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Nuclear Fuel Delivery. By: Adam Gable Christian Seymour Jesse Nesbitt. Nuclear Fuel. Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% U235 High Enriched Uranium (HEU) 90% U235. Nuclear Fuel Transport. IAEA projects continued growth US NRC – Protection from radiation
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Nuclear Fuel Delivery By: Adam Gable Christian Seymour Jesse Nesbitt
Nuclear Fuel • Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% U235 • High Enriched Uranium (HEU) 90% U235
Nuclear Fuel Transport • IAEA projects continued growth • US NRC – Protection from radiation • minimizing the time exposed to radioactive materials • maximizingthe distancefrom the source of radiation • shielding from external exposure and inhaling radioactive material.
Threats to Nuclear Fuel Transport • Terrorists Crude radiological dispersion device (RDD) Fear and Panic Economic impact/Decontamination efforts • Accidents Improper shielding of radioactive material Collisions Rely on local law enforcement • Government is responsible US NRC
Current Nuclear Power Reactors Areva (A) General Electric (GE) Westinghouse (W)
Contract between GE and Columbia ( Total distance = 2631 Miles) Columbia GE
Areva only 11 miles from Columbia Columbia Areva
Problem Formulation A 61 Nuclear Facilities W Uranium Enrichment Facility GE
Assumptions • Modeling generic fuel rod – Everyone Produces and Consumes the same fuel rod • Number of deliveries to each power plant is based on number of reactors. • 3 reactors : Requires 3 deliveries • Route used is Shortest Google Map distance • Supply from the 3 Producers is based on current market share not capacity
Do we only care about minimizing the total distance? NO – Lets look at a multi- commodity flow problem
Min-Route Model • Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
Min-Route Flow • Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
Does the loss of a Producer increase the distance(RISK) of the multi-commodity solution? Yes – Lets Look at the multi-commodity flow problem with the loss of a producer.
Min-Route Model: Loss of Producer • Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
What if a new Producer was built in a more centralized location? • We chose Kentucky next to the enrichment plant • What better place, because you also decrease the transport distance of the LEU to the producer
Min-Route Model – Including New Producer • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
Min-Route Model – Including New Producer • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
What if we had projected increases in demand for existing plants and for new plants being built through 2025? We do, lets see the min-cost flow with the new demand and original Producers.
Conclusions • Current LEU procurement process has shows little concern for transport risk. • “Transport of nuclear cargo is part of nuclear life cycle most vulnerable to violent, forcible theft, since it’s impossible to protect with thick walls and many minutes of delay when its is on the road” Securing the Bomb 2010 Harvard Review • Our research shows that significant decreases in distance can be obtained which has the potential to reduce risk. • Government policy decisions
Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • HEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)
Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • HEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)
Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)
Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)
Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)
Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov) • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites