Deterrence & Diplomacy

1. Deterrence & Diplomacy TSDM- 16

2. Strategy and Deterrence “U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states.” 2010 QDR “Preventing wars is as important as winning them.” 2011 NMS

3. Strategic Deterrence “the use of threats of harm to prevent someone from doing something you do not want them to do.” ------------------------- “… convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.” Global Deterrence JOC, Version 2.0, December 2006 p. 8

4. Deterrence: Alter an adversary’s decision-making calculus • The Benefits of a Course of Action • The Costs of a Course of Action • The Consequences of Restraint (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking a course of action we seek to deter) “One-size-fits-all deterrence” no longer works [never did! – must always know your adversary’s strategic calculus]

5. Dissuasion vs.Deterrencevs.Compellence Deterrence -convince an adversary to not start an action -maintain status quo “Don’t try it!” Compellence -convince an adversary to stop an action already started -alter the status quo “Knock it off!” Dissuasion -convince an adversary to not attempt acquiring a capability “Don’t even think about it!”

7. Deterrence by: Denial have the military assets to defeat an attack or make it so costly the adversary will not try Punishment have the ability to punish an opponent should it take an unwanted action * Off-shore bombardment * Airpower * Nuclear weapons

8. Who is being protected? Primary deterrence - protecting the homeland - no credibility problem here Extended deterrence - protecting/assuring allies - inherent credibility problem * much more difficult to protect allies

9. Credibility:3 components Capability - capacity to carry out threats or rewards Cost - capability is sufficient to impose unacceptable costs Will - willing to follow through * carry out threats if deterrence fails * actually provide incentives

10. Tailored Deterrence Deterring different audiences with different approaches: a. near-peer competitors b. rogue states c. terrorist networks And different audiences within each of these: civilian political leaders, military leaders, general population

11. Deterring Diverse Audiences State Sponsor Org Leaders X X X X X X Cells X X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x Volunteers from General Populace x x x Sympathetic Patrons and Supporters Families Figureheads Tribes

12. Status of World Nuclear Forces 2011 Total Nuclear Delivery WeaponsVehicles China 0 (240)* 1 SSBN & ICBMs France 300 4 SSBNs & planes India 100 planes & missiles Israel 80 planes & missiles North Korea <10 ? Pakistan 90-110 planes & missiles Russia 7,000 (4,400) triad United Kingdom 225 (160) 4 SSBNs United States 5,113 (2,468) triad *Chinese warheads are kept in storage & not deployed on missiles (strategic and tactical deployed nuclear weapons)

13. Nuclear Effects

14. Hiroshima-size bomb on NWC – 15kt BLAST RINGS • 15 psi (total devastation) • 5 psi (severe damage) • 1 psi (significant damage) • .25 psi (light damage – 100% windows broken, most structures ok) RED ZONE: Extreme Heat Damage, Likely firestorm

15. Modern US warhead on NWC – 200kt

16. Cold War warhead on NWC – 20MT

17. US Nuclear Force Structure under START http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART 700 deployed delivery vehicles -- 800 deployed & non-deployed ICBMs (Minuteman III): 420 Submarines (SSBNs): 14 with 240 SLBMs Bombers (B-52H, B-2A): 60 Treaty entered into force: Feb 5, 2011 – 7 years to meet limits * US has to put 20 more systems under maintenance to meet limits * treaty expires in 10 years unless renewed for 5 more year * no provisions on testing or missile defense 1,550 deployed strategic warheads * no MIRVs New inspections regime

18. Can the world get to “zero”? “Smaller, Safer” New START did not go far enough * deeper cuts [still overkill] * lower levels of launch readiness Path to “global zero” *done while maintaining: -stable deterrence between US & Russia -a credible threat of retaliation - limited but adequate BMD against proliferators like Iran & N. Korea “Bursting Disarmament Bubble” Global Zero is wrong and based on 3 fallacies a. Reductions by nuclear powers won’t encourage others to forgo nuclear weapons b. Cutting stockpiles won’t make for safer world -key is stability c. World free of nuclear weapons will be safer -genie is out of the bottle Should the US seek further cuts to nuclear stockpiles?

19. Zero Option? “the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. … But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.” Pres Barack Obama Prague, April 2009 What role do nuclear weapons play in US security? Size and shape of the force?

20. Proposal to cut the strategic nuclear forceJohn Deutch 9 SSBNs 3-3-3 (768 warheads) 200 warheads on ICBMs & cruise missiles Eliminate bomber force Total Force: 968 warheads How much is enough? What is right force structure?

21. NPR - International Security Environment “threat of global nuclear war has become remote” 3 Key Challenges 1) “most immediate & extreme danger is nuclear terrorism” 2) “other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation” 3) “the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China”

22. 5 Key Objectives - Nuclear Posture Review 1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism -bolster the NPT; secure all nuclear material; new arms control [START, CTBT] 2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security -Negative security assurance: “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations” 3) Maintain strategic deterrence & stability at reduced nuclear force levels 4) Strengthen regional deterrence & reassure US allies and partners -credible nuclear umbrella 5) Sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal

23. Are the leaders of rogue states rational? Can they be deterred? How to deter them?

24. Deterring terrorists Difficult/impossible task? 2 problems: a. deterrence by punishment? -What can you threaten to do to a suicide bomber? b. rationality? More effective  deterrence by denial *defensive measures