Electronic Voting and Automation

1. Electronic Voting and Automation Cheryl A. Yager Union University February 13, 2004 Capstone Seminar Presentation

2. Agenda • History of voting machines • Fundamental Problems • Desirable Characteristics of Voting Machines • In-Depth Look - Lack of Audit Trails • In-Depth Look - Lack of Security • In-Depth Look - Lack of Usability • Congressman Rush Holt’s Proposal

3. History of Voting Machines – Before Ballots • Judges administered an oath to a voter, where the voter swore on a bible that he was entitled to vote and had not already done so • No right to a secret ballot, voter called out his choices to an election clerk

4. History of Voting Machines – Before Ballots

5. History of Voting Machines – Before Ballots- PROBLEMS - • Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to vote a certain way • Vote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain way

6. History of Voting Machines – The First Ballots • Ballot (def.) – translation of the Italian word ballota, meaning ball • Ancient Athens used “ballots” by depositing little clay balls into an appropriate clay pot • Voter was given a white ball and a black ball – white was a selection, black was a rejection • Voting machines consisted of a ballot container for each candidate and voters would place their ballot into the appropriate container

7. History of Voting Machines – The First Ballots- PROBLEMS - • Ballot box – it was possible for voters to “stuff the ballot box” when no one was looking • Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to vote a certain way • Vote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain way

8. History of Voting Machines – Paper Ballots • In 1629, first paper ballots were used in the U.S. for the election of a Salem Church pastor • Ballots were either provided by candidates, political parties, or the voters themselves • Voters would write-in the names of their choices for various offices

9. History of Voting Machines – Paper Ballots

10. History of Voting Machines – Paper Ballots • By the mid 19th century, parties were printing ballots (party tickets) naming all the candidates endorsed by the party by the respective office • By the 1880’s, parties were intentionally designing ballots so that names could not be written in and voters must vote “straight party”

11. History of Voting Machines – Paper Ballots

12. History of Voting Machines – Paper Ballots- PROBLEMS - • Ballot box – it was possible for voters to “stuff the ballot box” when no one was looking • Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to vote a certain way, handwriting could give them away, abandoned requirement that voters not disclose their votes • Vote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain way • Hard to use – developing ballots made it intentionally difficult to read and alter to fit the voter’s intent. • Hard to determine a winner – ballots were sorted by ticket style, then each style counted, along with the strike-outs. Each candidate’s total was determined by subtracting the strike-outs from the votes. Finally, all write-ins and handwritten additions would be counted and added. Need to interpret handwriting

13. History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper Ballots • Created in 1858 for an election in Victoria, Australia, adopted in the United States in 1888 • Ballots were printed by the government and standardized, listing all the candidates for each office • Voters would go to a polling place and receive one ballot for voting

14. History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper Ballots

15. History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper Ballots • New York and Massachusetts were the first U.S. states to use the “Australian Secret Ballot” in 1888 • Southern U.S states used the Australian ballot, but requested that voters scratch out the rejected names, rather than marking choices with “X”s

16. History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper Ballots

17. X Valid Invalid History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper Ballots- PROBLEMS - • Hard to determine a winner – Australian ballot requires interpretation on what is considered a “valid vote”. Michigan law (as of 2001) states that a vote is valid if the intersection of the X or corner of the check is within or on the border of the box printed on the ballot

18. History of Voting Machines – Lever Machines • Lever voting machines were first used in Lockport, NY in 1892 • Jacob H. Myers (inventor) stated that machines were designed to “protect mechanically the voter from rascaldom, and make the process of casting the ballot perfectly plain, simple, and secret”

19. History of Voting Machines – Lever Machines • Voters cast their votes by closing the curtain (using the main center lever), making their selections by depressing the appropriate lever, and allows their votes to be tallied by opening the curtain and resetting all the depressed levers • Lever machines have been out of production since 1982, but are still in use across the country, including New York

20. History of Voting Machines – Lever Machines

21. History of Voting Machines – Lever Machines- PROBLEMS - • No audit trail – there’s no proof that the vote was recorded correctly • Loss of votes (the “99” syndrome) – gears that weren’t maintained frequently recorded 99 as the number of votes a candidate got, couldn’t get to 100 because of gear failure

22. History of Voting Machines – Punch Card Ballots • Herman Hollerith developed the punch card for vital statistics tabulation for the Baltimore Board of Health • IBM furthered Hollerith’s work by developing pre-scored punch cards and the Port-A-Punch card punch • In early 1960’s, Professor Joseph P. Harris furthered IBM’s work and developed the Harris Votomatic company to sell his voting machines • In 1965, IBM bought the Harris Votomatic company

23. History of Voting Machines – Punch Card Ballots • Votomatic ballots contain 228 or 235 voting positions (by number) • Candidates are referenced by number in a book placed in the voting booth • Voters use a stylus to poke out the number position corresponding to the chosen candidate – remaining hole is counted as a vote

24. History of Voting Machines – Punch Card Ballots

25. History of Voting Machines – Punch Card Ballots- PROBLEMS - • Hard to determine a winner (The “hanging chad” problem) – Punch cards may require interpretation on what is considered a “valid vote”. • Hard to understand – The 2000 Presidential election was a nightmare • Voter Fraud – The book used to identify candidates could intentionally be swapped or marked incorrectly

26. History of Voting Machines – Optical Scanners- Mark-Sense Ballots - • Mark-sense scanning was developed in 1937 by IBM • Similar to SAT or ACT testing, where graphite pencil marks are detected on paper by their electrical conductivity • Mark-sense ballots were first used in 1962

27. History of Voting Machines – Optical Scanners- Mark-Sense Ballots -

28. History of Voting Machines – Optical Scanners- PROBLEMS - • Usability Problems – If voters didn’t fill in completely their choice, it might not get recorded correctly as a vote. Stray marks on a ballot could also invalidate it, even though the human voter may not detect such a mark as being a threat.

29. History of Voting Machines – DRE Voting MachinesDRE: Direct Recording Electronic • PC computers with a touch screen, packaged in a secure case, so a keyboard or mouse can’t be plugged into it during the election • Contains a UPS (uninterruptable power supply) for back-up

30. History of Voting Machines – DRE Voting Machines

31. Fundamental Problems- The Voting System Standards Program - • As early as the 1970’s, it was recognized that there were problems with electronic voting machines • Government didn’t have enough expertise in the technology being used • Government conducted a study to create guidelines

32. Fundamental Problems- The Voting System Standards Program - • In 1975, released a paper “Effective Use of Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying” • Biggest cause for computer related problems: lack of knowledge and appropriate technical skills by government officials to create and implement standards for hardware and software to be tested and evaluated against. • Recommended to improve the procedures used to design and develop such machines, the extensive use of audit trails and other internal controls, and further documentation authenticating the results of elections • Unfortunately, none of these performance and testing standards has helped solve the problems of DRE voting machines

33. In-Depth Look: Characteristics of Voting Machines • Anonymity: the ability for the voter to remain anonymous throughout the voting process. • Scalability: the ability for the voting machine to be used among all size groups of people, small or large. • Speed: the amount of time it will take a voter to use the system. • Audit capability: refers to its ability to prove the votes if need be, for example, if a recount is necessary. • Accuracy: the votes have been accurately reported and counted as the voter intended.

34. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Audit Trails - • DRE machines are a paperless process • No way to reconstruct an election or provide a recount

35. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Audit Trails - Solutions • Move away from DRE machines to a paper-based process with an audit trail • Implement a voter-verifiable audit trail, where the DRE machine prints a receipt

36. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Security - • Unintentional programming errors – missed semi-colon • Intentional programming errors – “Trojan horses” • Outside threats – hackers, corrupt poll-workers

37. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Security - Solutions • Better development, testing and scrutiny of code by vendors • Allow outside, independent audits of code by individuals designated by the government • Better testing by states – Texas is noted as having a 3-step process • Government needs to impose standards on vendors

38. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Usability - • Major problem – lack of understanding on how to use them. Voters aren’t being trained. This is more apparent in older adults compared to younger adults. • The DRE machines also provide accessibility issues, especially for the disabled. • Poll-workers are also not trained on how the system works, so they can usually offer little or no help, especially during the inevitable system malfunctions. • Issues usually stem from budgetary constraints or lack of programmer knowledge on what the users need. Often times, trade-offs need to be made and people sacrifice usability for security or even money

39. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Usability - Case Study • Benjamin Bederson, Paul Herrnson, and Richard Niemi conducted a study on the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting system • Conclusions – • Inconsistent Terminology/Labeling (5 reviewers) • Color usage (4 reviewers) • Inserting/Removing card (4 reviewers) • Help / Instructions (4 reviewers) • Layout (4 reviewers) • System information shown (4 reviewers) • Glare on screen (3 reviewers) • Changes / Feedback (2 reviewers) • Poor graphics/design quality (2 reviewers) • Privacy (1 reviewer)

40. In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting Machines- Lack of Usability - Solutions • Training for all registered voters • Special training for all poll-workers • Require that vendors work with states to determine what functionality is needed

41. A Solution: Rush Holt’s Bill- H.R. 2239 - • The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (H.R. 2239) was created on May 22, 2003 as a response to address the overwhelming concerns from election reform specialists and computer scientists with respect to the integrity of future elections. • Proposal: • Use of a voter-verified paper trail in all voting machines • Prohibiting the use of undisclosed software and wireless communication devices in voting systems and limits electronic communication to outgoing reports of vote totals only • Requirement that electronic voting systems be provided for persons with disabilities by January 2006 • Requirement that mandatory surprise recounts will take place in .5% of domestic jurisdictions and .5% of overseas jurisdictions • Requirement that all voting systems must meet these requirements in time for the general election in November 2004

42. A Solution: Rush Holt’s Bill- H.R. 2239 - • States may try to object to the bill, stating that there is no way they could possibly meet these requirements. • Holt’s bill tries to address such issues by allowing states to request additional funds from the government to meet these requirements • Bill also allows states that think they can’t meet the voter-verifiable paper trail requirement by November’s election to use a more traditional paper system, funded by the government, as an interim process until the DRE machines are updated.

43. QUESTIONS?