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AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS: AFRICAN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS: AFRICAN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVE. SANUSHA NAIDU INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE 25 JUNE 2019 PRESENTATION TO: DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA REGENSY BUSINESS SCHOOL SANDTON. INTRODUCTION. PART 1: CHINA’S (RE)EMERGING FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA

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AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS: AFRICAN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

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  1. AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS: AFRICAN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVE SANUSHA NAIDU INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE 25 JUNE 2019 PRESENTATION TO: DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA REGENSY BUSINESS SCHOOL SANDTON

  2. INTRODUCTION • PART 1: CHINA’S (RE)EMERGING FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA • PART 2: CONSOLIDATION OF CHINA’S AFRICA POLICY: FOCAC • PART 3: THE NEW ECONOMIC NORMAL • PART 4: REALIGNING CHINA’S GEO-STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN ITS AFRICA POLICY: FOCAC VS BRICS VS THE BRI

  3. PART 1: CHINA’S (RE)EMERGING FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA • HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP DEFINED BY: - THE OLD SILK ROAD AND MARITIME DIPLOMACY AND ENGAGEMENTS: PRE COLONISATION - THE EXPERIENCES OF COLONISATION - THE DYNAMCIS OF THE COLD WAR - THE POST COLD WAR

  4. RE-EMERGING OF TIES • TRACTION REALLY BEGINS AFTER THE 1990S. • BETWEEN 1990 AND 1999 THERE WERE EBBS AND FLOWS IN THE RELATION • THE TIANNAMEN SQUARE DEBACLE • A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE IN SHAPING THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN AFRICA AND CHINESE LEADERSHIP • THE HUMAN RIGHTS FACTOR IS CRITICAL • AFRICAN LANDSCAPE DOMINANTED BY THE POLICIES OF THE IFIS • CHINA’S NON INTERFERENCE POLICY PROVIDES AN ATTRACTIVE ATERNATIVE

  5. POST 2000: THE G0ING OUT STRATEGY 1.0 • DRIVEN BY THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: • The ‘Washington Consensus’ (Structural Adjustment and Liberalization of African markets) • ‘Going global’ Strategy in 1999. Encourage SOEs to invest in overseas markets. Linked to the Economic Modernization reform policy of the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping. Aligned to Chinese govt. desire to harness ‘global champions and competitors’ to reverse the isolation under Mao’s State Socialism. • A new impulse in African relations propelled by the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). Infuses trade, aid and investment strategy • Influenced by domestic economy needs to sustain high growth levels (resource security)

  6. PART 2: THE FORMALISATION OF RELATIONS: FOCAC • LINKED TO: • THE RESOURCE FACTOR, OIL AND OTHER COMMODITIES • ACCESS TO NEW MARKET AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES • THE TRADE DIMENSION • DEVLOPMENT COOPERATION • UNDERPINNED BY SYMBOLIC DIPLOMACY • REINFORCED BY SOFT POWER

  7. PART 3: THE NEW ECONOMIC NORMAL

  8. WHAT IS THE NEW ECONOMIC NORMAL? • ITS ABOUT STABILISATION • REBALANCING AND REFORMING THE STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS OF THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE CONDITIONS OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY • WHY? • PREVENT OVERHEATING AND BUBBLES THAT HAVE SET IN • STIMULATE DOMESTIC CONSUMPTIONAND EMPLOYMENT • NO LONGER A CHEAP LABOUR SUPPLY • SET A TARGET OF 7% OR BELOW TO NORMALISE THE OUTPUT AND GDP GROWTH

  9. A NEW GOING OUT STRATEGY: 2.0: THE BELT ROAD INITIATIVE: THE NEW NORMAL: CONSUMPTION LED GROWTH

  10. A Development Security Nexus

  11. HOW DOES THIS FIT WITH AFRICA

  12. PART 4: GEO- STRATEGIC ALIGNING THE AFRICA POLICY: FOCAC VS BRICS VS BRI • ALL ROADS LEAD TO THE BRI • CHINA SEES IT AS ITS GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONNECTIVITY PROGRAMME • ALSO INTERPRETED AS ITS GLOBAL STRATEGIC VISION • CHINA HAS BEEN ON A CHARM OFFENSIVE • TRYING TO ALIGN FOCAC TO BRI, INCLUDED IN THE FINAL 2018 FOCAC DECLARATION AS AFFIRMING AFRICA’S SUPPORT FOR BRI • TRIED THE SAME AT BRICS 2018 BUT INDIA OBJECTED. ARGUED THAT THESE WERE SEPARATE FRAMEWORKS: • THOUGH THERE ARE OVERLAPS WITH CHINA’S GEO-COMPETITION AND FOOTPRINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION, EAST AFRICA, THE MAGREB REGION AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. • THERE IS A DEFINITE REALIGINING IN TERMS OF HOW FOCAC INTERSECTS WITH BRI

  13. CONTINUED…. • NEED TO EXAMINE WHAT PROJECTS ARE FOCAC CENTRIC AND WHICH ARE NOT AND WHETHER SUCH PROJECTS ARE BEING REDEFINED WITH A BRI FOCUSED • NEED CLARITY, ESP REGARDING THE FUNDING IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE, INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION • NO NEW MONEY ANNOUNCED AT 2018 FOCAC. IN FACT IT WAS LOWER THAN THE US60 BN ANNOUNCED AT THE 2015 FOCAC SUMMIT. • ALREADY SEEING THE DEBATE ON THE RESURGENCE OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN TERMS OF THE BRI E.G. THE STANDARD GAUGE RAILWAY PROJECT. • DOES AFRICA AND CHINA SEE THE BRI IN THE SAME? • HOW DOES THIS IMPACT ON PERCEPTIONS: AFRICA VERSUS EXTERNAL PARTNERSHIPS VERSUS THE CHINA NARRATIVE: OPPORTUNITY VERSUS THREAT • NOT LEAST THE DOMESTIC PERCEPTIONS IN AFRICAN COIUNTRIES TOWARDS CHINA: ELITES VS POPULAR OPINION • GOING BACK TO THE FUTRE

  14. THANK YOU

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