Mexican War: Winfield Scott

Mexican War: Winfield Scott Lsn 5-6

Agenda • Winfield Scott • Vera Cruz • Cerro Gordo • Logistics • Contreras and Churubusco • Mexico City • Influence on the Civil War

Winfield Scott • Epitomized the professional officer • Served in War of 1812, brevetted to major general • Studied European tactics • Became general-in-chief in 1841 • Selected by President Polk to lead a second major campaign in Mexico (Zachary Taylor’s was the first)

Winfield Scott • Objective as a principal of war • When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact • Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them. • Winfield Scott saw Mexico as a war of limited objectives, to be waged by limited means

Winfield Scott • Based on this belief, Scott developed a largely political strategy • Believed that Mexican political life centered around Mexico City so completely that capturing the capital would paralyze the country and oblige the Mexican government to sue for peace in order to remain a government at all • Therefore his objective was to capture Mexico City, not to destroy the Mexican army

Scott’s Concept • Mexico City must be approached from Vera Cruz rather than Monterrey • Speed was necessary to avoid the vomito (yellow fever) around Vera Cruz • The need for speed precluded the use of any port other than Vera Cruz • Fort San Juan de Ulua protected Vera Cruz from direct assault • Vera Cruz could be taken by siege • Special boats would be necessary to land the army outside the range of San Juan de Ulua’s guns

Building the Force • Scott increased the estimate of his required force from 10,000 to 20,000 • Collecting the ships was more difficult than collecting the men • Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup resourcefully gathered up the necessary ships, many of which belonged to civilian merchantmen or had to be built

Relations with Polk • As early as May, 1846, Scott had recognized the political machinations of the Polk Administration • Scott was fearful of receiving “a fire upon my rear, from Washington, and a fire, in front, from the Mexicans” • An option of creating the new rank of lieutenant general was being considered and many thought Polk would award it to Senator Thomas Hart Benton

Vera Cruz • By March 2, 1847, Scott had assembled 12,000 men with sufficient landing craft • He ordered his force forward from Lobos to Vera Cruz • In conjunction with Commodore David Conner, Scott developed a plan to land on the Collada beach • Against only negligible fire, the landing was completed on March 9

Vera Cruz • Population of 15,000 crowded into little area • City surrounded by a wall and protected by Forts Santiago and Conception • Some officers like Worth favored a direct assault, but Scott decided to lay siege • He built a trench line some two miles from the city

Vera Cruz • Scott began his bombardment on March 21 • His heavy mortars had not yet arrived and Scott reluctantly accepted Conner’s offer of heavy naval guns • When Commodore Matthew Perry replaced Conner, the good spirit of Army-Navy cooperation continued • Scott’s engineers were critical in emplacing the guns

Vera Cruz • Mexican civilians bore the brunt of the bombardment • Under pressure from foreign consuls, Mexican General Juan Morales feigned illness and turned his command over to General J. J. Landero who surrendered on March 27 • Scott granted generous terms including guaranteeing the civil and religious rights of the people of Vera Cruz

Vera Cruz • Scott imposed strict discipline on his troops and safeguarded the lives and property of the Mexicans • He scrupulously regulated his soldiers’ conduct and interaction with Mexican civilians, reducing contact to the minimum necessary for the sustenance of his army and the morale of his troops • He made every effort to confine bloodshed and suffering to the Mexican army rather than the civilian population • He courted the Roman Catholic Church, even ordering his men to salute priests and attending a mass himself • Buoyed by Scott’s success, Polk dispatched Nicholas Trist to Mexico to be “ready to take advantage of circumstances as they might arise to negotiate for peace”

After Vera Cruz • From Vera Cruz, Scott had two choices– the National Road or the Orzaba Road • Both were predictable, well-defended avenues of approach, but Scott picked the National Road because it was in better condition • Wanted to avoid frontal assaults by maneuver

Turning Movement • Maneuver • As both an element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage • Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly • Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them • The form of maneuver that Scott relied on in Mexico was the turning movement

Turning Movement • In a turning movementthe attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat. • A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus “turning” him out of his defensive positions.

Cerro Gordo • Santa Anna anticipated Scott’s use of the National Road and sent forward three infantry brigades commanded by General Valentin Canalizo • Canalizo secured key positions including Cerro Gordo • Cerro Gordo (Fat Mountain) was a broad thousand foot high elevation on the left of the National Road • On the right were steep cliffs and then Rio del Plan, a substantial stream

Cerro Gordo • Lee summarized the problem writing that “The right of the Mexican line rested on the river at a perpendicular rock, unscalable by man or beast, and their left on impassable ravines; the main road was defended by field works containing thirty-five cannon; in their rear was the mountain of Cerro Gordo, surrounded by intrenchments in which were cannon and crowned by a tower overlooking all-- it was around this army that it was intended to lead our troops”

Cerro Gordo • About a half-mile northeast of Cerro Gordo was a flat-topped high named La Atalaya • Between La Atalya and a deep ravine that ran into the National Road was solid chaparral, cut by gullies and hills • Santa Anna was confident no attack would come from this direction and he put only a small outpost on La Atalaya

Cerro Gordo • Brigadier General David Twiggs led Scott’s march • On April 11, 1847, Twiggs stopped just short of Cerro Gordo • As Twiggs was preparing to attack, Scott reached the position on April 14 • He wanted to avoid a costly frontal assault so he had Captain Robert E. Lee and other engineers recon a possible route around Santa Anna’s flank

Cerro Gordo • Lee initially followed a route reconned earlier by Lieutenant Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard which worked around the Mexican left to La Ayatala • Lee then continued further to the Mexican rear until he was well passed the Mexican main flank • Slowly Lee worked his way up the ravines north of the river. • The terrain was difficult, but Lee thought it would not be impossible to construct a crude road over it. • At one point Lee had to hide behind a large brush-covered log to avoid detection by the Mexicans • Mexican soldiers even sat on the log Lee hid behind, and he had to wait until darkness to escape

Cerro Gordo • Upon returning to American lines, Lee compared notes with Major Smith who, on his own reconnaissance, had come to similar conclusions as Lee • Scott directed them to continue their reconnaissance the next day and detailed to Lee a work party to cut a trail • By the end of that day, Lee and his crew had prepared a passable new trail up the ravine

Cerro Gordo • Not only was Lee responsible for finding the route and building the road, Scott also entrusted him with serving as guide for Brigadier General David Twiggs’s division in the conduct of the attack • Lee led Twiggs’s men up the ravines that passed around Santa Anna’s left, emplaced an artillery battery, and guided a brigade around the northern flank of Cerro Gordo with the intention of cutting off the enemy retreat

Cerro Gordo • Lee’s work allowed Scott to outflank the Mexican defenders, bypass the main defensive positions, and strike the Mexican rear • Cerro Gordo was the first of many turning movements Scott executed in his march to Mexico City • To make these movements possible Scott relied on the reconnaissance of Lee and other engineers • Scott wrote that Lee was “indefatigable during these operations, in reconnaissance as daring as laborious, and of the utmost value.” • Lee was brevetted to major “for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of Cerro Gordo”

Cerro Gordo • Scott had 8,500 men against 12,000 to 18,000 Mexicans • On April 17, he sent Twiggs down the new cut road to occupy La Atalaya in preparation for a main attack on Cerro Gordo the next day • Instead, Twiggs became decisively engaged and suffered heavy losses • Santa Anna thought he had defeated the main American attack

Cerro Gordo • Scott issued orders that on April 18, Twiggs would press forward, followed by Worth, and Pillow would launch a secondary attack near the river and then turn left or right to attack the Mexican artillery • Twiggs’s attack succeeded, but Pillow’s failed • Pillow had expressed doubts from the very beginning, calling the attack “a desperate undertaking” • He also argued with Lieutenant Zealous Tower, the engineer who had done the recon, over the best approach route • Pillow soon disappeared from the battlefield after receiving a minor wound in the arm

Cerro Gordo • In spite of Pillow’s failure, Twiggs’s attacks, especially the portion led by Brigadier General James Shields, so unnerved Santa Anna that he fled the field • The Americans lost 63 killed and 368 wounded • Estimates of Mexican losses range from 350 to 1,000 • 3,000 were taken prisoner, including five generals

Cerro Gordo • Comparison between Scott and Taylor’s generalship: • Taylor took few prisoners. Scott took 7,000 at Vera Cruz and 3,000 at Cerro Gordo • Scott suffered much fewer friendly losses than did Taylor • Taylor commanded only what was under his immediate supervision while Scott’s generalship was much more sophisticated, making strong use of reconnaissance, delegation, and staff officers

Jalapa • Scott occupied Jalapa which was much more hospitable than Vera Cruz had been • It was still in the fringe of the yellow fever region, and Scott did not want to stay there long • While in Jalapa, Scott continued his policy of kind treatment to the Mexican citizenry, most of whom showed indifference to the invaders • Scott meted out strict punishments to his soldiers who violated discipline • Scott’s most serious problem at Jalapa was that in May, the one year term of enlistment for 3,000 of his volunteers expired

Logistics • On May 28, Scott moved forward to Puebla • The departure of the volunteers left Scott with a little over 7,000 men • He could not afford to further reduce his manpower by garrisoning his supply bases at Vera Cruz, Jalapa, and Perote • To do so would have reduced his active army to 5,820

Logistics • Scott made the bold decision to abandon all stations between Vera Cruz and Puebla • He would cut his supply line with the coast and live off the land • The Duke of Wellington declared, “Scott is lost! He has been carried away by successes! He can’t take the city, and he can’t fall back on his bases.”

Logistics: Ulysses Grant • Served as a quartermaster in Mexico and personally saw the results of Scott cutting lose from his supply line • Grant made a similar move at Vicksburg • In Mexico Grant learned “the intricacies of military logistics from the bottom up. For a man who would go on to command large armies, no training could have been more valuable. During the Civil War, Grant’s armies might occasionally have straggled, discipline might sometimes have been lax, but food and ammunition trains were always expertly handled. While Grant’s military fame deservedly rests on his battlefield victories, those victories depended on his skill as a quartermaster. Unlike many Union armies, the forces he led never wanted the tools of war.” • Jean Edward Smith

Nicholas Trist • Trist arrived at Vera Cruz on May 6, 1847 • Trist was sick when he arrived and could not meet Scott personally • Instead he forwarded several sealed documents to Scott for delivery to Mexico City, but instructed Scott not to look at them • The easily-bruised Scott perceived this as a tremendous insult and a threat to his authority and the safety of the army • On June 4, he wrote, “I beg to be recalled from this army the moment that it may be safe for any person to embark at Vera Cruz…”

Puebla • Scott remained in Puebla for three months • He dealt with disciplinary matters including a court of inquiry that found Worth guilty of issuing an unfounded warning that the Mexicans were planning to poison the drinking water • He patched things up with Trist • He received reinforcements that brought his force up to 14,000 men (which included about 3,000 who were sick or convalescing) • Santa Anna had 36,000

Santa Anna’s Defenses • Wanted to defend as far forward of Mexico City as possible and take advantage of the limited road network and the three lakes that canalized the approach • Lakes Texcoco, Xochimilco, and Chalco • Santa Anna focused on the National Road at El Penon, just south of Lake Texcoco • Between Lakes Xochimilco and Chalco was a narrow isthmus which gave Scott a possible approach from the south

El Penon • Scott marched out of Puebla on August 7, 1847, with Twiggs’s division in the lead • Scott kept his divisions within half a day’s march of each other • Twiggs reached El Penon on August 12 and Scott then had to decide whether to continue to Mexico City head-on or turn south of Lake Chalco and approach indirectly • Based on a previous map study led by chief topographical engineer Major William Turnbull and Lee, Scott had tentatively decided on the indirect approach

El Penon • Lee set out on a recon and quickly determined El Penon to be too strongly defended to assault • He also determined a small road that branched off of the National Road to Mexicalcingo was too restricted • He did find a previously unreported road that led south of Lake Chalco and then joined the Acapulco Road at San Agustin, directly south of Mexico City

El Penon • Lee reported these preliminary findings to Scott who ordered Worth to recon the San Agustin Road • Worth sent Lieutenant Colonel James Duncan to confirm Lee’s findings, which he did • Scott decided on this southern approach • On August 13, Scott began his march with Worth, Pillow, and Quitman while leaving Twiggs to threaten El Penon

Contreras and Churubusco • Santa Anna was aware that Scott was up to something, but did not acknowledge until August 17 that Scott was moving south • Santa Anna then had to move from his strong position at El Penon • He established a new line behind the Churubusco River • He had some 20,000 men; about twice as many as Scott

Contreras and Churubusco • On August 18, Scott had marched 25 miles and was closing in on San Agustin • His lead elements made heavy contact with the Mexicans and then learned the enemy could not be outflanked because of a large lava field called the Pedregal to the west and deep water to the east

Contreras and Churubusco • Scott’s precarious position was eased by the tension between Santa Anna and General Gabriel Valencia, Santa Anna’s chief political rival and the defender of the Mexican eastern flank • Valencia ignored Santa Anna’s instructions to defend from San Angel and instead moved forward to a position between Padierna and Contreras where he hoped to fight and win a battle independent of Santa Anna

Contreras and Churubusco • Valencia’s move divided the Mexican force and left Scott an opening if he could somehow find a way through the Pedregal • According to one Mexican officer, “The birds couldn’t cross the Pedregal.” • Scott sent Lee on another recon on August 18, and Lee found a rough trail along the southern edge of the Pedregal • Scott decided to envelop Churubusco and San Antonio from the west

Contreras and Churubusco • Scott’s plan was for Pillow to lead with a 500 man work party to improve the Pedregal Road • Twiggs would provide the security for Pillow’s men • Worth would attack through the path cleared by Pillow and Twiggs while Quitman remained in reserve at San Agustin

Contreras and Churubusco • When the road was nearly completed, the Americans came under fire • A jumbled mess ensued in which Pillow asserted himself as commander but did nothing to affect the situation • The Americans were in danger until Persifor Smith, a brigade commander in Twiggs’s division rose to the occasion • With artillery support from Captain John Magruder, Smith, acting without orders, assessed the situation and moved through the Pedregal around the right flank • He also sent Lee back to inform Scott of the plan

Contreras and Churubusco • Lee finally reached Scott at 11 p.m., and Scott sent Lee and Twiggs out to round up troops to support Smith • Smith began his attack a little before 3 a.m. • The cold weather had caused the Mexican pickets to retreat to shelter, giving Smith the element of surprise • Smith’s assault broke Valencia’s line in just seventeen minutes • Santa Anna refused to send reinforcements and began a general withdrawal • Smith had attacked with 4,500 men against 7,000

Contreras and Churubusco • Santa Anna decided to bring whatever troops could be saved back within the walls of Mexico City • To protect the retreat he had to hold the bridge at Churubusco • Among the defenders was the San Patricio Battalion, a group of American deserters • Scott pursued head-on, suffering heavy casualties

Contreras and Churubusco • The ensuing Battle of Churubusco was fought as three independent actions at the Churubusco Bridge by Worth and Pillow, at the San Meto Convent that protected it by Twiggs, and a turning movement led by Shields and Pierce to Portales • By committing all his forces, Scott personally had little ability to influence the battle • Still the independent actions carried the day with the bridge and then the convent falling • The pursuit of the turning movement was hamstrung by the restrictive causeways

Contreras and Churubusco • In all the fighting on August 20, Santa Anna lost 4,000 killed and wounded • Another 3,000 were captured, including eight generals • Scott suffered some 1,000 casualties • Santa Anna reached Mexico City early in the afternoon • If he had pursued vigorously, Scott probably could have taken Mexico City that day, but he didn’t

Mexico City • After peace negotiations failed, Scott began preparations to attack • His approaches would be limited to the few causeways that could support artillery • The Mexican defenses centered around the Castle of Chapultepec, the Molino del Rey (King’s Mill), and the Casa de la Mata

Mexico City • On September 8, Scott attacked Molino del Rey with Worth’s division • Santa Anna had become aware of Scott’s plan and was ready • The Americans prevailed, but at great cost • Scott suffered 116 dead and 671 wounded; more than Taylor had suffered at Monterrey with a force twice as large • It was a battle of little operational consequence

Mexican War: Winfield Scott