinary word with a new meaning. • Suffering is not real. • Reply: BS! (Bait & Switch). If ‘suffering’ and ‘real’ mean what they ordinarily mean, it is absurd to suggest that suffering is not real. • God’s love &/or God’s goodness are Divine love and Divine goodness, not to be judged by human standards. • Reply: More BS!

  13. Objection 1: Pain is necessary as a warning system • Replies to Objection 1: • Pain is an imperfect warning mechanism. Surely an all-powerful God would make a perfect one? • Why do the sources of pain exist? An omnipotent God could just take them away.

  14. Objection 2: Evil is punishment for wrongdoing • Replies to Objection 2: • Being a bad person and suffering do not always seem to be go together • This objection cannot explain why innocent babies, and animals, suffer

  15. Objection 3: Evil is necessary in order for us to appreciate the good • Imagine a perfect world…?? • Replies: • We don't need this much suffering in order to appreciate the good! • An omnipotent God could just create very appreciative people.

  16. Objection 4: The Free Will Defense • God could have built us without free will. But a world with no free creatures would not be such a good world. Since He chose to give us free will, we must be free to do evil. Vs.

  17. First reply to the Free Will Defense • A distinction: Moral evil vs. natural evil • Reply: The Free Will Defense can only explain moral evil, not natural evil. • Counter-objection: Natural evil (as well as moral evil) helps to build character. • Replies: • We don't need this much suffering! • Why couldn't God just create people with great moral character?

  18. Second reply to the Free Will Defense • Mackie's point: It is possible for people to have the freedom to choose evil, but never to do so. • Most people do this most of the time. • An omnipotent God could build a world like that.

  19. Objection 5: Reasons We Don’t Understand • Analogy: Parents sometimes allow their children to suffer for very good reasons which the children cannot understand. • Reply: This perhaps shows that the Problem of Evil does not prove that God does not exist. (It solves the Logical Problem; i.e. it provides a 'defense’; i.e. it shows that Version 1 of the argument is not sound.)

  20. Reply to Objection 5, cont’d • But to be convinced by a mere ‘defense’, we need some reason to believe that the Basic God exists. • Hume’s way of making this point: • “Let us allow that if the goodness of the Deity …could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena [suffering], however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle, but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert that, as goodness is not antecedently established but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject…. (Dialogues, Part XI)

  21. Pascal’s Wager Or, You Bet Your (After)Life

  22. Pascal’s Wager • Two kinds of reasons for belief: • Believing something because you have good reason to think that it's true • I believe that someone was mugged because I was an eye-witness • I believe that the basic JCM God exists because I don't think there's anything wrong with (say) the Ontological Argument • Believing something because having that belief makes your life better • I believe that I won the women's 100m because it makes me happy • Pascal's reason for believing in the Basic JCM God

  23. “Expected value” (or "expected utility") theory: • Expected value theory: A theory of how we should work out what is the best thing to do • A (fair) coin is going to be flipped • Choosing which bet to take • Bet 1: • Heads: you win $20 • Tails: you win $70 • Bet 2: • Heads: you win $30 • Tails: you win $50 • Which is better?

  24. Expected value theory says… • For each bet: • Write down the probability of each possible state of affairs • Write down the value of what you get in each state of affairs • for each possible state of affairs, multiply the value of what happens by the probability of that state of affairs • add up the resulting numbers. • This gives the expected value of this bet. • Do this for each bet • Now you have the expected values for all the bets. • It is rational to choose the bet with the highest expected value.

  25. How to choose between bet 1 and bet 2, according to expected value theory • Evaluating Bet 1 • probability of heads: ½ • probability of tails: ½ • value I get if coin comes up heads ($20): 20 • value I get if coin comes up tails ($70): 70

  26. Calculating the expected value of Bet 1 • probability of heads x value you get if heads happens = ½ x 20 = 10 • probability of tails x value you get if tails happens = ½ x 70 = 35 • Add these numbers together: • Expected value of bet 1 = 10 + 35 = 45

  27. Evaluating Bet 2 • Evaluating bet 2: • probability of heads: ½ • probability of tails: ½ • value I get if coin comes up heads ($30): 30 • value I get if coin comes up tails ($50): 50

  28. Calculating the expected value of Bet 2 • probability of heads x value I get if heads happens = 1/2 x 30 = 15 • probability of tails x value I get if tails happens = 1/2 x 50 = 25 • Expected value of Bet 2 = 15 + 25 = 40.

  29. Choosing between Bet 1 and Bet 2 • The expected value of Bet 1 (45) is higher than the expected value of Bet 2 (40) • So, expected value theory says: the rational choice is bet 1!

  30. A diagram to illustrate the choice between Bet 1 and Bet 2 Value of bet 1 = ½ x 20 + ½ x 70 = 10 + 35 = 45 Value of bet 2 = ½ x 30 + ½ x 50 = 15 + 25 = 40

  31. A second example to illustrate expected utility theory • Another example: a weighted coin. Probability of heads is 1/3, probability of tails is 2/3 • Bet 1: • Heads: you win NOTHING. • Tails: you win $50 • Bet 2: • Heads: you win $15 • Tails: you win $45 • Q: Which bet is it rational to choose?

  32. Pascal’s argument • There are two possible states of affairs: either God exists, or he doesn't exist. • The bets I am choosing between are: believe in God, or don't believe in God. • First question: what is the probability that God exists? • We can suppose (with the atheist) that the probability that God exists is very low.

  33. Bet 1: Believe in God • Bet 1: Believe in God ('wager for God') • Probability that God exists: 0.01 • Probability that God does not exist: 0.99 • Value I get if I believe in God, and God exists: infinity! (I go to heaven) • Value I get if I believe in God, and God does not exist: 0, say

  34. Bet 2: don’t believe in God • Bet 2: Don't believe in God • Probability that God exists: 0.01 • Probability that God does not exist: 0.99 • Value I get if I don't believe in God, and God exists: 0, say • Value I get if I don't believe in God, and God does not exist: 100, say

  35. Choosing whether to believe in God or not Expected value of bet 1 = 0.01 x ∞ + 0.99 x 0 = ∞ + 0 = ∞ Expected value of bet 2 = 0.01 x 100 + 0.99 x 100 = 1 + 99 = 100

  36. Choosing whether to believe in God or not • Calculating the value of these two bets, we find that the expected value of believing in God is infinity, and the expected value of not believing in God is 100 • Infinity is larger than 100 • So, according to expected value theory, it is rational to believe in God!

  37. First objection to Pascal’s argument: Belief is not voluntary! • Belief is not voluntary! i.e. It is not something you can decide to do, no matter how advantageous it would be. • Try deciding to believe that world peace will break out tomorrow. • For the atheists: Try deciding to believe in a basic JCM God!

  38. Pascal’s reply to the first objection • Pascal’s reply: You can’t decide to believe, but you can decide to do things that will lead to belief, e.g.: • read inspirational books • associate with religious people

  39. Second objection to Pascal’s argument: Other Gods and other bets • Pascal assumes that the only choice is between believing in the Basic JCM God or not believing in Him. But an entirely parallel argument can be given for believing in a very different God.

  40. WILLIAM JAMES: THE WILL TO BELIEVE

  41. Overview of James’ Thesis: • Against "scientific absolutism”: the idea that belief without ‘sufficient evidence’ is somehow irresponsible • Under certain circumstances, it is not irrational for one’s belief to be determined by one’s “passional nature” (i.e. one’s emotions & desires). • Religion is a case like this. • People may have different emotions, but James' emotions pull him towards accepting religion.

  42. Some definitions • Hypothesis: "anything proposed to belief", a suggestion that might be true or false • Option: A choice between two hypotheses • Living option: one where both answers “appeal to you as a real possibility.” • For most of us, one or more of the JCM religions is a live hypothesis, and so is atheism, but Greaves-ism is not.

  43. More definitions • Forced Option: One on which you can’t avoid taking a position. • You can’t avoid deciding whether to (i) believe in God or (ii) not to believe in God (where this includes both atheism and agnosticism). ??

  44. Yet more definitions • Momentous Option: One which has a profound effect on your life & the way you view the world. • Scientific belief is not momentous. • Religious belief is momentous because it offers the possibility of life after death, reward for the deserving and punishment for the undeserving. • Genuine option: One which is living, momentous and forced.

  45. How to choose whether to believe something or not • The two maxims for choosing beliefs: 'Know the truth!' 'Avoid error!' • But these conflict! • In the case of religious belief, some people decide to withhold belief because they have no adequate evidence. But those who adopt this principle do so for emotional (“passional”) reasons, too!

  46. James’ thesis • If an option meets two conditions, then it is not irrational (and in fact it is obligatory) to allow it to be settled by our “passional” nature. Those conditions are: • The option is genuine (i.e. living, momentous & forced). • The issue at hand cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. • Religion is a case like this.

  47. James’ argument for his thesis (P1) The decision between believing in God, disbelieving and remaining agnostic is a forced option (so, it cannot be left unsettled). (P2) The issue of God’s existence or nonexistence cannot be settled on intellectual grounds. (P3) If an option cannot be settled on intellectual grounds, and it is a living option, it must be settled on emotional grounds. (C1) The decision between believing in God and not believing must be settled on emotional grounds. (from (P1), (P2), (P3)) (P4) It is not irrational for one's emotions to favor not believing in God, but it is not irrational for the emotions to favor believing in God, either. (C2) It is not irrational not to believe in God, but it is not irrational to believe in God, either.

  48. Reasons your emotions might agree with James': • If God does not exist, then “death ends all” and much of the suffering and apparent injustice in the world is meaningless. • The idea of such a universe fills James (and many others) with despair & loathing.

  49. Critique of James: • He has not shown that the issue of God’s existence cannot be settled on intellectual grounds. (i.e. (P2) is dubious) • Many philosophers think that it has been settled by the arguments we’ve considered. • But even if currently existing arguments do not suffice to settle the issue, showing that the cannot be settled on intellectual grounds would require a powerful argument that no one knows how to construct.

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