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Hydrogen Applications in the Aircraft Industry

Hydrogen Applications in the Aircraft Industry. Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004. Gerhard Klein & Bernd Zapf (gerhard.klein/bernd.zapf@tuev-sued.de) TÜV Industrie Service GmbH TÜV SÜD Group, Germany. Contents.

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Hydrogen Applications in the Aircraft Industry

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  1. Hydrogen Applications in the Aircraft Industry Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004 Gerhard Klein & Bernd Zapf (gerhard.klein/bernd.zapf@tuev-sued.de) TÜV Industrie Service GmbH TÜV SÜD Group, Germany

  2. Contents • Basic Properties of Hydrogen and its Application for Aircrafts • Basic Aspects of Risk and Safety • Automotive Industry • Tolerable Risk Targets for Hydrogen in the Aircraft Sector • Implementation of Risk Strategy Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  3. Conventional Aircraft Power Architecture Aircraft Power Sources Aircraft Main Power Consumers Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  4. Methane Gasoline Diesel fuel Propane Kerosene Methanol Hydrogen (g) (l) (l) (g) (l) (l) (g) Vapor density 0.55 3.2-4 7 1.56 about 1.5 1.4 0.09 relative to air Flammability limit (Vol.%) 5-16 0.6-8 0.6-6.5 2-10 0.6-7.0 6-36.5 4-75 Ignition temperature (°C) 595 220-280 220 460 about 500 455 585 min. ignition energy (mJ) 0.3 0.24 ./. 0.26 about 0.16 0.14 0.02 g = gaseousl = liquid Some properties of hydrogen and other fuels Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  5. Hydrogen – Current Applications Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  6. Hydrogen Technology for Aerospace Fuel Cell in space Apollo Fuel Cell as APU Combustion Engine Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  7. Fuel cells for Aircrafts – Why? ´More efficient power supply - due to FC technology • Low emissions - significant NOx reduction on ground and in flight • Low noise - excellent potential for significant on ground noise reduction • Fuel economy - up to 75% Fuel Reduction on ground - about 30% Fuel Reduction in flight • Heat production • Water production Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  8. 4e- 4e- 2H2 O2 2H2O Fuel Cells as Auxiliary Power Systems Performance evaluation shows two favorable fuel cell processes for aircraft applications: • Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell – PEMFC • Solid Oxide Fuel Cell – SOFC SOFC PEMFC T  800°C – 1000°C T  60°C – 80°C Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  9. PEMFC SOFC Operating Temperature approx. 60 – 80°C approx. 800 – 1000°C Efficiency up to 40% up to 60% Fuel kerosene kerosene Fuel Processing no residual contamination residual contamination tolerable Carbon Monoxide CO must be removed less susceptible to CO Sulfur sulfur must be removed less susceptible to sulfur Power Density < 1kg/kW < 1kg/kW Maturity Level pending on system concept improvement necessary Main characteristics of Fuel Cells Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  10. Utilization of hydrogen onboard GH2 for Fuel Cell • Insulated tanks with: • high mass • high cost • shelf life of LH2 marginal - pressurized tanks • Reformer • GH2 filters • conv. Fuel tanks GH2 Hydrocarbons LH2 Veff 400 l/kg(H2) Weff  24.2 kg/kg(H2) Veff 15 l/kg(H2) Weff  7.5 kg/kg(H2) Depending on process @ 30bar Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  11. Water Steam Hydrogen rich gas Air Kerosene Kerosene reforming process The main advantages of reforming kerosene onboard the aircraft are: • high density fuel (4 times higher than LH2) • easily storable • only one fuel type (kerosene) onboard There are several reforming processes: 3) Autothermal Reforming 2) Partial Oxidation 1) Steam Reforming Water Steam Heat Hydrogen rich gas Air Kerosene Hydrogen rich gas Kerosene Heat Temperature: 700 °C Pressure: 2,5 bar – 30 bar Temperature: 1300 °C Pressure: 30 bar – 70 bar Temperature: 700 °C Pressure: 1 bar Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  12. Safety / Optimization Risk Assessment System Analysis Rules and Regulations Social Requirements Results fromResearch and Development Experience from operation Quality Standards Safety Concepts Explicit rules for a new technology ´Synthesis ´Analysis ´Requirements ´Basis Targets:’Acceptance on the part of public and authorities’Acceptable safety

  13. Our Services for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Applications • Safety consultancy • Expertise • Certification • Qualification, Tests • Training • Safety • Quality • Reliability • Economic efficiency

  14. Safety in commercial aircrafts • Procedure: • Identify hazards, perform a fault hazard analysis • Trace back the hazards to components & their failure modes • Assign a reliability target to each hazard • Design and manufacture component according to this reliability rates using single element integrity, fail-safe-design, ... • This procedure has proven to be very successful in the past because • commercial aircraft designs don’t change considerably over time • commercial aircraft industry is very conservative in design approaches • commercial aircraft is tightly regulated Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  15. Safety aspects – Strategies and requirements Strategies for the implementation of “new” technology or “old” technology in a new context • Requirements derived from • experiences with similar technology in related areas of application • codes, technical rules • “State of the art” well defined • Requirements derived from • system analysis (probabilities of failures and their consequences) •  Main weak-points are identified •  Suitable counter-measures can be taken What‘s the situation for hydrogen? Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  16. Rules - Codes and Standards 97/23/ECpressure equipment directive 94/9/EC“ATEX directive“ 73/23/EEClow voltage directive 89/336/EECelectromagnetic compatibility 98/37/ECindustrial machinery directive IEC TC 105fuel cell technologies IEC 62282 fuel cell technologies ISO TC 197Hydrogen Technologies ANSI/CSA FC 1-2004 stationary Fuel Cell Power Systems Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  17. Stationary H2 Applications Solar Hydrogen Plant H2MUC MTU PAFC / SOFC / div. PEM / MCFC Mobile H2 Applications DaimlerChrysler / VW / BMW / MAN / Proton Motor / Opel / Ford Portable H2 Applications (FC) Smart Fuel Cell, P21, EnKat, Fronius Experiences of TÜV SÜD LPG, CNG mobile and stationary applications since 1975 Precommercial Phase Standards 1990 1995 2000 2005

  18. 1st conclusion • Experiences with hydrogen in the automotive and other sectors are only partly of use for aircrafts with respect to - technical boundary conditions and - qualification of users • Standardization is on the way, but - there is no obvious cooperation of the “big 2 players” - the example of automotive industry shows that standardization takes some time Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  19. Tasks Therefore, the following questions arise: - How can we push forward the introduction of hydrogen, simultaneously demonstrating it is “safe”, i. e. free from unacceptable risk? - What is the residual risk for occupants or flight crew? - Will it be accepted by the authorities (and the public)? - How safe is safe enough? What is risk? Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  20. Risk = Frequency x Consequence not acceptable Risk = const. log (Frequency) Risk = const. acceptable log (Consequence) What is risk? – Risk Analysis Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  21. Barriers (defenses to the potential escalation of a critical event) • internal • external Critical event limited defects of barriers E/E/PE safety-related systems Other technology safety-related systems External risk reduction facilities Hazard State Circumstantial / procedural barriers (e.g. operating instructions, unplanned yet beneficial circumstances) Consequence Performance of Risk Analysis Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  22. IEC 61508: Safety requirements For each hazard state we have to specify the necessary risk reduction in order to determine the safety integrity1 requirements for the safety-related systems involved: (from IEC 61508, part 5) 1safety integrity: probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all stated conditions within a stated period of time. Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  23. AMC 25.1309 / AC 25.1309-1 What is the “necessary risk reduction” in aircraft industry? • No single failure will result in a Catastrophic Failure Condition • Each Catastrophic Failure Condition is extremely impossible Dealing with hydrogen, we can have catastrophic failure conditions, e. g. leakage of hydrogen to the environment which is not detected by the sensors. So we have to avoid corresponding single failures and have to show that these conditions are extremely impossible Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  24. Allowable Quantitative Probability: Average Probability per Flight Hour on the Order of < 10-9 Catastrophic AMC 25.1309 / AC 25.1309-1 Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  25. AMC 25.1309 / AC 25.1309-1 If it is not technologically or economically practicable to meet the numerical criteria for a Catastrophic Failure Condition, the safety objective may be met by accomplishing all of the following: (1) Utilizing well proven methods for the design and construction of the system (“deterministic approach”) and (2) Determining the Average Probability per Flight Hour of each Failure Condition using structured methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis, or Dependency Diagrams (“probabilistic approach”) ; and (3) Demonstrating that the sum of the Average Probabilities per Flight Hour of all Catastrophic Failure Conditions caused by systems is of the order of 10-7 or less Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  26. AMC 25.1309 / AC 25.1309-1 If it is not technologically or economically practicable to meet the numerical criteria for a Catastrophic Failure Condition, the safety objective may be met by accomplishing all of the following: (1) Utilising well proven methods for the design and construction of the system (“deterministic approach”) and (2) Determining the Average Probability per Flight Hour of each Failure Condition using structured methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis, or Dependency Diagrams (“probabilistic approach”) ; and (3) Demonstrating that the sum of the Average Probabilities per Flight Hour of all Catastrophic Failure Conditions caused by systems is of the order of 10-7 or less Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  27. Proven methods Failures and Hazards – Scenarios (Munich Airport) Mechanical Stresses Explosion / Fire Human Error • Accident involving a H2 Vehicle • Separation of H2 • supply lines during filling Technical Failures • Deviations of process • parameters • H2 release from safety • valves • Leakage, loss of • containment Environmental Stresses Outdoor installation Overfilling

  28. Hydrogen (LH2) Gasoline Proven methods Consequences – Fire tests with Hydrogen and Gasoline Tank

  29. Proven methods Human Factor • Operating instructions • Alarm and danger avoidance plan • Short briefings • Regular trainings • Maintenance strategy

  30. Proven methods General safety equipment for the overall plant • Leak proof design of components, suitable materials • Defined explosion zones and safety areas • Dominant P&I system • Emergency-off control-switch system • Specific process parameters monitored • non technical measures • Gas + Fire alarm system • Infrared camera

  31. AMC 25.1309 / AC 25.1309-1 If it is not technologically or economically practicable to meet the numerical criteria for a Catastrophic Failure Condition, the safety objective may be met by accomplishing all of the following: (1) Utilising well proven methods for the design and construction of the system (“deterministic approach”) and (2) Determining the Average Probability per Flight Hour of each Failure Condition using structured methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis, or Dependency Diagrams (“probabilistic approach”) ; and (3) Demonstrating that the sum of the Average Probabilities per Flight Hour of all Catastrophic Failure Conditions caused by systems is of the order of 10-7 or less Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  32. Apportionment of quantitative requirements Determining the Probability – Causal Analysis Logical OR-Gate Logical AND-Gate Basic event („= component + failure mode“) Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  33. IEC 61508: Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for E/E/PES For E/E/PES we expect that SIL 3 or 2 should be sufficient (see IEC 61508-1, 7.6.2.9). Existing sensors, PLC, and fire protection systems should be able to fulfil these requirements Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  34. “Playing with numbers” LNG-data (Center for Chemical Process Safety) Further assumptions:  (Logic system) = 10-7/h; Test period: 1 year Series connection SIL 1 (maybe not sufficient) Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  35. 2nd conclusion • There seem to be no fundamental difficulties with the introduction of hydrogen for aircrafts • More detailed analyses of the - process technology to be used, - E/E/PES, - state of the art of components and systems- organizational measures - Optimized strategies for maintenance and repair - Regular inspections- Training of personnel are still necessary to guarantee the required level of safety • Learning from existing solutions is encouraged Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  36. Hydrogen Technology – Ready for Take-off with TÜV Aerospace gerhard.klein@tuev-sued.de Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

  37. The Fourth Triennial International Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference The Fourth Triennial International Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference Lisbon, Portugal 15-18 November 2004

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