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This presentation introduces SeRLoc, a decentralized and resource-efficient algorithm for enabling location determination in wireless sensor networks, even in the presence of malicious adversaries. It covers the overview of localization systems, comparisons with range-dependent methods, and detailed analysis of the SeRLoc algorithm, which employs secure communication and innovative threat analysis to mitigate risks such as wormhole and Sybil attacks. The presentation concludes with performance comparisons and simulations, demonstrating the robustness of SeRLoc against various security threats.
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SeRLoc: Secure Range-Independent Localization forWireless Sensor Networks Presenter: Yawen Wei Author: Loukas Lazos and Radha Poovendran Network Security Lab, Dept. of EE, University of Washington, Seattle, WA
Problem: Enabling nodes of a wireless sensor network to determine their location even in the presence of malicious adversaries. Design Goal: • Decentralized implementation • Resource efficiency • Robustness against security threats
Outline • Overview • SeRloc Algorithm • Comparison & Simulation • Conclusion
Overview • What is Localization System? • How to determine position? (Schemes) 1.range-dependent GPS, Active Badge, Active Bat, Cricket 2.range-independent DV-hop, amorphous localization, APIT, Centroid • Why security?
Range-dependent Location System • Time of arrival (TOA) • Angle of arrival • Signal strength • RF, acoustic, infrared and ultrasound • Disadvantages (x1,y1); (x2,y2);(x3,y3)
SeRloc Algorithm • Network Model • Location Determination • Security Scheme • Threat Analysis
Network Model • N: unknown locations • L: known locations and orientations, “locators” • spatial homogeneous Poisson point process
SeRloc: Location Determination • Secure Range-Independent Localization a. the locator’s coordinates b. the angles of the antenna boundary lines c. R: the locator-sensor-communication range d. Overlapping region e. CoG (Center of Gravity)
Step 1: Locators heard • Step 2: Search area
Determination of the search area A rectangular area of size less than A rectangular area of size greater than
Step 3: Overlapping region-Majority vote • Step 4:Location estimation
SeRloc: Security Scheme • Encryption: • Global symmetric key • Sensor s & locator shares pairwise key • Locator ID authentication • Collision-resistant hash function (e.g. MD5) • Beacon of locator Li
SeRloc: Threat Analysis • Types: Wormhole / Sybil / Compromised nodes • Wormhole attack • Packet leshes: geographical / temporal • Time measuring in challenge-reply scheme
Wormholes 1. Sector uniqueness property : area of locators heard by origin point : area of locators heard by s
Wormholes 2. Communication range violation property A sensor cannot hear two locators that are more than 2R apart
the first message: q = k − 1 • the last message: q = 0 • All locators wait for a q ∗ Ts time
SeRloc: Threat Analysis • Sybil Attack and Compromised nodes • Multiple network entities • Assume sensor identities • Assume locators (Not directly heard)
Outline • Overview • SeRloc Algorithm • Comparison & Simulation • Conclusion
Comparison • Dv-hop and Amorphous localization
Comparison • APIT localization 5
Simulation • Localization Error vs. Locators heard • Localization Error vs. Antenna Sectors • Localization Error vs. Sector Error • Localization Error vs. GPS Error • Communication Cost vs. Locators Heard
Conclusion • Secure localization in WSN • Range independent • Decentralized • Security mechanisms • Threats • Higher accuracy and fewer locators