1 / 34

Nuclear Fuel Delivery

Nuclear Fuel Delivery. By: Adam Gable Christian Seymour Jesse Nesbitt. Nuclear Fuel. Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% U235 High Enriched Uranium (HEU) 90% U235. Nuclear Fuel Transport. IAEA projects continued growth US NRC – Protection from radiation

arin
Télécharger la présentation

Nuclear Fuel Delivery

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Nuclear Fuel Delivery By: Adam Gable Christian Seymour Jesse Nesbitt

  2. Nuclear Fuel • Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% U235 • High Enriched Uranium (HEU) 90% U235

  3. Nuclear Fuel Transport • IAEA projects continued growth • US NRC – Protection from radiation • minimizing the time exposed to radioactive materials • maximizingthe distancefrom the source of radiation • shielding from external exposure and inhaling radioactive material.

  4. Threats to Nuclear Fuel Transport • Terrorists Crude radiological dispersion device (RDD) Fear and Panic Economic impact/Decontamination efforts • Accidents Improper shielding of radioactive material Collisions Rely on local law enforcement • Government is responsible US NRC

  5. Current Nuclear Power Reactors Areva (A) General Electric (GE) Westinghouse (W)

  6. Contract between GE and Columbia ( Total distance = 2631 Miles) Columbia GE

  7. Areva only 11 miles from Columbia Columbia Areva

  8. Problem Formulation A 61 Nuclear Facilities W Uranium Enrichment Facility GE

  9. Assumptions • Modeling generic fuel rod – Everyone Produces and Consumes the same fuel rod • Number of deliveries to each power plant is based on number of reactors. • 3 reactors : Requires 3 deliveries • Route used is Shortest Google Map distance • Supply from the 3 Producers is based on current market share not capacity

  10. Min-Total Model

  11. Do we only care about minimizing the total distance? NO – Lets look at a multi- commodity flow problem

  12. Areva Max Distance Route

  13. GE Max Distance Route

  14. Westinghouse Max Distance Route

  15. Min-Route Model • Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

  16. Min-Route Flow • Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

  17. Does the loss of a Producer increase the distance(RISK) of the multi-commodity solution? Yes – Lets Look at the multi-commodity flow problem with the loss of a producer.

  18. Min-Route Model: Loss of Producer • Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

  19. What if a new Producer was built in a more centralized location? • We chose Kentucky next to the enrichment plant • What better place, because you also decrease the transport distance of the LEU to the producer

  20. Min-Route Model – Including New Producer • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

  21. Min-Route Model – Including New Producer • OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

  22. What if we had projected increases in demand for existing plants and for new plants being built through 2025? We do, lets see the min-cost flow with the new demand and original Producers.

  23. Projected Nuclear Power Reactors by 2025 5/8/2013

  24. Min-Total Model with 2025 Projected demand

  25. Min-Route Model with 2025 Projected Demand

  26. Min-Route Model with 2025 Projected Demand

  27. Conclusions • Current LEU procurement process has shows little concern for transport risk. • “Transport of nuclear cargo is part of nuclear life cycle most vulnerable to violent, forcible theft, since it’s impossible to protect with thick walls and many minutes of delay when its is on the road” Securing the Bomb 2010 Harvard Review • Our research shows that significant decreases in distance can be obtained which has the potential to reduce risk. • Government policy decisions

  28. Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • HEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

  29. Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • HEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

  30. Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

  31. Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

  32. Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

  33. Expanding • Detailed transportation model • Region specific model/global network model • Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route • LEU medical/other purpose transportation route • Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) • Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov) • Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites

  34. Questions

More Related