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Long term behavioral and community effects of drought

Long term behavioral and community effects of drought. Preliminary findings Jeffrey Andrews. Introduction. What are the long term effects of droughts on individual level behavior and community dynamics? Acute responses and long term historical dynamics – Oral Histories

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Long term behavioral and community effects of drought

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  1. Long term behavioral and community effects of drought Preliminary findings Jeffrey Andrews

  2. Introduction What are the long term effects of droughts on individual level behavior and community dynamics? • Acute responses and long term historical dynamics – Oral Histories • Preferences for economic redistribution – Modified Dictator games • Preferences for political centralization – Modified Public goods game

  3. Study Rational • Development projects often involve passing on initial endowment to other villagers. • Two of the greatest challenges in the next century will be rising rates of inequality and increase in extreme weather. • Human’s high levels of cooperation and ‘egalitarian syndrome’ remains a mystery in evolutionary biology.

  4. Oral Histories How do acute responses to shocks lead to long term historical processes? • 72 participants • Six villages • Three ecological zones. • Semi structured Interviews • 60 years of history on: • Agricultural practices • Environmental and climactic changes • Regional economic activity • Community politics • Intergroup relationships • Social norms

  5. Economic redistribution and dictator game Does the frequency and intensity of economic shocks – particularly drought affect preferences for economic redistribution • 180 participants across six villages spanning three ecological zones • Modified dictator game where participants redistribute real money to members of their own/other villages • Can earn days wage • Measures aversion to both self-advantageous and self-disadvantageous in costly and costless situations • Use of surveys to capture demographic controls , social capital and severity of exposure to shocks.

  6. Costless Sharing Allocation

  7. Costless Envy Allocation

  8. Costly Sharing Allocation

  9. Costly Envy Allocation

  10. Political centralization and the public goods game Is there a connection between the frequency and intensity of shocks that a person has experienced and their preference for centralized authority? • Modified public goods game : • Contribute to the public good or free ride . • Participants can vote in a leader with two powers • Can freely modify other players contribution to the public good. • Can withdraw money from the common pool as ‘payment for services’

  11. Scattered Plots and Risk Diversification • Population growth, Deforestation and drought induced erosion result in decreased yields • Farmers compensate by extensification • Plots become scattered because of competition for land • Scattered plots allow for risk mitigation strategies for high spatial variability in rainfall patterns.

  12. Spite Popular considerations of egalitarian behavior considers the aversion to self-advantageous inequality, which is motivated by feelings of compassion, fear and guilt– the other side of the equation is an aversion to self-disadvantageous inequality. Here, the proximate mechanisms include emotions of envy, anger and jealousy which manifest themselves as spite. • Spite is paying a cost to reduce someone else's payoff. • 20 of 90 participants play spiteful strategies • These results are also observed in oral histories and anecdotes of poisoning livestock and witchcraft accusations.

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