1. Steering FailureCase Study MS Basel Australia

2. At about 0937[on 1 November 2010, the Liberian container ship MSC Basel grounded in Moreton Bay, while departing the port of Brisbane. MSC Basel was in the main shipping channel when its rudder unexpectedly moved to starboard without any order from the bridge. The ship immediately began turning to starboard. The main engine was run astern and the port anchor was let go. However, this did not prevent the ship from grounding on Yule Banks, in the north of the channel.

3. Steering Failure

4. At 0807 the main engine was running at slow ahead. The pilot slowly increased the ship’s speed as he manoeuvred it into the centre of the channel. • At 0831½, he ordered harbour full ahead on the main engine. • At 0832, MSC Basel passed the Brisbane River entrance beacons. After that, the chief mate was relieved by the third mate and the chief mate then left the bridge. • At 0836½, the pilot ordered starboard 10° . • At 0838½, the ship was steady on a heading of 062° to the East Channel. • At 0902, the pilot ordered port 10° as he started the turn into the East Channel. • By 0905¼, the ship was on a heading of 014°. • The tide was nearing the end of the ebb. A low tide of 0.4 m was expected at 0959. • At 0925½, the pilot ordered port 10° helm • At 0926¼, he ordered the helmsman to steady the ship on a heading of 342°. At 0927, the helmsman reported that the ship was steady on 342°

5. At 0928¼, the pilot ordered port 10°. • At 0929, he ordered midships • At 0929¼, he ordered the ship steadied on a heading of 318°. By 0929¾, the helmsman had steadied the ship on 318°. • At 0931¾, the pilot instructed the helmsman to steer 317°. The ship’s speed was now 15.6 knots.

6. At 0935, the pilot noticed the ship’s head starting to move to starboard. He checked the rudder angle indicator and saw that the rudder was at starboard 20°. • At 0935¼, he ordered midships and called out ‘what’s happening here’. He then ordered port 20°, followed by midships. The helmsman followed the commands but the rudder did not respond. • At 0935½, the pilot shouted ‘it’s stuck, change to emergency steering ‘. The master changed the steering control to the bridge control console lever. He also noted that the rudder was stuck at starboard 20°.

7. At 0935¾, the pilot ordered full astern and told the master to use the lever. However, the rudder was still not responding. • At 0936, the master suggested letting go the anchor. The pilot agreed and at 0936½, the master let go the port anchor. The ship’s speed was now 11.6 knots. • By 0936¾, the main engine was stopped and started in the astern direction.

8. The third mate telephoned the engine room and reported the steering malfunction to the chief engineer. The chief engineer sent the second engineer to the steering gear room to check the steering gear and then told the third mate to stop one of the steering motors. • The rudder started to return to midships and the ship’s rate of turn started to decrease. • At 0937¼, the master informed the pilot that the rudder was now at midships. • The ship’s speed was decreasing and at 0937½, the pilot shouted ‘aground now’. The ship had grounded on Yule Banks. The ship’s GPS position was 27° 5.85’S 153° 19.47’E.

9. At 0940, the pilot reported the grounding to the Brisbane Port and requested tug assistance. Two minutes later the harbour master telephoned the pilot for a more detailed report. Then the master reported the grounding, and the actions taken since it happened, to the ship’s managers. • The main engine was still running at full astern but the ship did not move. • At 0947, the pilot ordered the main engine stopped. • The master and the pilot talked about the situation and agreed to wait for the ship to refloat on the flooding tide. They also decided to pump water out of the ship’s number one water ballast tank in order to reduce its forward draught.

10. There was no sign of pollution in the water around the ship and soundings of the tanks indicated that the hull was not damaged. The steering was tested and it appeared to be operating normally. • At 1032, the main engine was started and run astern to try to refloat the ship. However, it did not move and at 1033, the main engine was stopped. • The tide started to rise and both the master and the pilot noticed that the ship’s stern was moving to starboard. • By this time, there was a tug en route to assist with refloating MSC Basel. However, it appeared to the pilot that the ship would refloat before the tug arrived, so he decided to refloat it under its own power.

11. At 1136, the main engine was started and run at dead slow astern. • At 1138, the ship started to move astern. The anchor was recovered and the pilot used the main engine and the bow thruster to manoeuvre the ship back into the channel. • Once the ship was safely in the channel, the pilot set a course back to the Brisbane inner anchorage. He increased the main engine speed to slow ahead in order to maintain a speed of about 9 knots. • Only one steering motor was running, but the steering appeared to be working satisfactorily. • At 1218, the tug Daintree was made fast to MSC Basel’s centre lead aft. The tug then escorted the ship to the anchorage.

12. At 1323, representatives from Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) and the ship owner’s protection and indemnity (P&I) club boarded MSC Basel by launch. • At 1324, MSC Basel’s port anchor was let go in position 27° 14.9’S 153° 20.3’E in the inner anchorage. At 1330, after the ship had brought up to the anchor, Daintree was let go. • Because of the grounding, MSC Basel was detained by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) until Germanischer Lloyd (GL) released a report saying that the ship was seaworthy.

13. While MSC Basel was at anchor, representatives from AMSA, ATSB, and GL attended the ship. Its hull was internally inspected and an underwater survey was carried out. Neither inspection identified any significant damage. The steering gear was also inspected and while it appeared that one of the ram/tiller pins had seized, the manufacturer reported that the steering gear could be safely operated without replacing the pin. An inspection of the steering control systems noted no abnormalities. At 1330 on 5 November, AMSA removed the detention order after the authority was provided with a declaration of seaworthiness by GL. Later that day, MSC Basel departed Brisbane bound for Singapore.

14. Questions • Where had the MSC Basel come from? • How long was the ship in port? • How did they test the main engine? • How did they check the steering? • How did they maneuver the ship off the berth? • Who was on the bridge team? • What was the ships aft draft? • When did they enter the Brisbane river? • Who left the bridge? • When did they first notice there was a problem? • What did the pilot tell the helmsman to do? • How did they try to stop the ship grounding? • What time did the ship run a ground? • Who did the pilot report the grounding to? • Who did the master report the grounding to? • What did the pilot and the master decide to do about the situation? • What was the name of the boat that came to assist? • How many times had they started and stop the engine since grounding?

15. The End