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David Hume (1711-1776)

David Hume (1711-1776). An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (Text, pp. 121-155). An overall outline of the text. Sensation & the Origin of Ideas The Nature & Limits of Human Knowledge The Nature & Limits of Inductive Reasoning

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David Hume (1711-1776)

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  1. David Hume(1711-1776) An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Text, pp. 121-155)

  2. An overall outline of the text • Sensation & the Origin of Ideas • The Nature & Limits of Human Knowledge • The Nature & Limits of Inductive Reasoning • The Idea that there is a Necessary Connection between Cause & Effect • The Value & Limitations of Skepticism

  3. 1. Sensation & the Origin of Ideas(121-126) • The contents of the mind: (1) ideas & (2) impressions (sensations & feelings) -- Ideas (concepts, beliefs, memories, mental images, etc.) are faint & unclear; impressions are strong & vivid. (121-122) • Ideas are derived from impressions: All [all?] ideas are copies of impressions.(122-125) • The meaning of ideas depends on impressions [see next slide]. (125-126)

  4. The empirical criterion of meaning “From what impression is that alleged idea derived?” No impression, no meaning? No impression, no foundation in reality? (Text, 126)

  5. 2. The Nature & Limits of Human Knowledge (126-132)

  6. Two kinds of ideas(or judgments) “All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds: relations of ideas and matters of fact” (126). “Hume’s Fork”

  7. Judgments concerning relations of ideas Ideas (“Hume’s Fork”) Judgments concerning matters of fact (Text, 126)

  8. Judgments concerning relations of ideas • Intuitively or demonstrably certain • Discoverable by thought alone [a priori] • Cannot be denied without contradiction *Hume’s examples: the Pythagorean Theorem 3 x 5 = 30  2 (Text, 127)

  9. The Pythagorean Theorem On a right triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides 5’ 4’ (hypotenuse) 3 + 4 = 5 (9 + 16 = 25) 3’

  10. Judgments concerning matters of fact • “Every judgment concerning matters of fact can be denied without contradiction” (e.g., “the sun will not rise tomorrow”). • Neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain • Not discoverable by thought alone [a priori], but rather on the basis of sense experience [a posteriori] (Text, 128) More specifically,

  11. All judgments concerning matters of fact are based on . . . . the [more fundamental] belief that there is “a tie or connection” between cause & effect. (See Text, 128-129)

  12. And why do we believe that there is a “tie or connection” between cause & effect? Answer: The belief arises entirely from experience [a posteriori, not a priori], namely, the experience of finding that two events (cause & effect) are “constantly conjoined” with each other. (Text, 129)

  13. (Text, 130-132) It is not logically necessary that a particular effect follows a particular cause; it is just a fact of experience. This view leads to Hume’s discussion of . . . .

  14. 3. The Nature & Limits of Inductive Reasoning (the problem of induction) (Text, 133-137)

  15. Hume on Induction • Induction is the process of drawing inferences from past experiences of cause & effect sequences to present or future events. • Hume’s point is that an “effect” cannot be validly deduced from its “cause;” • the inference from “cause” to “effect” is based on past experiences of “constant conjunction,” and these past experiences . . . .

  16. accustom or habituate us to believe that one event is the cause of another, which we believe to be the effect of the prior event. This is what leads us to believe that . . . .

  17. the future will resemble the past. It is all a matter of CUSTOM or HABIT. This is the foundation of . . . .

  18. (Text, 137-141) 4. The Idea that there is a Necessary Connection between Cause & Effect If this is a meaningful (& true?) idea, then (according to Hume) it must be derived from sense impressions. What, then, is the sense impression from which this idea is derived?

  19. There is no sense impression of causal power or necessary connection of cause & effect, but we do experience . . . . • (1) the spatial contiguity, • (2) the temporal succession, and • (3) the constant conjunction of “cause” & “effect.”

  20. It is from this experience, • especially the experience of constant conjunction, • that the idea of a necessary connection between “cause” & “effect” arises (or is inferred); • but the “inference” is simply a matter of “custom or habit.”

  21. 5. The Value & Limitations of Skepticism (Text, 141-155)

  22. Hume discusses 5 kinds of skepticism: • (1) “Antecedent” skepticism (141-2) • (2) “Consequent” skepticism (142-6) • (3) Skepticism concerning mathematical reasoning (146-8) • (4) Extreme skepticism concerning matters of fact (148-151) • (5) Moderate skepticism (151-5)

  23. The pro’s & con’s of “antecedent skepticism”(Text, 141-2) • Criticism of “Cartesian skepticism” -- Is Hume’s characterization of Descartes’ approach correct? Fair?(141-2) • The value of the Cartesian approach when used in a “more moderate and reasonable way”(142)

  24. “consequent skepticism”(Text, 142-6) • The nature of “consequent skepticism” (142) • Weaker & stronger arguments in support of consequent skepticism (143) • A skeptical critique of epistemic realism (143-6) • Common sense realism (143-4) • Representational realism (144-5) • God & the reliability of sense perceptions (145) • Skeptical conclusion with regard to epistemic realism (145-6)

  25. The idea of the infinite divisibility of space results in “absurdities & contradictions” that raise skeptical doubts as to the reliability of mathematics itself (147-8). The idea of the infinite divisibility of time does the same (148). Skepticism concerning mathematical reasoning with regard to space & time(Text, 146-8) Why? Why?

  26. “Popular” skepticism with regard to empirical knowledge (148-9) “Philosophical” skepticism with regard to empirical knowledge (Hume’s own position)(149-50) Hume’s criticism of these forms of skepticism: their impracticality & human nature’s resistance to that (149, 150-51). Extreme skepticism concerning knowledge of matters of fact(Text, 148-151)

  27. Moderate Skepticism(Text, 151-5) • Intellectual humility (the majority vs. the learned) (151-2) • The limitation of inquiry to accessible subjects (i.e., the concerns of everyday life) (152-3) • The limits of certainty: two types of human knowledge -- formal (a priori & certain) & empirical (a posteriori & uncertain)(153-4) • Conclusion on factual reasoning, theology, ethics & aesthetics, & speculative metaphysics (155)

  28. The End

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