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Computer-Mediated Communication

Computer-Mediated Communication. Collective Action and CMC: Game Theory Approaches and Applications. Critiquing Hardin and Olson.

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Computer-Mediated Communication

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  1. Computer-Mediated Communication Collective Action and CMC: Game Theory Approaches and Applications

  2. Critiquing Hardin and Olson I do believe there is another side to this, which is that people's actions may not match their intentions. How actively are people really balancing these issues of public good and free riding on a daily basis? People's concepts and mental models of contribution might also be very different. -George H. I worked at Microsoft, which (as a pretty sizable company) is often afflicted with some of the shortcomings that Olson ascribes to large groups. On several occasions, I witnessed events and occurrences where bodies within the company (both individuals and teams) would essentially work against the greater good because they wanted a certain outcome that would have been more locally beneficial to themselves. -Brendan C. Computer-Mediated Communication

  3. Critiquing…topics of research After reading the collaborative action background pieces, I was totally ready to read about amazing developments in Web2.0 and enabling more flash mobs…I guess I should have expected two Usenet articles seeing how last week featured two eBay articles. Anyways, enough ranting. -Adam J. Computer-Mediated Communication

  4. Considering the Core of Olson’s Argument: Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups Computer-Mediated Communication

  5. The “Free-Rider Problem” in Online Systems of Collective Action (Bimber et al.) Communality and Discretionary Databases “Second-Order” Communality Computer-Mediated Communication

  6. Choice, Assumption of Intention and Collective Action I would argue, however, that in the case of blogs in particular, the individual is still making a decision to enter into the public sphere. If an individual really did want to write a blog solely for personal reflection, he or she could write in an offline journal instead. The person is specifically choosing to put his or her reflections in the public sphere. In doing so, it becomes a public good rather than a private one. -Alison M. Computer-Mediated Communication

  7. When is it a public good…private good…club good? Pressing a little harder on their use of language which characterizes a deterioration of the public/private boundary, one might wonder why they still cling to the language of 'public good' in the end. Namely, if the boundary slips away between these two terms, then the two terms themselves slip away since they are mutually co-constitutive. No more public, no more private—just one big muddy swamp. And if there is no more public as we know it, can we say that there are still 'public' goods as such? -David H. Computer-Mediated Communication

  8. Why Game Theory for mediated communication? Computer-Mediated Communication

  9. Game Theory (definition) “Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of action depends on what several agents choose to do and where their choices depend on what others choose to do.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/ Computer-Mediated Communication

  10. Game Theory and Core Concepts • Analytical vs. Behavioral Game Theory • Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games • Zero and Non-Zero Sum Games • One-Shot vs. Repeated • Equilibria • (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) (example for cooperative game) Computer-Mediated Communication

  11. Types of Social Dilemmas Different social dilemma games make different use of the payouts: T>R>P>S Prisoner’s Dilemma But also… T>R>S>P Chicken T>P>R>S Deadlock R>T>P>S Stag Hunt B 3 (R) 5 (T) 0 (S) Reward Temptation Sucker Punishment 3 (R) A 0 (S) 1 (P) 5 (T) 1 (P) Computer-Mediated Communication

  12. Example: Chicken Game T>R>S>PChicken Coop = Swerve Defect = Do Not Swerve B 3 (R) 5 (T) Reward Temptation Sucker Punishment 1 (S) 3 (R) A 1 (S) -1 (P) 5 (T) -1 (P) Computer-Mediated Communication

  13. Public Good • N-person PD • 2-person repeated PD Computer-Mediated Communication

  14. The N-person PD “No one wants to pay taxes because the benefits are so diffuse and the costs are so direct. But everyone may be better off if each person has to pay so that each can share the benefits” cf. Schelling 1973; Axelrod 1984 http://www.flickr.com/photos/cogdog/4353774/ Computer-Mediated Communication

  15. The Evolution of Cooperation • Axelrod’s famous (1984) tournament allowed individuals to submit any strategy. • All strategies played each other in the tournament. • The winner was one of the shortest submissions, about 4 lines of code. Computer-Mediated Communication

  16. The Simple Effectiveness of the Tit-for-Tat Strategy • Tit-for-Tat: begin with ‘cooperate’ and then do whatever the opponent did on the last turn. Computer-Mediated Communication

  17. Lessons from Tit-for-Tat • Be nice • It starts by cooperating. Most top-scoring strategies do this. • Be forgiving • It quickly and happily returns to cooperation without holding a grudge. • Be able to retaliate • It never allows defection to go unpunished. • Be clear • It is predictable and easy to understand. It pays to be predictable in non-zero sum games. Computer-Mediated Communication

  18. Considering the “Shadow of the Future” Computer-Mediated Communication

  19. 2-person repeated PD Public Good How is tit-for-tat different in the two types of situations? • N-person PD Computer-Mediated Communication

  20. Some common complaints… • “A theoretical tool cannot explain real life, right?” • “Hey, isnt this rational choice?” (Picture courtesy vismod.media.mit.edu) Computer-Mediated Communication

  21. The Value Fallacy: Individuals and Collectives Computer-Mediated Communication

  22. Finding “Roles” in Online Collective Action Behaviors Computer-Mediated Communication

  23. Structural similarity Computer-Mediated Communication

  24. Computer-Mediated Communication

  25. Computer-Mediated Communication

  26. Critique… …some of methods seems too obvious. For example, with the first method, authorline, authors suggest that they can find 'answer person' by finding users who only answers rather than start new threads. Isn't it a 'definition' of 'answer person'? :(However, I think utilizing multiple signatures is a good approach to deal with varying levels of relations between users' actual behavior and structural consequences. -Chulki L. Computer-Mediated Communication

  27. Revisiting our earlier question…Where does this apply to CMC? Del.ic.ious Computer-Mediated Communication

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