MINWARA 2003 Organic Mine Countermeasures “End to End Assessment…” May 2003 CAPT Vito Jimenez

1. MINWARA 2003Organic Mine Countermeasures “End to End Assessment…” May 2003 CAPT Vito Jimenez

2. Overview • 2001 Assessment Results* • Purpose & Process • Shortfalls • Recommended solutions • 2003 “Re”assessment • Two year hindsight • CONOPS development • Shortfalls status • Potential solutions • Summary *This is a top-level brief. The assessment itself developed over 300 slides and numerous analytical work products that can’t be shown here due to time constraints and level of detail.

3. Purpose of E2E • To analytically determine and inform PEO MUW, what the expected capability of OMCM systems is likely to be; as a suite of systems, in the notional 2007 operational environment, per current program plan • To determine shortfalls in the program plan or in the suite of system’s operational and technical capabilities in support of POM-04 and beyond • To provide quantitative results to support setting realistic expectations of delivered capability to the fleet as OMCM becomes operational

4. (Not to Scale) MH-60S DDG-51 ALMDS (AN/AES-1) RAMICS OASIS (AN/WSS-1) RMS (AN/WLD-1) SSN AMNS AQS-20/X LMRS (AN/BLQ-11) Organic MCM Systems

5. Key Assumptions & References • Section 2.1.1 • Appendix F • MH-60 ORD (Annex B) • CVBG/MIW CONOPS • N75 references • Concept for H-60 Anti-Mine Warfare Operations in the Battle Group • SC21 COEA/Helo Master Plan • PMA-299 references • Appendix G—Methodology

6. Detailed Assessment Boundary AQS-20/X C4ISR CV TSC or DDG CIC ALMDS AMNS ISR sensor data in storage OASIS RAMICS Reachback RMS LMRS Boundaries • The following areas remain for further assessment: • Full cost assessment • Dedicated MCM forces (capability and interoperability) • Mining • Allied reinforcement or interoperability • MCM Explosive Ordnance Disposal units • Real-time dynamic tasking of ISR assets

7. E2E Assessment Process Data Flow Diagrams  Define and bound the problem: Quantify/qualify threat and force protection, define end-end countermeasures and C4I capability  Develop scenario and measures, and identify countermeasures systems to be applied as a suite of systems  Play scenarios: Assess technical and tactical system capability. Determine effectiveness and efficiency of countermeasures in the notional environment of 2007  Identify “holes”: Issues, shortfalls, and recommendations See appendix G-1 of the report for a full description Integrate Known Requirements, Concept of Operations and Employment OAMCM LMRS RMS Communications / Data flow CVBG/ARG MIW CONOPS System Technical Parameters Probability of detection Probability of neutralization Endurance Other … Shortfalls Assessment Methodology Measures of effectiveness Modeling Fleet expertise Review Panel Identify Capabilities and Shortfalls Baseline Scenario Development Threats TACSITs Environment Asset Availability TACSITs with threat & environment Prioritize and Rank Recommendations

8. Scenario Development Channel (SLOC): From CVBG/ARG MIW CONOPS OPAREA: From Capstone Requirements Document (Draft)

9. Assessment • Results • Communications matrix • Appendix A • Timelines matrix • Section 2.5 Analysis Excursions • Shortfalls • Exec Summary and Appendix D • Action • Page ix (Table ES.4)

10. Results (as stated in 2001) • Current suite of systems under development is adequate for the intended applications with various shortfalls, some significant • Mine Hunting • OMCM will be capable of performing the mine hunting role adequately • Limitations generally result from platform limitations (MH-60S range/endurance, SSN configuration, DDG configuration) • Mine Sweeping • Platform size/weight restrictions impact the mine sweeping performance capability. Tactical solutions will be necessary • Shortfalls: • Nine Priority A (significant impact to OMCM) • Eight Priority B (moderate impact to OMCM or not well defined) • Sixteen Findings (statements of fact, no immediate impact to OMCM)

11. Communications Matrix Numbers in cells are derived data transmission requirements. GREEN: ALL OMCM COMMUNICATIONS DATA RATE REQUIREMENTS ARE WITHIN CURRENT/NEAR TERM COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

12. Timeline Matrix Normalized Mission Time SLOC 10x10 Box OPAREA Baseline* Excursion 1 Excursion 2 Excursion 3 X 1.64X 14.7X 0.82X 1.09X 9.8X (2 Lily Pads vice 1) 1.55X 2.54X 22.9X (NOMBO Density = 16) 1.00X(1) 1.27X 11.5X (NOMBO Density = 4) * Baseline Consists of 1 Lily Pad, 2 MH-60S, 1 RMS, 1 LMRS, and NOMBO Density of 8 (1) No appreciable decrease in mission time due to necessity to perform OASIS missions (which are not affected by NOMBO density) after reconnaissance and are daytime-only towing missions. Section 2

13. Shortfall #1 • Shortfall: OMCM CVBG cannot meet combined MIW (OMCM and DMCM) timeline requirements outlined in the draft Capstone Requirements Document. CRD does not have OMCM-only requirements definition • Description: Increasing number of MCM systems and/or capabilities of MCM systems can substantially reduce timeline. Maintaining a rapidly deployable dedicated MCM force remains a necessity • Action: PMS210 develop roadmap for dedicated MCM capabilities that includes interoperability with OMCM forces. Recommend to OPNAV to define OMCM-only requirement

15. Shortfall #2 • Shortfall: OAMCM missions on MH-60S require lily pad to overcome OAMCM standoff distance and MH-60S range/endurance limitations • Description: A lily pad ship is required for use by the OAMCM systems. Unless the CV moves closer to the area to be addressed, and thus closer to a potential mined environment, then a lily pad is necessary due to the limited reach of the MH-60S aircraft. In order to increase the number of aircraft in MCM operations, additional ships will need to be tied to the lily pad role • Action: Base some MH-60S aircraft and OAMCM systems (with support) on another platform that can be moved to within 10 nmi of operation area

16. Time vs Standoff 29.2 18.2 16.0 10.0 • System 1 does search to low level, then bumper pool to ID each minelike contact 3. Time in Field from PMS299 data – Tropical Day, 5 sorties per day • System 2 does sweep to high level, Ship Count = 1 4. Baseline Case used CV at 50 nm and DDG at 10 nm

17. Shortfall #3 • Shortfall: MH-60S time on station is limited for tow missions in Hot Day (102.9 degrees F, 39.4 degrees C SL). These conditions are not unusual for the areas of interest • Description: MH-60S OAMCM tow operations (AN/AQS-20/X, OASIS) are limited during hot day (102.9 F at SL) conditions. At these conditions, the best-case mission performance on-station time is 30 minutes with 10nm transit radius from Lily-Pad platform. This low on-station time is inefficient and may not be practical • Action: PMS210 develop initial tactics to minimize employment of towed systems in hot day conditions. Other alternative considered: Increase MH-60S tow time under hot day conditions (aircraft improvements)

18. Hot Day Excursion MH-60S time in field is significantly reduced for a hot day (103ºF) compared to a tropical day (90ºF). This leads to significant increase in the number of sorties required. Time in Field (Minutes) for 10 nm transit MH-60 Sorties SLOC SLOC with RMS doing all hunting Baseline Hot 28 80 Note 1 Adds 16 Days For the baseline SLOC, the number of MH-60S tow missions (AQS-20/X and OASIS) increases from 28 to 80.

19. Tropical Day at: 1 nm: first 47 min at 5,000 lbs 10 nm: first 40 min at 5,000 lbs 30 nm: first 33 min at 5,000 lbs 60 nm: first 22 min at 5,000 lbs Standard Day All at 6,000 lbs Tow Tension Hot Day All at 5,000 lbs Tow Tension 100 90 80 70 Standard Day Hot Day 60 Trop Day, Wt Reduct. Time on Station - Min 50 OWE w/ Wt Reduction 40 30 20 10 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Transit Radius - NM MH-60S Mission Time on Station vs. RadiusAQS-20/X Towing Mission

20. Standard Day All at 6,000 lbs Tow Tension Hot Day All at 5,000 lbs Tow Tension Tropical Day at: 1 nm: first 50 min at 5,000 lbs 10 nm: first 42 min at 5,000 lbs 30 nm: first 35 min at 5,000 lbs 60 nm first 26 min at 5,000 lbs 100 90 80 70 60 Standard Day Time on Station - Min Hot Day 50 Trop Day, wt reduction OWE w/ Wt Reduction 40 30 20 10 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 MH-60S Mission Time on Station vs. RadiusOASIS Towing Mission Transit Radius - NM

21. Shortfall #4 • Shortfall: Influence minesweeping with OASIS requires 53% of all MH-60S sorties flown in baseline End to End scenario (this is one plausible scenario of many options) • Description: The OASIS system towed on the MH-60S requires the most sorties of any of the AMCM systems. The number of influence sweeping sorties is relatively insensitive to threat and environmental parameters, and can become the driver in the overall MCM timeline if insufficient AMCM-capable MH-60S aircraft and OASIS systems are not available in the CVBG • Action: Brief results to N752 and discuss possible force structure (increase number of OASIS systems on CV and the number of tow-capable aircraft) or sweep doctrine changes Appendix D, Exec Summary

22. Number of Sorties in the Baseline SLOC scenario from End to End Assessment * * * • Why such a high number? • OASIS: 1) Much smaller “A” compared to a MK-106 (½ to ⅔) coupled with ; 2) Shorter time on station (1.x vs. 4.x hrs) • AQS-20A: 1) Highly dependent on RMS hunt contribution on initial around the clock hunt. Without RMS, AQS-20A becomes primary helo resource user until hunt clearance gets to 64%… • LMRS survey contributes bottom characterization, clutter density and potential contacts of interest and may contribute to clearance levels if surveyed area overlaps MDA and/or established minefields

23. Oasis vs. MK-105 output OASIS Open Loop 550A

24. Value of Sweeping with OASIS? • Why must we sweep? • To account for “known/possible unknowns” • 1) Buried mines are not huntable (today) • 2) When bottom conditions preclude efficient hunting • 3) Mines missed during hunting, which remain after hunting (statistical residue) due to technical limitations (nav error, decoyed mines, oceanographic phenomena, occultation, etc.) • What if we don’t develop an organic sweep at all and quit at hunting + neutralizing? • We’ve only dealt with the known problem, ignores the “known/possible unknowns” piece • 1) Risk of buried, decoyed or missed mine actuation • 2) Capability gap in known unhuntable areas • OASIS is practically the most critical of the OAMCM weapons suite…to reduce risk

25. Subjective Groupings: = Good = Nominal = Poor Minehunting Bottom Type* Clutter DensityplusBottom Category Bottom Type Defines Which, in turn, predicts the fraction of mines that will be undetectable by sonar. 1 2 3 A B C D Bottom Category Depends Upon: - Bottom Composition (Sand, Mud/Sand, Mud, Rock) - Percent Mine Case Burial (0, <10, 10 to 20, 20 to 75, >75) - Bottom Profile <15 NOMBOs per nmi2 15 to 40 NOMBOs per nmi2 > 40 NOMBOs per nmi2 Fraction of Undetectable Mines Clutter 1 2 3 Bottom Category A = Smooth Sand with <10% Case Burial B = Moderate Sand with < 10% Case Burial, or Smooth Mud with 20-75% Case Burial, or Smooth-Moderate Mud/Sand w/10-20%, or Smooth Rock with 0% Case Burial C = Rough Sand with <10% Case Burial, or Rough Mud/Sand w/ 10-20% Case Burial, or Moderate Mud with 20-75% Case Burial, or Moderate-Rough Rock with 0% Case Burial D = > 75 % Mine Case Burial 0 0.4A A A Bottom Roughness (percentage) < 5 % 5 to 15 % > 15% Sand Ridge Height (feet) < 0.5 0.5 to 1.0 > 1.0 Bottom Profile Smooth Moderate Rough B A 2A 3A 3A C 5A 8A D 10A 13A 18A * per Current MCM Procedures Documented in NWP 3-15 (formerly NWP 27-1)

26. Fraction of Undetectable Mines, μ Clutter 1 2 3 Bottom Category 0 0.4A A A B A 2A 3A 3A C 5A 8A D 10A 13A 18A Value of sweeping as a function of Risk • Sweeping is valuable in two situations • High clutter density areas. Hunt and ID of a large number of minelike contacts is less efficient than sweep, once the density of the clutter exceeds a threshold • In areas with a high fraction of undetectable mines. Hunting alone can only achieve a maximum value that is dependent on the bottom type. The maximum clearance obtainable is 1 – μ • Sweeping is only means to address un-huntable (poor environmental conditions) and buried threats; OASIS is the only organic solution…

27. Progress since 2001 • Shortfalls and findings: • Resolved or reasonably addressed 13 of 33 to date • No “addressable” shortfalls in POM-04 or PR05 • Exploring effects of changes in Program Plans to expected OMCM capability • Possible loss of TCDL • Potential inclusion of LCS within CSG • Potential inclusion of OMCM in ESG • Value of sweeping (OASIS contract just awarded…) • Analytically established that organic mine countermeasures is not a substitute for dedicated mine countermeasures forces, but a complementary force package

28. More progress • CONOPS recognizes stand-off constraints and tactically optimizes platform positioning to maximize MH-60S time on station • Potential LCS force structure may further mitigate this constraining factor (TBD) • Modifications to MH-60S planned to improve time on station/stand-off range • Tactics to maximize non-towed missions at longer ranges (ALMDS, AMNS, RAMICS)

29. Link 16 Comm matrix Numbers in cells are derived data transmission requirements. CV TSC to MH60S to CV DDG to RMV RMV to DDG UUV to SSN SSN to UUV MH60S TSC LOS - TCDL LOS - TCDL LOS 3.15 Mbps LOS 3.15 Mbps BRA-34A / USQ-42 BRA-34A / USQ-42 System 200 kbps 10.71 Mbps OTH 16 kbps OTH 64 kbps UHF SAT 32 kbps UHF SAT 32 kbps 600 bps LMRS (LMRS antenna) 0.12 100 kbits Dual Quadrifilar Helix Antenna Mbits every 9-12 LST-5D transceiver mission plan hours Store and 600 bps forward capability RMS LOS: 9.6 kbps LOS UHF: BAE VRC-99B LOS: 2.8 Mbps OTH: 0.8-2.4 (12-15 nm range) OTH: 40 kbps OTH VHF: Harris PRC-117F kbps (surface wave) 0.448 Mbps ALMDS 100 kbits nom. 8.0 Mbps TCDL Ku Band Rod Antenna: mission plan max What’s lost? Ability to watch the hunt real-time, and pass video contacts over a net; little if any penalty in actual contact prosecution 0.012 Mbps AN/AQS-20X 100 kbits nom 6.9 Mbps TCDL Ku Band Rod Antenna: mission plan max 600 bps (TCDL) OASIS 100 kbits Actuation events TCDL Ku Band Rod Antenna: mission plan (voice) 0.58 Mbps RAMICS 100 kbits Lidar image (no TCDL Ku Band Rod Antenna: mission plan trans req) 5 Mbps AMNS 100 kbits video/Ancillary TCDL Ku Band Rod Antenna: mission plan (no trans req) LINK 16 PROVIDES ESSENTIAL REAL-TIME DATA (FORMATTED TEXT MESSAGE) ON AIRCRAFT TRACK, AREA SEARCHED, CONTACT/ACTUATION LOCATIONS, BUT NO REAL-TIME IMAGERY

30. Impact of Data Link on E2E Baseline SLOC Timeline This figure shows timeline using two aircraft with TCDL to clear the SLOC. • When datalink is removed, the timeline doesn't change. Why? • Large number of OASIS sorties dictate length of operation. Requires no data link capability • Few Q-20 and ALMDS sorties to make efficient use of data link. Rapid follow-on not possible (asset limitations) or necessary (OASIS) • Tactical implications of not having TCDL and using Link-16 instead • Real-time contact reaction not available at CVTSC. Is it necessary? Not really • Links through complete battlegroup (non-video) into an established network

31. MH-60S Time on Station improvements • Hot day performance up to 41 min (30 threshold / 45 objective), achieved through: • removal of HIRSS and ISD (though the provisions remain), • weight reduction throughout the Block 2 and 3A-Kits, • weight reduction within the Block 2B-Kit, and • implementation of a 10-min rating for the engine • Other weight reduction initiatives being explored to gain more margin (not yet implemented) include • composite stabilator, • crew reduction, • improved ECS unit, • active vibration, • light-weight tow cable, electric winch, etc. • A CDL system is in the baseline program of record, scheduled for an 04 start, fielding in 07. Potential savings of 260 lbs if requirement is eliminated (TCDL of questionable tactical advantage)

32. Shortfall Status Unresolved Resolved 2 Level of Impact 1 1 2 6 17 Operationally Significant Marginally Administrative Significant Significant Category of impact Status of shortfalls • Operationally significant shortfalls directly influence number of sorties • Significant shortfalls severely complicate MCM execution • Marginally significant shortfalls moderately complicate MCM execution • Administrative shortfalls have no direct impact on the number of sorties (A3, A4) (A7)

33. Summary of E2E (2003) • Current suite of systems under development is adequate for the intended applications with various shortfalls, some significant • Mine Hunting • OMCM will be capable of performing the mine hunting role adequately • Limitations generally result from platform (MH-60S range/endurance, SSN configuration, DDG configuration) limitations • Mine Sweeping • Platform size/weight restrictions impact the mine sweeping performance capability. A tactical solution will be necessary • Analytically established that organic mine countermeasures is not a substitute for dedicated mine countermeasures forces, but a complementary force package No change to conclusions of 2001, the study stands as previously stated

34. End

37. AN/BLQ-11 (LMRS) Requirements / Goals/ Capabilities • Enabler for the submarine to operate in littorals • Addresses enhanced clandestine mine reconnaissance • Autonomous operations with the following measures of effectiveness: ThresholdGoal Single sortie reach 75 nm 120nm Total area coverage 400 nm2 650 nm2 Area coverage rate 35 nm2/day 50 nm2/day Technology Schedule • Significantly increased system endurance, 4-5 times silver zinc battery energy density • Advanced forward look search sonars with CAD/CAC capability • ACOMMs, RF and UHF SATCOM communications between the Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) and SSN • Significantly increased reliability over existing UUV systems Dec 97 Detailed Design Contract Award Nov 99 Development Phase Contract Award Apr/May 01 OPEVAL Aug 03 MS III Sep 03 IOC 1st Qtr FY04 Production Contract Award

38. LMRS Simulation Results for SLOC • By FY10, there will be 12 LMRS systems • Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS) will provide for LMRS a 3-fold improvement in range and a 36x improvement in resolution over the AQS-14A and AQS-20 • LMRS could provide a search capability approaching that of RMS depending on • number of SSNs and LMRS assigned to MCM • effectiveness and speed of SAS in providing additional threat information • tactics employed to minimize LMRS localization errors due to inertial navigation • With reasonable assumptions, LMRS should be capable of achieving search clearance levels to 95%. Area Depicted to Represent Approximately Two LMRS Sorties is Three 1500 yds by 60 nm Used LMRS to select lane of interest

39. AN/WLD-1(V)1Remote Minehunting System Requirements / Goals / Capabilities • • Part of the Fleet Engagement Strategy to “Mainstream” mine warfare. • • High endurance, offboard system, operated from and maintained aboard surface ship • • Rapid reconnaissance of bottom and moored mines from the deep water region (greater than 200 feet) to the 30-foot contour of the very shallow water region • Inventory Objective - 33 systems • Mine Identification Technology Schedule • Surface Launched and Recovered • Over-the-Horizon Operations • Integrated with AN/SQQ-89(V)15 • Utilizes AN/AQS-20 Sensor with Electro-Optic Identification • Unmanned Autonomous Operations Jun 99 System Requirements Review Nov 99 System Design Review Dec 99 Milestone II Nov 00 Preliminary Design Review Dec 01 Critical Design Review Aug 04 OPEVAL Feb 05 Milestone III Jun 05 IOC

40. AN/WLD-1(V) Predicted Endurance

41. MH-60S Mission Time on Station vs. RadiusALMDS Free Flight Mission

42. MH-60S Mission Time on Station vs. RadiusRAMICS Hover Mission

43. MH-60S Mission Time on Station vs. RadiusAMNS (Tethered) Hover Mission

44. MH-60S Mission Time on Station vs. RadiusAMNS (Untethered) Free Flight Mission

45. Shortfalls and Findings • Operational Shortfall Definition: • capability or supporting capability not currently in a defined program and whose absence significantly constrains overall OMCM capability POM action recommended • Analysis Shortfall Definition: • deficiency in problem definition, metrics, or analysis methods encountered in the assessment process • Finding Definition: • finding of fact that should be tracked but that does not require POM action • Priority of Shortfalls: • Priority A: Impact on OMCM capability is significant, and the impact is well-defined and understood • Priority B: Impact on OMCM capability is moderately significant, or the impact is not well-defined or well understood

46. Affordability Rating Estimated Cost Range High < $500,000 Medium $500,000 to $5M Low > $5M Recommendations-Legend • Technical Feasibility • HIGH indicates recommendation is not difficult to implement. • LOW indicates recommendation is more difficult to implement. • Affordability • Operational Desirability • HIGH indicates compatibility with projected fleet implementation. • LOW requires additional or unique efforts for fleet integration

47. Shortfalls: Priority A

48. Shortfalls: Priority B Appendix D

49. Recommendations

50. Findings (1 of 2)