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A Tale of Two Central Bankers: Eccles, Prebisch and Financial Reform

A Tale of Two Central Bankers: Eccles, Prebisch and Financial Reform. Matías Vernengo. Plan of the Talk. The Depression led to a need to rethink the principles of Central Banking;

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A Tale of Two Central Bankers: Eccles, Prebisch and Financial Reform

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  1. A Tale of Two Central Bankers: Eccles, Prebisch and Financial Reform Matías Vernengo

  2. Plan of the Talk • The Depression led to a need to rethink the principles of Central Banking; • In the Center central bankers dismissed the so-called real bills doctrine, and developed an activist view of the central bank; • In the periphery central banks changed to try to insulate the worst effects of balance of payments crises; • Eccles and Prebisch are paradigmatic examples of those tendencies; • Central banks were designed to stimulate, directly or indirectly, demand, and to maintain full employment. Class conflict and external shocks were seen as central for demand management.

  3. Capital Mobility and Default

  4. Terms of Trade

  5. Central Bank Reform • Real Bills Doctrine suggests that the Central Bank passively provides liquidity to the system. It is generally presumed that in the 1930s a more activist position (leaning against the wind) was developed; • The collapse of the Gold Standard gave an additional degree of freedom to central bankers (exchange rate policy); • Before Keynesian policies became popular, the role of demand policies was central for recovery; • Contested terrain view of monetary policy in the center, and the importance of the external constraint in the periphery.

  6. Marriner S. Eccles (1890-1977) • Inefficiency of monetary policy (pushing on a string); • Monetary policy centered on the role of the Fed as fiscal agent of the government, maintaining a 2.5 percent interest on government bonds, and increasing the amount of bonds held by the banking sector; • Eccles’ program consisted of increasing transfers to states, increase federal government spending, implement a program to control production and raise agricultural prices, refinance mortgages on a long term basis at low rates of interest, and bring about a permanent settlement of inter-allied debts by promoting cancellation of debts.

  7. Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986) • The other Prebisch (conservative or pragmatic?); • Prebisch saw monetary policy as an instrument to manage the cycle, that was in the case of the periphery imposed by external shocks; • Further, he saw the secular deterioration of export prices as the central problem for developing countries, and the infeasibility of generating employment by exporting commodities; • Advantages of abandoning the ‘intermittent Gold Standard.’

  8. Conclusion • Eccles considered the role of the Federal Reserve as fiscal agent of the Treasury as the essential one, in a situation that only expansionary fiscal policy could turn the economy around; • Prebisch considered that an independent central bank could minimize the effects of external crises in smooth out the cycle, in particular, by allowing a more depreciated currency and the abandonment of the Gold Standard; • Both Eccles and Prebisch did NOT consider that the central role of the central bank was to control inflation, even though they remained concerned about inflation.

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