1 / 28

The Doha Development Agenda

The Doha Development Agenda. Yvan Decreux 1 , Lionel Fontagné 2 WTO , November 2, 2010 1: CEPII, ITC 2: CEPII, University Paris 1. July 2008 package. Based on two different studies

carrington
Télécharger la présentation

The Doha Development Agenda

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. The Doha Development Agenda Yvan Decreux1, Lionel Fontagné2 WTO, November 2, 2010 1: CEPII, ITC 2: CEPII, University Paris 1

  2. July 2008 package Based on two different studies • Decreux, Y. & Fontagné, L. (2009). Economic Impact of potential outcome of the DDA, CEPII Research Report 2009-01 More comprehensive: includes trade facilitation • Decreux, Y. (2009). Effets d’un accord commercial multilatéral sur la base des propositions de décembre 2008, Report for the French Government More recent: • Includes precisions added in the December 08 package (anti-concentration clause and other elements related to sensitive products) • Some technical improvements • More sector details in agriculture

  3. Downloadable Both studies downloadable here: https://sites.google.com/site/ydecreux/

  4. Subjects covered • Agriculture • NAMA • Services • Trade facilitation

  5. Agriculture • Domestic support: mostly the US and EFTA • Export subsidies • US, EU • Agreement found long ago • Tariffs: EU, EFTA, Japan

  6. NAMA • Tariffs only • Most efforts to be made by developing countries (despite special and differential treatment) • But many are exempt of actual tariff reductions: Small and Vulnerable Economies, LDCs

  7. Export subsidies • Not really damaging in a deterministic world (stable prices and production), except for countries strongly specialised in agriculture • The world is not deterministic, especially in agriculture • Export subsidies (and tariffs) used to moderate internal instability, to the expense of other countries • Early agreement to phase out all export subsidies by 2013

  8. Modelling • Based on the Mirage model (CEPII) + MAcMap data (ITC, CEPII) • Some data missing (historical AMS for instance) → relied on INRA work (J-C Bureau, J-P Butault) for static impact • Inflation and growth: all commitments (except de minimis) expressed in LCU

  9. Inflation issue (illustrated)

  10. Inflation issue (continued) • Not taking it into account leads to • Overestimate the effect of export subsidy suppression • Underestimate the effect of domestic support reduction • Overall, broadly neutral on agricultural production as a whole for the EU, but significant differences at the product level (milk, sugar)

  11. Tariff reductions • Agriculture: tiered formulas • Sensitive products (tariff-rate quotas) • Special products • Tariff escalation issue • Tropical products • NAMA: Swiss formulas • Sensitive products for developing countries • Anti-concentration clause

  12. Implementation • Formulas applied to bound tariffs, at the HS6 level (MAcMap-HS6 2004) • Impact on applied tariffs • Aggregated at the sector and region level

  13. Other subjects • Services • Developed and emerging countries, on a free basis • Much less quantified at this stage • Trade facilitation • Potential source of significant gains • Not really a negotiation issue

  14. Mirage • Computable General Equilibrium Model of the World economy • Sequential dynamics setting • Capital accumulation • Exogenous labour, population and TFP growth • Exogenous labour supply & unemployment • Based on GTAP, MAcMap and other data sources (ILO, IMF, ...)

  15. Scenarios • Goods: December 08 proposals • Services: • Study 1: 3% cut for country participating in the specific negotiations on services • Study 2: 10% cut of the estimated ad-valorem equivalent of barriers to services trade, all countries except Sub-Saharan Africa and Rest of the World (mostly non-WTO members) → really optimistic

  16. World welfare

  17. Welfare: industrialized regions

  18. Welfare: Asia

  19. Welfare: Latin America

  20. Welfare losses

  21. Sources of gains / losses • Allocation efficiency: gains especially generated on high tariffs • Terms of trade: balance of concessions & preference erosion • Capital accumulation

  22. Employment in agricultural sectors

  23. NAMA exports (selected, bn USD)

  24. NAMA production (selected, bn USD)

  25. Trade facilitation • Based on estimates of time spent to export and import, by Minor and Tsigas • Time spent at the port supposed to partially converge to the median performance, for all countries over that median • No reduction of transport cost assumed • Expressed as an iceberg cost • Minor P. & Tsigas M. 2008. “Impacts of Better Trade Facilitation in Developing Countries, Analysis with a New GTAP Database for the Value of Time in Trade”, GTAP 11th Conference, Helsinki. • USAID 2007. “Calculating Tariff Equivalents for Time in Trade”, March

  26. Trade facilitation impact • Adds almost 100 bn USD gain per year (from 68 bn to 167 bn) • Especially favorable to developing countries, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa • Lack of a clear commitment by all partners to let trade facilitation benefits be an outcome of Doha negotiations

  27. Limitations of the methodology • Actual impacts of export subsidies not properly measured in a deterministic framework • Preference erosion may be overestimated: rules of origin actually reduce current preference benefits + importance of the EU in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to decrease more quickly than projected • Impact on poverty and inequality not assessed • Possible impact of trade competition on productivity not accounted for

  28. Conclusion • Balanced proposal, employment in agriculture rises in developing countries • Concern on preference erosion • Conservative estimates: benefits expected to be at least as large as the ones mentioned • Current situation corresponds to a non-cooperative equilibrium

More Related